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(In I:xxxiii。note。i。; I drew no distinction between possible and 



contingent; because there was in that place no need to distinguish 



them accurately。)







V。 By conflicting emotions I mean those which draw a man in different 



directions; though they are of the same kind; such as luxury and 



avarice; which are both species of love; and are contraries; not 



by nature; but by accident。







VI。 What I mean by emotion felt towards a thing; future; present; and 



past; I explained in III:xviii。;notes。i。;&ii。; which see。







(But I should here also remark; that we can only distinctly conceive 



distance of space or time up to a certain definite limit; that is; all 



objects distant from us more than two hundred feet; or whose distance 



from the place where we are exceeds that which we can distinctly conceive; 



seem to be an equal distance from us; and all in the same plane; so also 



objects; whose time of existing is conceived as removed from the present 



by a longer interval than we can distinctly conceive; seem to be all 



equally distant from the present; and are set down; as it were; to the 



same moment of time。)







VII。 By an end; for the sake of which we do something; I mean a desire。







VIII。 By virtue (virtus) and power I mean the same thing; that is 



(III:vii。); virtue; in so far as it is referred to man; is a man's 



nature or essence; in so far as it has the power of effecting what 



can only be understood by the laws of that nature。















AXIOM。







There is no individual thing in nature; than which there is not 



another more powerful and strong。 Whatsoever thing be given; there is 



something stronger whereby it can be destroyed。















PROPOSITIONS。



Prop。 I。 No positive quality possessed by a 



false idea is removed by the presence of 



what is true; in virtue of its being true。







Proof。… Falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge which 



inadequate ideas involve (II:xxxv。); nor have they any positive 



quality on account of which they are called false (II:xxxiii。);   contrariwise; in so far as they



are referred to God; they are true 



(II:xxxii。)。  Wherefore; if the positive quality possessed by a false 



idea were removed by the presence of what is true; in virtue of its 



being true; a true idea would then be removed by itself; which 



(IV:iii。) is absurd。 Therefore; no positive quality possessed by a 



false idea; &c。 Q。E。D。







Note。… This proposition is more clearly understood from II:xvi。Coroll。ii。 



For imagination is an idea; which indicates rather the present disposition 



of the human body than the nature of the external body; not indeed 



distinctly; but confusedly; whence it comes to pass; that the mind is 



said to err。 For instance; when we look at the sun; we conceive that it 



is distant from us about two hundred feet; in this judgment we err; so 



long as we are in ignorance of its true distance; when its true distance 



is known; the error is removed; but not the imagination; or; in other 



words; the idea of the sun; which only explains tho nature of that 



luminary; in so far as the body is affected thereby: wherefore; though 



we know the real distance; we shall still nevertheless imagine the sun 



to be near us。 For; as we said in III:xxxv。note; we do not imagine the sun 



to be so near us; because we are ignorant of its true distance; but because 



the mind conceives the magnitude of the sun to the extent that the body is 



affected thereby。  Thus; when the rays of the sun falling on the surface of 



water are reflected into our eyes; we imagine the sun as if it were in the 



water; though we are aware of its real position; and similarly other 



imaginations; wherein the mind is deceived whether they indicate the 



natural disposition of the body; or that its power of activity is 



increased or diminished; are not contrary to the truth; and do not vanish 



at its presence。 It happens indeed that; when we mistakenly fear an evil; 



the fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings; but the contrary also 



happens; namely; that we fear an evil which will certainly come; and our 



fear vanishes when we hear false tidings; thus imaginations do not vanish 



at the presence of the truth; in virtue of its being true; but because 



other imaginations; stronger than the first; supervene and exclude the 



present existence of that which we imagined; as I have shown in II:。xvii。















Prop。 II。 We are only passive; in so far as 



we are apart of Nature; which cannot be 



conceived by itself without other parts。







Proof。… We are said to be passive; when something arises in us; whereof 



we are only a partial cause (III:Def。ii。); that is (III:Def。i。); something 



which cannot be deduced solely from the laws of our nature。 We are passive 



therefore in so far as we are a part of Nature; which cannot be conceived 



by itself without other parts。 Q。E。D。















Prop。 III。 The force whereby a man persists 



in existing is limited; and is infinitely 



surpassed by the power of external causes。







Proof。…This is evident from the axiom of this part。 For; when man is 



given; there is something else … say A … more powerful; when A is given; 



there is something else … say B … more powerful than A; and so on to 



infinity; thus the power of man is limited by the power of some other 



thing; and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes。 Q。E。D。















Prop。 IV。 It is impossible; that man should 



not be a part of Nature; or that he should 



be capable of undergoing no changes; save 



such as can be understood through his nature 



only as their adequate cause。







Proof。… The power; whereby each particular thing; and consequently man; 



preserves his being; is the power of God or of Nature (I:xxiv。Coroll。); 



not in so far as it is infinite; but in so far as it can be explained by 



the actual human essence (III:vii。)。 Thus the power of man; in so far 



as it is explained through his own actual essence; is a part of the 



infinite power of God or Nature; in other words; of the essence thereof 



(I:xxxiv。)。 This was our first point。 Again; if it were possible; that man 



should undergo no changes save such as can be understood solely through 



the nature of man; it would follow that he would not be able to die; but 



would always necessarily exist; this would be the necessary consequence 



of a cause whose power was either finite or infinite; namely; either of 



man's power only; inasmuch as he would be capable of removing from himself 



all changes which could spring from external causes; or of the infinite 



power of Nature; whereby all individual things would be so ordered; that 



man should be incapable of undergoing any changes save such as tended 



towards his own preservation。 But the first alternative is absurd (by the 



last Prop。; the proof of which is universal; and can be applied to all 



individual things)。 Therefore; if it be possible; that man should not be 



capable of undergoing any changes; save such as can be explained solely 



through his own nature; and consequently that he must always (as we have 



shown) necessarily exist; such a result must follow from the infinite 



power of God; and consequently (I:xvi。) from the necessity of the divine 



nature; in so far as it is regarded as affected by the idea of any given 



man; the whole order of nature as conceived under the attributes of 



extension and thought must be deducible。 It would therefore follow (I:xxi。) 



that man is infinite; which (by the first part of this proof) is absurd。



It is; therefore; impossible; that man should not undergo any changes save 



those whereof he is the adequate cause。 Q。E。D。







Corollary。… Hence it follows; that man is necessarily always a prey to 



his passions; that he follows and obeys the general order of nature; and 



that he accommodates himself thereto; as much as the nature of things 



demands。















Prop。 V。 The power and increase of every 



passion; and its persistence in existing 



are not defined by the power; whereby we 



ourselves endeavour to persist in existing; 



but by the power of an external cause 



compared with our own。







Proof。… The essence of a passion cannot be explained through our 



essence alone (III:Def。i。&。ii。); that is (III:vii。); the power of 



a passion cannot be defined by the power; whereby we ourselves 



endeavour to persist in existing; but (as is shown in II:xvi。) must 



necessarily be defined by the power of an external cause compared 



with our own。 Q。E。D。 















Prop。 VI。 The force of any passion or emotion 



can overcome the rest of a man's activities or 



power; so that the emotion b

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