science of logic-第8节

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appeal　to　such　and　such　as　recognised　facts；　or　rather　the　plea　can　be　advanced　that　such　and
such　could　be　accepted　as　recognised　facts。　There　will　always　be　someone　who　will　adduce　a
case；　an　instance；　according　to　which　something　more　and　different　is　to　be　understood　by　certain
terms　the　definition　of　which　must　therefore　be　made　more　precise　or　more　general　and　the
science　too；　must　be　accommodated　thereto。　This　again　involves　argumentation　about　what　should
be　admitted　or　excluded　and　within　what　limits　and　to　what　extent；　but　argumentation　is　open　to
the　most　manifold　and　various　opinions；　on　which　a　decision　can　finally　be　determined　only
arbitrarily。　In　this　method　of　beginning　a　science　with　its　definition；　no　mention　is　made　of　the　need
to　demonstrate　the　necessity　of　its　subject　matter　and　therefore　of　the　science　itself。

The　Notion　of　pure　science　and　its　deduction　is　therefore　presupposed　in　the　present　work　in　so
far　as　the　Phenomenology　of　Spirit　is　nothing　other　than　the　deduction　of　it。　Absolute　knowing　is
the　truth　of　every　mode　of　consciousness　because；　as　the　course　of　the　Phenomenology　showed；
it　is　only　in　absolute　knowing　that　separation　of　the　object　from　the　certainty　of　itself　is
completely　eliminated：　truth　is　now　equated　with　certainty　and　this　certainty　with　truth。

Thus　pure　science　presupposes　liberation　from　the　opposition　of　consciousness。　It　contains
thought　in　so　far　as　this　is　just　as　much　the　object　in　its　own　self；　or　the　object　in　its　own
self　in　so　far　as　it　is　equally　pure　thought。　As　science；　truth　is　pure　self…consciousness　in　its
self…development　and　has　the　shape　of　the　self；　so　that　the　absolute　truth　of　being　is　the　known
Notion　and　the　Notion　as　such　is　the　absolute　truth　of　being。

This　objective　thinking　then；　is　the　content　of　pure　science。　Consequently；　far　from　it　being　formal；
far　from　it　standing　in　need　of　a　matter　to　constitute　an　actual　and　true　cognition；　it　is　its　content
alone　which　has　absolute　truth；　or；　if　one　still　wanted　to　employ　the　word　matter；　it　is　the　veritable
matter　—　but　a　matter　which　is　not　external　to　the　form；　since　this　matter　is　rather　pure　thought　and
hance　the　absolute　form　itself。　Accordingly；　logic　is　to　be　understood　as　the　system　of　pure　reason；
as　the　realm　of　pure　thought。　This　realm　is　truth　as　it　is　without　veil　and　in　its　own　absolute　nature。
It　can　therefore　be　said　that　this　content　is　the　exposition　of　God　as　he　is　in　his　eternal　essence
before　the　creation　of　nature　and　a　finite　mind。　

Anaxagoras　is　praised　as　the　man　who　first　declared　that　Nous；　thought；　is　the　principle　of　the
world；　that　the　essence　of　the　world　is　to　be　defined　as　thought。　In　so　doing　he　laid　the　foundation
for　an　intellectual　view　of　the　universe；　the　pure　form　of　which　must　be　logic。　

What　we　are　dealing　with　in　logic　is　not　a　thinking　about　something　which　exists　independently　as
a　base　for　our　thinking　and　apart　from　it；　nor　forms　which　are　supposed　to　provide　mere　signs　or
distinguishing　marks　of　truth；　on　the　contrary；　the　necessary　forms　and　self…consciousness　of
thought　are　the　content　and　the　ultimate　truth　itself。

To　get　some　idea　of　this　one　must　discard　the　prejudice　that　truth　must　be　something　tangible。
Such　tangibility　is；　for　example；　imported　even　into　the　Platonic　Ideas　which　are　in　God's　thinking；
as　if　they　are；　as　it　were；　existing　things　but　in　another　world　or　region；　while　the　world　of　actuality
exists　outside　that　region　and　has　a　substantial　existence　distinct　from　those　Ideas　and　only　through
this　distinction　is　a　substantial　reality。　The　Platonic　Idea　is　the　universal；　or　more　definitely　the
Notion　of　an　object；　only　in　its　Notion　does　something　possess　actuality　and　to　the　extent　that　it　is
distinct　from　its　Notion　it　ceases　to　be　actual　and　is　a　non…entity；　the　side　of　tangibility　and
sensuous　self…externality　belongs　to　this　null　aspect。　But　on　the　other　side；　one　can　appeal　to　the
conceptions　of　ordinary　logic　itself；　for　it　is　assumed；　for　example；　that　the　determinations
contained　in　definitions　do　not　belong　only　to　the　knower；　but　are　determinations　of　the　object；
constituting　its　innermost　essence　and　its　very　own　nature。　Or；　if　from　given　determinations　others
are　inferred；　it　is　assumed　that　what　is　inferred　is　not　something　external　and　alien　to　the　object；　but
rather　that　it　belongs　to　the　object　itself；　that　to　the　thought　there　is　a　correspondent　being。

