wealbk05-第37节
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页,按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页,按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部!
————未阅读完?加入书签已便下次继续阅读!
corporate in the kingdom; and arises almost altogether; either
from the rent of houses; or from what is supposed to be the
interest of trading and capital stock。 According to the
estimation; therefore; by which Great Britain is rated to the
land…tax; the whole mass of revenue arising from the rent of all
the lands; from that of all the houses; and from the interest of
all the capital stock; that part of it only excepted which is
either lent to the public; or employed in the cultivation of
land; does not exceed ten millions sterling a year; the ordinary
revenue which government levies upon the people even in peaceable
times。 The estimation by which Great Britain is rated to the
land…tax is; no doubt; taking the whole kingdom at an average;
very much below the real value; though in several particular
counties and districts it is said to be nearly equal to that
value。 The rent of the lands alone; exclusively of that of
houses; and of the interest of stock; has by many people been
estimated at twenty millions; an estimation made in a great
measure at random; and which; I apprehend; is as likely to be
above as below the truth。 But if the lands of Great Britain; in
the present state of their cultivation; do not afford a rent of
more than twenty millions a year; they could not well afford the
half; most probably not the fourth part of that rent; if they all
belonged to a single proprietor; and were put under the
negligent; expensive; and oppressive management of his factors
and agents。 The crown lands of Great Britain do not at present
afford the fourth part of the rent which could probably be drawn
from them if they were the property of private persons。 If the
crown lands were more extensive; it is probable they would be
still worse managed。
The revenue which the great body of the people derives from
land is in proportion; not to the rent; but to the produce of the
land。 The whole annual produce of the land of every country; if
we except what is reserved for seed; is either annually consumed
by the great body of the people; or exchanged for something else
that is consumed by them。 Whatever keeps down the produce of the
land below what it would otherwise rise to keeps down the revenue
of the great body of the people still more than it does that of
the proprietors of land。 The rent of land; that portion of the
produce which belongs to the proprietors; is scarce anywhere in
Great Britain supposed to be more than a third part of the whole
produce。 If the land which in one state of cultivation affords a
rent of ten millions sterling a year would in another afford a
rent of twenty millions; the rent being; in both cases; supposed
a third part of the produce; the revenue of the proprietors would
be less than it otherwise might be by ten millions a year only;
but the revenue of the great body of the people would be less
than it otherwise might be by thirty millions a year; deducting
only what would be necessary for seed。 The population of the
country would be less by the number of people which thirty
millions a year; deducting always the seed; could maintain
according to the particular mode of living and expense which
might take place in the different ranks of men among whom the
remainder was distributed。
Though there is not at present; in Europe; any civilised
state of any kind which derives the greater part of its public
revenue from the rent of lands which are the property of the
state; yet in all the great monarchies of Europe there are still
many large tracts of land which belong to the crown。 They are
generally forest; and sometimes forest where; after travelling
several miles; you will scarce find a single tree; a mere waste
and loss of country in respect both of produce and population。 In
every great monarchy of Europe the sale of the crown lands would
produce a very large sum of money; which; if applied to the
payment of the public debts; would deliver from mortgage a much
greater revenue than any which those lands have ever afforded to
the crown。 In countries where lands; improved and cultivated very
highly; and yielding at the time of sale as great a rent as can
easily be got from them; commonly sell at thirty years' purchase;
the unimproved; uncultivated; and low…rented crown lands might
well be expected to sell at forty; fifty; or sixty years'
purchase。 The crown might immediately enjoy the revenue which
this great price would redeem from mortgage。 In the course of a
few years it would probably enjoy another revenue。 When the crown
lands had become private property; they would; in the course of a
few years; become well improved and well cultivated。 The increase
of their produce would increase the population of the country by
augmenting the revenue and consumption of the people。 But the
revenue which the crown derives from the duties of customs and
excise would necessarily increase with the revenue and
consumption of the people。
The revenue which; in any civilised monarchy; the crown
derives from the crown lands; though it appears to cost nothing
to individuals; in reality costs more to the society than perhaps
any other equal revenue which the crown enjoys。 It would; in all
cases; be for the interest of the society to replace this revenue
to the crown by some other equal revenue; and to divide the lands
among the people; which could not well be done better; perhaps;
than by exposing them to public sale。
Lands for the purposes of pleasure and magnificence… parks;
gardens; public walks; etc。; possessions which are everywhere
considered as causes of expense; not as sources of revenue… seem
to be the only lands which; in a great and civilised monarchy;
ought to belong to the crown。
Public stock and public lands; therefore; the two sources of
revenue which may peculiarly belong to the sovereign or
commonwealth; being both improper and insufficient funds for
defraying the necessary expense of any great and civilised state;
it remains that this expense must; the greater part of it; be
defrayed by taxes of one kind or another; the people contributing
a part of their own private revenue in order to make up a public
revenue to the sovereign or commonwealth。
PART 2
Of Taxes
THE private revenue of individuals; it has been shown in the
first book of this Inquiry; arises ultimately from three
different sources: Rent; Profit; and Wages。 Every tax must
finally be paid from some one or other of those three different
sorts of revenue; or from all of them indifferently。 I shall
endeavour to give the best account I can; first; of those taxes
which; it is intended; should fall upon rent; secondly; of those
which; it is intended; should fall upon profit; thirdly; of those
which; it is intended; should fall upon wages; and; fourthly; of
those which; it is intended; should fall indifferently upon all
those three different sources of private revenue。 The particular
consideration of each of these four different sorts of taxes will
divide the second part of the present chapter into four articles;
three of which will require several other subdivisions。 Many of
those taxes; it will appear from the following review; are not
finally paid from the fund; or source of revenue; upon which it
was intended they should fall。
Before I enter upon the examination of particular taxes; it
is necessary to premise the four following maxims with regard to
taxes in general。
I。 The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards
the support of the government; as nearly as possible; in
proportion to their respective abilities; that is; in proportion
to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection
of the state。 The expense of government to the individuals of a
great nation is like the expense of management to the joint
tenants of a great estate; who are all obliged to contribute in
proportion to their respective interests in the estate。 In the
observation or neglect of this maxim consists what is called the
equality or inequality of taxation。 Every tax; it must be
observed once for all; which falls finally upon one only of the
three sorts of revenue above mentioned; is necessarily unequal in
so far as it does not affect the other two。 In the following
examination of different taxes I shall seldom take much further
notice of this sort of inequality; but shall; in most cases;
confine my observations to that inequality which is occasioned by
a particular tax falling unequally even upon that particular sort
of private revenue which is affected by it。
II。 The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to
be certain; and not arbitrary。 The time of payment; the manner of
payment; the quantity to be paid; ought all to be clear and plain
to the contributor; and to every other person。 Where it is
otherwise; every person subject to the tax is