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the preface to Pt。 IV。); one and the same action being sometimes good; 



sometimes bad; wherefore to the action which is sometimes bad; or arises 



from some evil emotion; we may be led by reason (IV:xix。)。 Q。E。D。 







Note。… An example will put this point in a clearer light。 The action of 



striking; in so far as it is considered physically; and in so far as we 



merely look to the fact that a man raises his arm; clenches his fist; and 



moves his whole arm violently downwards; is a virtue or excellence which 



is conceived as proper to the structure of the human body。 If; then; a man; 



moved by anger or hatred; is led to clench his fist or to move his arm; 



this result takes place (as we showed in Pt。II。); because one and the 



same action can be associated with various mental images of things; 



therefore we may be determined to the performance of one and the same 



action by confused ideas; or by clear and distinct ideas。 Hence it is 



evident that every desire which springs from emotion; wherein the mind is 



passive; would become useless; if men could be guided by reason。 Let us 



now see why desire which arises from emotion; wherein the mind is passive; 



is called by us blind。















Prop。 LX。 Desire arising from a pleasure 



or pain; that is not attributable; to 



the whole body; but only to one or certain 



parts thereof; is without utility in 



respect to a man as a whole。







Proof。… Let it be assumed; for instance; that A; a part of a body; is so 



strengthened by some external cause; that it prevails over the remaining 



parts (IV:vi。)。 This part will not endeavour to do away with its own 



powers; in order that the other parts of the body may perform its office; 



for this it would be necessary for it to have a force or power of doing 



away with its own powers; which (III:vi。) is absurd。 The said part; and; 



consequently; the mind also; will endeavour to preserve its condition。 



Wherefore desire arising from a pleasure of the kind aforesaid has no 



utility in reference to a man as a whole。 If it be assumed; on the other 



hand; that the part; A; be checked so that the remaining parts prevail; 



it may be proved in the same manner that desire arising from pain has no 



utility in respect to a man as a whole。 Q。E。D。







Note。… As pleasure is generally (IV:xliv。Note) attributed to one part 



of the body; we generally desire to preserve our being with out taking 



into consideration our health as a whole: to which it may be added; that 



the desires which have most hold over us (IV:ix。) take account of the 



present and not of the future。















Prop。 LXI。 Desire which springs from 



reason cannot be excessive。







Proof。… Desire (Def。 of the Emotions:i。) considered absolutely is the 



actual essence of man; in so far as it is conceived as in any way 



determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself。 



Hence desire; which arises from reason; that is (III:iii。); which is 



engendered in us in so far as we act; is the actual essence or nature of 



man; in so far as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are 



adequately conceived through man's essence only (III:Def。ii。)。 Now; if 



such desire could be excessive; human nature considered in itself alone 



would be able to exceed itself; or would be able to do more than it can; 



a manifest contradiction。 Therefore; such desire cannot be excessive。 Q。E。D。















Prop。 LXII。 In so far as the mind conceives 



a thing under the dictates of reason; it is 



affected equally; whether the idea be of a 



thing future; past; or present。







Proof。… Whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason; it 



conceives under the form of eternity or necessity (II:xliv。Coroll。ii。); 



and is therefore affected with the same certitude (II:xliii。&Note)。  



Wherefore; whether the thing be present; past; or future; the mind 



conceives it under the same necessity and is affected with the same 



certitude; and whether the idea be of something present; past; or future; 



it will in all cases be equally true (II:xli。); that is; it will always 



possess the same properties of an adequate idea (II:Def。iv。); therefore; in 



so far as the mind conceives things under the dictates of reason; it is 



affected in the same manner; whether the idea be of a thing future; past; 



or present。 Q。E。D。







Note。… If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the duration of things; 



and could determine by reason their periods of existence; we should 



contemplate things future with the same emotion as things present; and 



the mind would desire as though it were present the good which it 



conceived as future; consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser 



good in the present for the sake of a greater good in the future; and 



would in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source of 



evil in the future; as we shall presently show。 However; we can have but 



a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of things (II:xxxi。) and the 



periods of their existence (II:xliv。Note) we can only determine by 



imagination; which is not so powerfully affected by the future as by the 



present。 Hence such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is 



merely abstract or general; and the judgment which we pass on the order 



of things and the connection of causes; with a view to determining what 



is good or bad for us in the; present; is rather imaginary than real。  



Therefore it is nothing wonderful; if the desire arising from such 



knowledge of good and evil; in so far as it looks on into the future; be 



more readily checked than the desire of things which are agreeable at the 



present time。 (Cf。 IV:xvi。)















Prop。 LXIII。 He who is led by fear; 



and does good in order to escape evil; 



is not led by reason。







Proof。… All the emotions which are attributable to the mind as active; 



or in other words to reason; are emotions of pleasure and desire (III:lix。); 



therefore; he who is led by fear; and does good in order to escape evil; 



is not led by reason。







Note。… Superstitions persons; who know better how to rail at vice than 



how to teach virtue; and who strive not to guide men by reason; but so 



to restrain them that they would rather escape evil than love virtue; 



have no other aim but to make others as wretched as themselves; wherefore 



it is nothing wonderful; if they be generally troublesome and odious to 



their fellow…men。







Corollary。… Under desire which springs from reason; we seek good directly; 



and shun evil indirectly。







Proof。… Desire which springs from reason can only spring from a pleasurable 



emotion; wherein the mind is not passive (III:lix。); in other words; from 



a pleasure which cannot be excessive (IV:lxi。); and not from pain; 



wherefore this desire springs from the knowledge of good; not of evil 



(IV:viii。); hence under the guidance of reason we seek good directly and 



only by implication shun evil。 Q。E。D。







Note。… This Corollary may be illustrated by the example of a sick and a 



healthy man。 The sick man through fear of death eats what he naturally 



shrinks from; but the healthy man takes pleasure in his food; and thus 



gets a better enjoyment out of life; than if he were in fear of death; 



and desired directly to avoid it。 So a judge; who condemns a criminal 



to death; not from hatred or anger but from love of the public 



well…being; is guided solely by reason。















Prop。 LXIV。 The knowledge of evil is 



an inadequate knowledge。







Proof。… The knowledge of evil (IV:viii。) is pain; in so far as we are 



conscious thereof。 Now pain is the transition to a lesser perfection 



(Def。 of the Emotions:iii。) and therefore cannot be understood through 



man's nature (III:vi。;& II:vii。); therefore it is a passive state 



(III。Def。ii。) which (III:iii。) depends on inadequate ideas; consequently 



the knowledge thereof (II:xxix。); namely; the knowledge of evil; is 



inadequate。 Q。E。D。







Corollary。… Hence it follows that; if the human mind possessed only 



adequate ideas; it would form no conception of evil。















Prop。 LXV。 Under the guidance of reason we 



should pursue the greater of two goods and 



the lesser of two evils。







Proof。… A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good is in 



reality an evil; for we apply the terms good and bad to things; in so 



far as we compare them one with another (see preface to this Part); 



therefore; evil is in reality a lesser good; hence under the guidance of 



reason we seek or pursue only the greater good and the lesser evil。 Q。E。D。







Corollary。… We may; under the guidance of reason; pursue the lesser evil 



as 

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