It　is　implied　generally　in　the　use　of　forms　of　the　Notion；　of　judgement；　syllogism；　definition；
division；　etc。；　that　they　are　not　merely　forms　of　self…conscious　thinking　but　also　of　the　objective
understanding。　

Thought　is　an　expression　which　attributes　the　determination　contained　therein　primarily　to
consciousness。　But　inasmuch　as　it　is　said　that　understanding；　reason；　is　in　the　objective　world；　that
mind　and　nature　have　universal　laws　to　which　their　life　and　changes　conform；　then　it　is　conceded
that　the　determinations　of　thought　equally　have　objective　value　and　existence。

The　critical　philosophy　had；　it　is　true；　already　turned　metaphysics　into　logic　but　it；　like　the　later
idealism；　as　previously　remarked；　was　overawed　by　the　object；　and　so　the　logical　determinations
were　given　an　essentially　subjective　significance　with　the　result　that　these　philosophies　remained
burdened　with　the　object　they　had　avoided　and　were　left　with　the　residue　of　a　thing…in…itself；　an
infinite　obstacle；　as　a　beyond。　But　the　liberation　from　the　opposition　of　consciousness　which　the
science　of　logic　must　be　able　to　presuppose　lifts　the　determinations　of　thought　above　this　timid；
incomplete　standpoint　and　demands　that　they　be　considered　not　with　any　such　limitation　and
reference　but　as　they　are　in　their　own　proper　character；　as　logic；　as　pure　reason。

Kant　moreover　considers　logic；　that　is；　the　aggregate　of　definitions　and　propositions　which
ordinarily　passes　for　logic；　to　be　fortunate　in　having　attained　so　early　to　completion　before　the
other　sciences；　since　Aristotle；　it　has　not　lost　any　ground；　but　neither　has　it　gained　any；　the　latter
because　to　all　appearances　it　seems　to　be　finished　and　complete。　Now　if　logic　has　not　undergone
any　change　since　Aristotle　—　and　in　fact；　judging　by　modern　compendiums　of　logic　the　changes
frequently　consist　mainly　in　omissions　—　then　surely　the　conclusion　which　should　be　drawn　is　that　it
is　all　the　more　in　need　of　a　total　reconstruction；　for　spirit；　after　its　labours　over　two　thousand　years；
must　have　attained　to　a　higher　consciousness　about　its　thinking　and　about　its　own　pure；　essential
nature。

A　comparison　of　the　forms　to　which　spirit　has　raised　itself　in　the　practical　and　religious　sphere　and
in　every　branch　of　science　both　physical　and　mental；　with　the　form　presented　by　logic　which　is
spirit's　consciousness　of　its　own　pure　essence；　reveals　so　vast　a　difference　that　the　utter
inadequacy　and　unworthiness　of　the　latter　consciousness　in　comparison　with　the　higher
consciousness　displayed　in　those　other　spheres　cannot　fail　to　strike　the　most　superficial　observer。

In　point　of　fact　the　need　for　a　reconstruction　of　logic　has　long　since　been　felt。　In　form　and　in
content；　logic；　as　exhibited　in　the　text…books；　may　be　said　to　have　fallen　into　contempt。　It　is　still
dragged　in；　but　more　from　a　feeling　that　one　cannot　dispense　with　logic　altogether　and　because　the
tradition　of　its　importance　still　survives；　rather　than　from　a　conviction　that　such　commonplace
content　and　occupation　with　such　empty　forms　is　valuable　and　useful。

The　additions　of　psychological；　pedagogic　and　even　physiological　material　which　logic　received　in
the　past　have　subsequently　been　recognised　almost　universally　as　disfigurements。　A　great　part　of
these　psychological；　pedagogic　and　physiological　observations；　laws　and　rules；　whether　they　occur
in　logic　or　anywhere　else；　must　appear　very　shallow　and　trivial　in　themselves；　and　without
exception　all　those　rules　such　as；　for　example；　that　one　must　think　out　and　test　what　one　reads　in
books　or　hears　by　word　of　mouth；　that　when　one's　sight　is　not　good　one　should　help　one's　eyes　by
wearing　spectacles　—　rules　which　in　textbooks　of　so…called　applied　logic　were　solemnly　set　out　in
paragraphs　and　put　forward　as　aids　to　the　attainment　of　truth　—　these　must　strike　everyone　as
superfluous　—　except　only　the　writer　or　teacher　who　finds　difficulty　in　expanding　by　some　means
or　other　the　otherwise　scanty　and　life…less　content　of　logic。'

Regarding　this　content；　the　reason　why　logic　is　so　dull　and　spiritless　has　already　been　given　above。
Its　determinations　are　accepted　in　their　unmoved　fixity　and　are　brought　only　into　external　relation
with　each　other。　In　judgments　and　syllogisms　the　operations　are　in　the　main　reduced　to　and
founded　on　the　quantitative　aspect　of　the　determinations；　consequently　everything　rests　on　an
external　difference；　on　mere　comparison　and　becomes　a　completely　analytical　procedure　and
mechanical　calculation。　The　deduction　of　the　so…called　rules　and　laws；　chiefly　of　inference；　is　not
much　better　than　a　manipulation　of　rods　of　unequal　length　in　order　to　sort　and　group　them
according　to　size　—　than　a　childish　game　of　fitting　together　the