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monies　which　they　shall　receive　from　the　company；　they　are

allowed　a　sum　not　exceeding　eight　hundred　pounds　for　the　salaries

of　their　clerks　and　agents　at　London；　Bristol；　and　Liverpool；　the

house　rent　of　their　office　at　London；　and　all　other　expenses　of

management；　commission；　and　agency　in　England。　What　remains　of

this　sum；　after　defraying　these　different　expenses；　they　may

divide　among　themselves；　as　compensation　for　their　trouble；　in

what　manner　they　think　proper。　By　this　constitution；　it　might

have　been　expected　that　the　spirit　of　monopoly　would　have　been

effectually　restrained；　and　the　first　of　these　purposes

sufficiently　answered。　It　would　seem；　however；　that　it　had　not。

Though　by　the　4th　of　George　III；　c。　20；　the　fort　of　Senegal；　with

all　its　dependencies；　had　been　vested　in　the　company　of　merchants

trading　to　Africa；　yet　in　the　year　following　（by　the　5th　of

George　III；　c。　44）　not　only　Senegal　and　its　dependencies；　but　the

whole　coast　from　the　port　of　Sallee；　in　south　Barbary；　to　Cape

Rouge；　was　exempted　from　the　jurisdiction　of　that　company；　was

vested　in　the　crown；　and　the　trade　to　it　declared　free　to　all　his

Majesty's　subjects。　The　company　had　been　suspected　of　restraining

the　trade；　and　of　establishing　some　sort　of　improper　monopoly。　It

is　not；　however；　very　easy　to　conceive　how；　under　the　regulations

of　the　23rd　of　George　II；　they　could　do　so。　In　the　printed

debates　of　the　House　of　Commons；　not　always　the　most　authentic

records　of　truth；　I　observe；　however；　that　they　have　been　accused

of　this。　The　members　of　the　committee　of　nine；　being　all

merchants；　and　the　governors　and　factors；　in　their　different

forts　and　settlements；　being　all　dependent　upon　them；　it　is　not

unlikely　that　the　latter　might　have　given　peculiar　attention　to

the　consignments　and　commissions　of　the　former　which　would

establish　a　real　monopoly。

　　　　　For　the　second　of　these；　purposes；　the　maintenance　of　the

forts　and　garrisons；　an　annual　sum　has　been　allotted　to　them　by

Parliament；　generally　about　L13；000。　For　the　proper　application

of　this　sum；　the　committee　is　obliged　to　account　annually　to　the

Cursitor　Baron　of　Exchequer；　which　account　is　afterwards　to　be

laid　before　Parliament。　But　Parliament；　which　gives　so　little

attention　to　the　application　of　millions；　is　not　likely　to　give

much　to　that　of　L13；000　a　year；　and　the　Cursitor　Baron　of

Exchequer；　from　his　profession　and　education；　is　not　likely　to　be

profoundly　skilled　in　the　proper　expense　of　forts　and　garrisons。

The　captains　of　his　Majesty's　navy；　indeed；　or　any　other

commissioned　officers　appointed　by　the　Board　of　Admiralty；　may

inquire　into　the　condition　of　the　forts　and　garrisons；　and　report

their　observations　to　that　board。　But　that　board　seems　to　have　no

direct　jurisdiction　over　the　committee；　nor　any　authority　to

correct　those　whose　conduct　it　may　thus　inquire　into；　and　the

captains　of　his　Majesty's　navy；　besides；　are　not　supposed　to　be

always　deeply　learned　in　the　science　of　fortification。　Removal

from　an　office　which　can　be　enjoyed　only　for　the　term　of　three

years；　and　of　which　the　lawful　emoluments；　even　during　that　term；

are　so　very　small；　seems　to　be　the　utmost　punishment　to　which　any

committee…man　is　liable　for　any　fault；　except　direct

malversation；　or　embezzlement；　either　of　the　public　money；　or　of

that　of　the　company；　and　the　fear　of　that　punishment　can　never　be

a　motive　of　sufficient　weight　to　force　a　continual　and　careful

attention　to　a　business　to　which　he　has　no　other　interest　to

attend。　The　committee　are　accused　of　having　sent　out　bricks　and

stones　from　England　for　the　reparation　of　Cape　Coast　Castle　on

the　coast　of　Guinea；　a　business　for　which　Parliament　had　several

times　granted　an　extraordinary　sum　of　money。　These　bricks　and

stones　too；　which　had　thus　been　sent　upon　so　long　a　voyage；　were

said　to　have　been　of　so　bad　a　quality　that　it　was　necessary　to

rebuild　from　the　foundation　the　walls　which　had　been　repaired

with　them。　The　forts　and　garrisons　which　lie　north　of　Cape　Rouge

are　not　only　maintained　at　the　expense　of　the　state；　but　are

under　the　immediate　government　of　the　executive　power；　and　why

those　which　lie　south　of　that　Cape；　and　which　are；　in　part　at

least；　maintained　at　the　expense　of　the　state；　should　be　under　a

different　government；　it　seems　not　very　easy　even　to　imagine　a

good　reason。　The　protection　of　the　Mediterranean　trade　was　the

original　purpose　of　pretence　of　the　garrisons　of　Gibraltar　and

