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other conditions being equal; fainter than an 



emotion towards a thing past。







Proof。… In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent; we are not 



affected by the image of any other thing; which asserts the existence 



of the said thing (IV:Def。iii。); but; on the other hand (by hypothesis); 



we conceive certain things excluding its present existence。 But; in so 



far as we conceive it in relation to time past; we are assumed to 



conceive something; which recalls the thing to memory; or excites the 



image thereof (II:xviii。&Note); which is so far the same as regarding 



it as present (II:xvii。Coroll。)。 Therefore (IV:ix。) an emotion towards a 



thing contingent; which we know does not exist in the present; is fainter; 



other conditions being equal; than an emotion towards a thing past。 Q。E。D。















Prop。 XIV。 A true knowledge of good and evil 



cannot check any emotion by virtue of being true; 



but only in so far as it is considered as an emotion。







Proof。… An emotion is an idea; whereby the mind affirms of its body a 



greater or less force of existing than before (by the general Definition 



of the Emotions); therefore it has no positive quality; which can be 



destroyed by the presence of what is true; consequently the knowledge 



of good and evil cannot; by virtue oi being true; restrain any emotion。  



But; in so far as such knowledge is an emotion (IV:viii。) if it have 



more strength for restraining emotion; it will to that extent be able 



to restrain the given emotion。 Q。E。D。















Prop。 XV。 Desire arising from the 



knowledge of good and bad can be 



quenched or checked by many of the 



other desires arising from the 



emotions whereby we are assailed。







Proof。… From the true knowledge of good and evil; in so far as it is an 



emotion; necessarily arises desire (Def。 of the Emotions; i。); the strength 



of which is proportioned to the strength of the emotion wherefrom it arises 



(III:xxxvii。)。 But; inasmuch as this desire arises (by hypothesis) from the 



fact of our truly understanding anything; it follows that it is also 



present with us; in so far as we are active (III:i。); and must therefore 



be understood through our essence only (III:Def。ii。); consequently 



(III:vii。) its force and increase can be defined solely by human power。 



Again; the desires arising from the emotions whereby we are assailed are 



stronger; in proportion as the said emotions are more vehement; wherefore 



their force and increase must be defined solely by the power of external 



causes; which; when compared with our own power; indefinitely surpass it 



(IV:iii。); hence the desires arising from like emotions may be more 



vehement; than the desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and 



evil; and may; consequently; control or quench it。 Q。E。D。















Prop。 XVI。 Desire arising from the knowledge 



of good and evil; in so far as such knowledge 



regards what is future; may be more easily 



controlled or quenched; than the desire for 



what is agreeable at the present moment。







Proof。… Emotion towards a thing; which we conceive as future; is fainter 



than emotion towards a thing that is present (IV:ix。Coroll。)。 But desire; 



which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil; though it be 



concerned with things which are good at the moment; can be quenched 



or controlled by any headstrong desire (by the last Prop。; the proof 



whereof is of universal application)。 Wherefore desire arising from 



such knowledge; when concerned with the future; can be more easily 



controlled or quenched; &c。 Q。E。D。















Prop。 XVII。 Desire arising from the true 



knowledge of good and evil; in so far as 



such knowledge is concerned with what is 



contingent; can be controlled far more 



easily still; than desire for things 



that are present。







Proof。… This Prop。 is proved in the same way as the last Prop。 from 



IV:xii。Coroll。







Note。… I think I have now shown the reason; why men are moved by opinion 



more readily than by true reason; why it is that the true knowledge of good 



and evil stirs up conflicts in the soul; and often yields to every kind of 



passion。 This state of things gave rise to the exclamation of the poet: 



(Ov。 Met。 vii。20; 〃Video meliora proboque; Deteriora sequor。〃)







    The better path I gaze at and approve; 







   The worse … I follow。〃



Ecclesiastes seems to have had the same thought in his mind; when he says; 



〃He who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow。〃 I have not written the 



above with the object of drawing the conclusion; that ignorance is more 



excellent than knowledge; or that a wise man is on a par with a fool in 



controlling his emotions; but because it is necessary to know the power 



and the infirmity of our nature; before we can determine what reason can 



do in restraining the emotions; and what is beyond her power。 I have said; 



that in the present part I shall merely treat of human infirmity。 The 



power of reason over the emotions I have settled to treat separately。















Prop。 XVIII。 Desire arising from pleasure is; 



other conditions being equal; stronger than 



desire arising from pain。







Proof。… Desire is the essence of a man (Def。 of the Emotions; i。); 



that is; the endeavour whereby a man endeavours to persist in his own 



being。 Wherefore desire arising from pleasure is; by the fact of 



pleasure being felt; increased or helped; on the contrary; desire 



arising from pain is; by the fact of pain being felt; diminished or 



hindered; hence the force of desire arising from pleasure must be 



defined by human power together with the power of an external cause; 



whereas desire arising from pain must be defined by human power only。 



Thus the former is the stronger of the two。 Q。E。D。







Note。… In these few remarks I have explained the causes of human infirmity 



and inconstancy; and shown why men do not abide by the precepts of reason。 



It now remains for me to show what course is marked out for us by reason; 



which of the emotions are in harmony with the rules of human reason; and 



which of them are contrary thereto。







But; before I begin to prove my Propositions in detailed geometrical 



fashion; it is advisable to sketch them briefly in advance; so that 



everyone may more readily grasp my meaning。







As reason makes no demands contrary to nature; it demands; that every 



man should love himself; should seek that which is useful to him … I mean; 



that which is really useful to him; should desire everything which really 



brings man to greater perfection; and should; each for himself; endeavour 



as far as he can to preserve his own being。 This is as necessarily true; 



as that a whole is greater than its part。 (Cf。 III:iv。)







Again; as virtue is nothing else but action in accordance with the 



laws of one's own nature (IV:Def。viii。); and as no one endeavours to 



preserve his own being; except in accordance with the laws of his own 



nature; it follows; first; that the foundation of virtue is the endeavour 



to preserve one's own being; and that happiness consists in man's power 



of preserving; his own being; secondly; that virtue is to be desired for 



its own sake; and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful to 



us; for the sake of which we should desire it; thirdly and lastly that 



suicides are weak…minded; and are overcome by external causes repugnant to 



their nature。 Further; it follows from Postulate iv。 Part。II。; that we can 



never arrive at doing without all external things for the preservation of 



our being or living; so as to have no relations with things 



which are outside ourselves。 Again; if we consider our mind; we see that 



our intellect would be more imperfect; if mind were alone; and could 



understand nothing besides itself。 There are; then; many things outside 



ourselves; which are useful to us; and are; therefore; to be desired。 



Of such none can be discerned more excellent; than those which are in 



entire agreement with our nature。 For if; for example; two individuals 



of entirely the same nature are united; they form a combination twice 



as powerful as either of them singly。







Therefore; to man there is nothing more useful than man … nothing; 



I repeat; more excellent for preserving their being can be wished for 



by men; than that all should so in all points agree; that the minds and 



bodies of all should form; as it were; one single mind and one single 



body; and that all should; with one consent; as far as they are able; 



endeavour to preserve their being; and all with one consent seek what is 



useful to them all。 Hence; men who are governed by reason … that is; who 



seek wha

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