the prince(王子)-第21节
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people； he can only be attacked with difficulty。 For this reason a prince
ought to have two fears； one from within； on account of his subjects； the
other from without； on account of external powers。 From the latter he is
defended by being well armed and having good allies； and if he is well
armed he will have good friends； and affairs will always remain quiet
within when they are quiet without； unless they should have been already
disturbed by conspiracy； and even should affairs outside be disturbed； if he
has carried out his preparations and has lived as I have said； as long as he
does not despair； he will resist every attack； as I said Nabis the Spartan
did。
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But concerning his subjects； when affairs outside are disturbed he has
only to fear that they will conspire secretly； from which a prince can easily
secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised； and by keeping the
people satisfied with him； which it is most necessary for him to
accomplish； as I said above at length。 And one of the most efficacious
remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not to be hated and
despised by the people； for he who conspires against a prince always
expects to please them by his removal； but when the conspirator can only
look forward to offending them； he will not have the courage to take such
a course； for the difficulties that confront a conspirator are infinite。 And as
experience shows； many have been the conspiracies； but few have been
successful； because he who conspires cannot act alone； nor can he take a
companion except from those whom he believes to be malcontents； and as
soon as you have opened your mind to a malcontent you have given him
the material with which to content himself； for by denouncing you he can
look for every advantage； so that； seeing the gain from this course to be
assured； and seeing the other to be doubtful and full of dangers； he must be
a very rare friend； or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince； to keep
faith with you。
And； to reduce the matter into a small compass； I say that； on the side
of the conspirator； there is nothing but fear； jealousy； prospect of
punishment to terrify him； but on the side of the prince there is the majesty
of the principality； the laws； the protection of friends and the state to
defend him； so that； adding to all these things the popular goodwill； it is
impossible that any one should be so rash as to conspire。 For whereas in
general the conspirator has to fear before the execution of his plot； in this
case he has also to fear the sequel to the crime； because on account of it he
has the people for an enemy； and thus cannot hope for any escape。
Endless examples could be given on this subject； but I will be content
with one； brought to pass within the memory of our fathers。 Messer
Annibale Bentivogli； who was prince in Bologna （grandfather of the
present Annibale）； having been murdered by the Canneschi； who had
conspired against him； not one of his family survived but Messer
Giovanni；＇*＇ who was in childhood： immediately after his assassination
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the people rose and murdered all the Canneschi。 This sprung from the
popular goodwill which the house of Bentivogli enjoyed in those days in
Bologna； which was so great that； although none remained there after the
death of Annibale who was able to rule the state； the Bolognese； having
information that there was one of the Bentivogli family in Florence； who
up to that time had been considered the son of a blacksmith； sent to
Florence for him and gave him the government of their city； and it was
ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due course to the
government。
＇*＇ Giovanni Bentivogli； born in Bologna 1438； died at Milan 1508。
He ruled Bologna from 1462 to 1506。 Machiavelli's strong condemnation
of conspiracies may get its edge from his own very recent experience
（February 1513）； when he had been arrested and tortured for his alleged
complicity in the Boscoli conspiracy。
For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies of
little account when his people hold him in esteem； but when it is hostile to
him； and bears hatred towards him； he ought to fear everything and
everybody。 And well…ordered states and wise princes have taken every
care not to drive the nobles to desperation； and to keep the people satisfied
and contented； for this is one of the most important objects a prince can
have。
Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France；
and in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty and
security of the king； of these the first is the parliament and its authority；
because he who founded the kingdom； knowing the ambition of the
nobility and their boldness； considered that a bit to their mouths would be
necessary to hold them in； and； on the other side； knowing the hatred of
the people； founded in fear； against the nobles； he wished to protect them；
yet he was not anxious for this to be the particular care of the king；
therefore； to take away the reproach which he would be liable to from the
nobles for favouring the people； and from the people for favouring the
nobles； he set up an arbiter； who should be one who could beat down the
great and favour the lesser without reproach to the king。 Neither could you
have a better or a more prudent arrangement； or a greater source of
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security to the king and kingdom。 From this one can draw another
important conclusion； that princes ought to leave affairs of reproach to the
management of others； and keep those of grace in their own hands。 And
further； I consider that a prince ought to cherish the nobles； but not so as to
make himself hated by the people。
It may appear； perhaps； to some who have examined the lives and
deaths of the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example
contrary to my opinion； seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed
great qualities of soul； nevertheless they have lost their empire or have
been killed by subjects who have conspired against them。 Wishing；
therefore； to answer these objections； I will recall the characters of some
of the emperors； and will show that the causes of their ruin were not
different to those alleged by me； at the same time I will only submit for
consideration those things that are noteworthy to him who studies the
affairs of those times。
It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to
the empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus； they were
Marcus and his son Commodus； Pertinax； Julian； Severus and his son
Antoninus Caracalla； Macrinus； Heliogabalus； Alexander； and Maximinus。
There is first to note that； whereas in other principalities the ambition
of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be contended
with； the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to put up with
the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers； a matter so beset with difficulties
that it was the ruin of many； for it was a hard thing to give satisfaction
both to soldiers and people； because the people loved peace； and for this
reason they loved the unaspiring prince； whilst the soldiers loved the
warlike prince who was bold； cruel； and rapacious； which qualities they
were quite willing he should exercise upon the people； so that they could
get double pay and give vent to their own greed and cruelty。 Hence it arose
that those emperors were always overthrown who； either by birth or
training； had no great authority； and most of them； especially those who
came new to the principality； recognizing