Minorca；　and　the　maintenance　and　government　of　those　garrisons

has　always　been；　very　properly；　committed；　not　to　the　Turkey

Company；　but　to　the　executive　power。　In　the　extent　of　its

dominion　consists；　in　a　great　measure；　the　pride　and　dignity　of

that　power；　and　it　is　not　very　likely　to　fail　in　attention　to

what　is　necessary　for　the　defence　of　that　dominion。　The　garrisons

at　Gibraltar　and　Minorca；　accordingly；　have　never　been　neglected；

though　Minorca　has　been　twice　taken；　and　is　now　probably　lost　for

ever；　that　disaster　was　never　even　imputed　to　any　neglect　in　the

executive　power。　I　would　not；　however；　be　understood　to　insinuate

that　either　of　those　expensive　garrisons　was　ever；　even　in　the

smallest　degree；　necessary　for　the　purpose　for　which　they　were

originally　dismembered　from　the　Spanish　monarchy。　That

dismemberment；　perhaps；　never　served　any　other　real　purpose　than

to　alienate　from　England　her　natural　ally　the　King　of　Spain；　and

to　unite　the　two　principal　branches　of　the　house　of　Bourbon　in　a

much　stricter　and　more　permanent　alliance　than　the　ties　of　blood

could　ever　have　united　them。

　　　　　Joint　stock　companies；　established　by　Royal　Charter　or　by

Act　of　Parliament；　differ　in　several　respects；　not　only　from

regulated　companies；　but　from　private　copartneries。

　　　　　First；　in　a　private　copartnery；　no　partner；　without　the

consent　of　the　company；　can　transfer　his　share　to　another　person；

or　introduce　a　new　member　into　the　company。　Each　member；　however；

may；　upon　proper　warning；　withdraw　from　the　copartnery；　and

demand　payment　from　them　of　his　share　of　the　common　stock。　In　a

joint　stock　company；　on　the　contrary；　no　member　can　demand

payment　of　his　share　from　the　company；　but　each　member　can；

without　their　consent；　transfer　his　share　to　another　person；　and

thereby　introduce　a　new　member。　The　value　of　a　share　in　a　joint

stock　is　always　the　price　which　it　will　bring　in　the　market；　and

this　may　be　either　greater　or　less；　in　any　proportion；　than　the

sum　which　its　owner　stands　credited　for　in　the　stock　of　the

company。

　　　　　Secondly；　in　a　private　copartnery；　each　partner　is　bound　for

the　debts　contracted　by　the　company　to　the　whole　extent　of　his

fortune。　In　a　joint　stock　company；　on　the　contrary；　each　partner

is　bound　only　to　the　extent　of　his　share。

　　　　　The　trade　of　a　joint　stock　company　is　always　managed　by　a

court　of　directors。　This　court；　indeed；　is　frequently　subject；　in

many　respects；　to　the　control　of　a　general　court　of　proprietors。

But　the　greater　part　of　those　proprietors　seldom　pretend　to

understand　anything　of　the　business　of　the　company；　and　when　the

spirit　of　faction　happens　not　to　prevail　among　them；　give

themselves　no　trouble　about　it；　but　receive　contentedly　such

half…yearly　or　yearly　dividend　as　the　directors　think　proper　to

make　to　them。　This　total　exemption　from　trouble　and　from　risk；

beyond　a　limited　sum；　encourages　many　people　to　become

adventurers　in　joint　stock　companies；　who　would；　upon　no　account；

hazard　their　fortunes　in　any　private　copartnery。　Such　companies；

therefore；　commonly　draw　to　themselves　much　greater　stocks　than

any　private　copartnery　can　boast　of。　The　trading　stock　of　the

South　Sea　Company；　at　one　time；　amounted　to　upwards　of

thirty…three　millions　eight　hundred　thousand　pounds。　The　divided

capital　of　the　Bank　of　England　amounts；　at　present；　to　ten

millions　seven　hundred　and　eighty　thousand　pounds。　The　directors

of　such　companies；　however；　being　the　managers　rather　of　other

people's　money　than　of　their　own；　it　cannot　well　be　expected　that

they　should　watch　over　it　with　the　same　anxious　vigilance　with

which　the　partners　in　a　private　copartnery　frequently　watch　over

their　own。　Like　the　stewards　of　a　rich　man；　they　are　apt　to

consider　attention　to　small　matters　as　not　for　their　master's

honour；　and　very　easily　give　themselves　a　dispensation　from

having　it。　Negligence　and　profusion；　therefore；　must　always

prevail；　more　or　less；　in　the　management　of　the　affairs　of　such　a

company。　It　is　upon　this　account　that　joint　stock　companies　for

foreign　trade　have　seldom　been　able　to　maintain　the　competition

against　private　adventurers。　They　have；　accordingly；　very　seldom

succeeded　without　an　exclusive　privilege；　and　frequently　have　not

succeeded　with　one。　Without　an　exclusive　privilege　they　have

commonly　mismanaged　the　trade。　With　an　exclusive　privilege　they

have　both　mismanaged　and　confined　it。

　　　　　The　Royal　African　Company；　the　predecessors　of