the ethics(part iv)-第14节
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
Proof。… If it be asked： What should a man's conduct be in a case where
he could by breaking faith free himself from the danger of present death？
Would not his plan of self…preservation completely persuade him to deceive？
This may be answered by pointing out that； if reason persuaded him to act
thus； it would persuade all men to act in a similar manner； in which case
reason would persuade men not to agree in good faith to unite their forces；
or to have laws in common； that is； not to。 have any general laws； which is
absurd。
Prop。 LXXIII。 The man； who is guided by reason；
is more free in a State； where he lives under
a general system of law； than in
solitude； where he is independent。
Proof。… The man； who is guided by reason； does not obey through fear
（IV：Ixiii。）： but； in so far as he endeavours to preserve his being
according to the dictates of reason； that is （IV：lxvi。Note）； in so far
as he endeavours to live in freedom； he desires to order his life
according to the general good （IV：xxxvii。）； and； consequently （as we
showed in IV：xxxvii。Note。ii。）； to live according to the laws of his
country。 Therefore the free man； in order to enjoy greater freedom；
desires to possess the general rights of citizenship。 Q。E。D。
Note。… These and similar observations； which we have made on man's true
freedom； may be referred to strength； that is； to courage and nobility
of character （III：lix。Note）。 I do not think it worth while to prove
separately all the properties of strength； much less need I show； that he
that is strong hates no man； is angry with no man； envies no man； is
indignant with no man； despises no man； and least of all things is proud。
These propositions； and all that relate to the true way of life and
religion； are easily proved from IV：xxxvii。 and IV：xlvi。； namely； that
hatred should be overcome with love； and that every man should desire for
others the good which he seeks for himself。 We may also repeat what
we drew attention to in the note to IV：I。； and in other places； namely；
that the strong man has ever first in his thoughts； that all things
follow from the necessity of the divine nature； so that whatsoever he
deems to be hurtful and evil； and whatsoever； accordingly； seems to him
impious； horrible； unjust； and base； assumes that appearance owing to his
own disordered； fragmentary； and confused view of the universe。 Wherefore
he strives before all things to conceive things as they really are； and
to remove the hindrances to true knowledge； such as are hatred； anger；
envy； derision； pride； and similar emotions； which I have mentioned above。
Thus he endeavours； as we said before； as far as in him lies； to do good；
and to go on his way rejoicing。 How far human virtue is capable of
attaining to such a condition； and what its powers may be； I will prove
in the following Part。
APPENDIX。
What have said in this Part concerning the right way of life has not been
arranged； so as to admit of being seen at one view； but has been set forth
piece…meal； according as I thought each Proposition could most readily be
deduced from what preceded it。 I propose； therefore； to rearrange my
remarks and to bring them under leading heads。
I。 All our endeavours or desires so follow from the necessity of our
nature； that they can be understood either through it alone； as their
proximate cause； or by virtue of our being a part of nature； which cannot
be adequately conceived through itself without other individuals。
II。 Desires； which follow from our nature in such a manner； that they can
be understood through it alone； are those which are referred to the mind；
in so far as the latter is conceived to consist of adequate ideas： the
remaining desires are only referred to the mind； in so far as it conceives
things inadequately； and their force and increase are generally defined
not by the power of man； but by the power of things external to us：
wherefore the former are rightly called actions； the latter passions； for
the former always indicate our power； the latter； on the other hand； show
our infirmity and fragmentary knowledge。
III。 Our actions； that is； those desires which are defined by man's power
or reason； are always good。 The rest maybe either good or bad。
IV。 Thus in life it is before all things useful to perfect the
understanding or reason； as far as we can； and in this alone man's
highest happiness or blessedness consists； indeed blessedness is nothing
else but the contentment of spirit； which arises from the intuitive
knowledge of God： now； to perfect the understanding is nothing else
but to understand God； God's attributes； and the actions which follow
from the necessity of his nature。 Wherefore of a man； who is led by reason；
the ultimate aim or highest desire； whereby he seeks to govern all his
fellows； is that whereby he is brought to the adequate conception of
himself and of all things within the scope of his intelligence。
V。 Therefore； without intelligence there is not rational life： and things
are only good； in so far as they aid man in his enjoyment of the
intellectual life； which is defined by intelligence。 Contrariwise；
whatsoever things hinder man's perfecting of his reason； and capability
to enjoy the rational life； are alone called evil。
VI。 As all things whereof man is the efficient cause are necessarily good；
no evil can befall man except through external causes； namely； by virtue
of man being a part of universal nature； whose laws human nature is
compelled to； obey； and to conform to in almost infinite ways。
VII。 It is impossible； that man should not be a part of nature； or that
he should not follow her general order； but if he be thrown among
individuals whose nature is in harmony with his own； his power of action
will thereby be aided and fostered； whereas； if he be thrown among such as
are but very little in harmony with his nature； he will hardly be able to
accommodate himself to them without undergoing a great change himself。
VIII。 Whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil； or to be capable of
injuring our faculty for existing and enjoying the rational life； we may
endeavour to remove in whatever way seems safest to us； on the other hand；
whatsoever we deem to be good or useful for preserving our being； and
enabling us to enjoy the rational life； we may appropriate to our use and
employ as we think best。 Everyone without exception may； by sovereign
right of nature； do whatsoever he thinks will advance his own interest。
IX。 Nothing can be in more harmony with the nature of any given thing
than other individuals of the same species； therefore （cf。 vii。） for man
in the preservation of his being and the enjoyment of the rational life
there is nothing more useful than his fellow…man who is led by reason。
Further； as we know not anything among individual things which is more
excellent than a man led by reason； no man can better display the power of
his skill and disposition； than in so training men； that they come at last
to live under the dominion of their own reason。
X。 In so far as men are influenced by envy or any kind of hatred； one
towards another； they are at variance； and are therefore to be feared in
proportion； as they are more powerful than their fellows。
XI。 Yet minds are not conquered by force； but by love and high…mindedness。
XII。 It is before all things useful to men to associate their ways of life；
to bind themselves together with such bonds as they think most fitted to
gather them all into unity； and generally to do whatsoever serves to
strengthen friendship。
XIII。 But for this there is need of skill and watchfulness。 For men are
diverse （seeing that those who live under the guidance of reason are few）；
yet are they generally envious and more prone to revenge than to sympathy。
No small force of character is therefore required to take everyone as he
is； and to restrain one's self from imitating the emotions of others。 But
those who carp at mankind； and are more skilled in railing at vice than
in instilling virtue； and who break rather than strengthen men's
dispositions； are hurtful both to themselves and others。 Thus many from
too great impatience of spirit； or from misguided religious zeal； have
preferred to live among brutes rather than among men； as boys or youths；
who cannot peaceably endure the chidings of their parents； will enlist as
soldiers and choose the hardships of war and the despotic discipline in
preference to the comforts of home and the admonitions of their father：
