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monies which they shall receive from the company; they are

allowed a sum not exceeding eight hundred pounds for the salaries

of their clerks and agents at London; Bristol; and Liverpool; the

house rent of their office at London; and all other expenses of

management; commission; and agency in England。 What remains of

this sum; after defraying these different expenses; they may

divide among themselves; as compensation for their trouble; in

what manner they think proper。 By this constitution; it might

have been expected that the spirit of monopoly would have been

effectually restrained; and the first of these purposes

sufficiently answered。 It would seem; however; that it had not。

Though by the 4th of George III; c。 20; the fort of Senegal; with

all its dependencies; had been vested in the company of merchants

trading to Africa; yet in the year following (by the 5th of

George III; c。 44) not only Senegal and its dependencies; but the

whole coast from the port of Sallee; in south Barbary; to Cape

Rouge; was exempted from the jurisdiction of that company; was

vested in the crown; and the trade to it declared free to all his

Majesty's subjects。 The company had been suspected of restraining

the trade; and of establishing some sort of improper monopoly。 It

is not; however; very easy to conceive how; under the regulations

of the 23rd of George II; they could do so。 In the printed

debates of the House of Commons; not always the most authentic

records of truth; I observe; however; that they have been accused

of this。 The members of the committee of nine; being all

merchants; and the governors and factors; in their different

forts and settlements; being all dependent upon them; it is not

unlikely that the latter might have given peculiar attention to

the consignments and commissions of the former which would

establish a real monopoly。

     For the second of these; purposes; the maintenance of the

forts and garrisons; an annual sum has been allotted to them by

Parliament; generally about L13;000。 For the proper application

of this sum; the committee is obliged to account annually to the

Cursitor Baron of Exchequer; which account is afterwards to be

laid before Parliament。 But Parliament; which gives so little

attention to the application of millions; is not likely to give

much to that of L13;000 a year; and the Cursitor Baron of

Exchequer; from his profession and education; is not likely to be

profoundly skilled in the proper expense of forts and garrisons。

The captains of his Majesty's navy; indeed; or any other

commissioned officers appointed by the Board of Admiralty; may

inquire into the condition of the forts and garrisons; and report

their observations to that board。 But that board seems to have no

direct jurisdiction over the committee; nor any authority to

correct those whose conduct it may thus inquire into; and the

captains of his Majesty's navy; besides; are not supposed to be

always deeply learned in the science of fortification。 Removal

from an office which can be enjoyed only for the term of three

years; and of which the lawful emoluments; even during that term;

are so very small; seems to be the utmost punishment to which any

committee…man is liable for any fault; except direct

malversation; or embezzlement; either of the public money; or of

that of the company; and the fear of that punishment can never be

a motive of sufficient weight to force a continual and careful

attention to a business to which he has no other interest to

attend。 The committee are accused of having sent out bricks and

stones from England for the reparation of Cape Coast Castle on

the coast of Guinea; a business for which Parliament had several

times granted an extraordinary sum of money。 These bricks and

stones too; which had thus been sent upon so long a voyage; were

said to have been of so bad a quality that it was necessary to

rebuild from the foundation the walls which had been repaired

with them。 The forts and garrisons which lie north of Cape Rouge

are not only maintained at the expense of the state; but are

under the immediate government of the executive power; and why

those which lie south of that Cape; and which are; in part at

least; maintained at the expense of the state; should be under a

different government; it seems not very easy even to imagine a

good reason。 The protection of the Mediterranean trade was the

original purpose of pretence of the garrisons of Gibraltar and

Minorca; and the maintenance and government of those garrisons

has always been; very properly; committed; not to the Turkey

Company; but to the executive power。 In the extent of its

dominion consists; in a great measure; the pride and dignity of

that power; and it is not very likely to fail in attention to

what is necessary for the defence of that dominion。 The garrisons

at Gibraltar and Minorca; accordingly; have never been neglected;

though Minorca has been twice taken; and is now probably lost for

ever; that disaster was never even imputed to any neglect in the

executive power。 I would not; however; be understood to insinuate

that either of those expensive garrisons was ever; even in the

smallest degree; necessary for the purpose for which they were

originally dismembered from the Spanish monarchy。 That

dismemberment; perhaps; never served any other real purpose than

to alienate from England her natural ally the King of Spain; and

to unite the two principal branches of the house of Bourbon in a

much stricter and more permanent alliance than the ties of blood

could ever have united them。

     Joint stock companies; established by Royal Charter or by

Act of Parliament; differ in several respects; not only from

regulated companies; but from private copartneries。

     First; in a private copartnery; no partner; without the

consent of the company; can transfer his share to another person;

or introduce a new member into the company。 Each member; however;

may; upon proper warning; withdraw from the copartnery; and

demand payment from them of his share of the common stock。 In a

joint stock company; on the contrary; no member can demand

payment of his share from the company; but each member can;

without their consent; transfer his share to another person; and

thereby introduce a new member。 The value of a share in a joint

stock is always the price which it will bring in the market; and

this may be either greater or less; in any proportion; than the

sum which its owner stands credited for in the stock of the

company。

     Secondly; in a private copartnery; each partner is bound for

the debts contracted by the company to the whole extent of his

fortune。 In a joint stock company; on the contrary; each partner

is bound only to the extent of his share。

     The trade of a joint stock company is always managed by a

court of directors。 This court; indeed; is frequently subject; in

many respects; to the control of a general court of proprietors。

But the greater part of those proprietors seldom pretend to

understand anything of the business of the company; and when the

spirit of faction happens not to prevail among them; give

themselves no trouble about it; but receive contentedly such

half…yearly or yearly dividend as the directors think proper to

make to them。 This total exemption from trouble and from risk;

beyond a limited sum; encourages many people to become

adventurers in joint stock companies; who would; upon no account;

hazard their fortunes in any private copartnery。 Such companies;

therefore; commonly draw to themselves much greater stocks than

any private copartnery can boast of。 The trading stock of the

South Sea Company; at one time; amounted to upwards of

thirty…three millions eight hundred thousand pounds。 The divided

capital of the Bank of England amounts; at present; to ten

millions seven hundred and eighty thousand pounds。 The directors

of such companies; however; being the managers rather of other

people's money than of their own; it cannot well be expected that

they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with

which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over

their own。 Like the stewards of a rich man; they are apt to

consider attention to small matters as not for their master's

honour; and very easily give themselves a dispensation from

having it。 Negligence and profusion; therefore; must always

prevail; more or less; in the management of the affairs of such a

company。 It is upon this account that joint stock companies for

foreign trade have seldom been able to maintain the competition

against private adventurers。 They have; accordingly; very seldom

succeeded without an exclusive privilege; and frequently have not

succeeded with one。 Without an exclusive privilege they have

commonly mismanaged the trade。 With an exclusive privilege they

have both mismanaged and confined it。

     The Royal African Company; the predecessors of 

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