science of logic-第7节

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really　true　in　them；　that　is；　things　not　in　their　immediacy　but　as　first　raised　into　the　form　of　thought；
as　things　thought。　Thus　this　metaphysics　believed　that　thinking　（and　its　determinations）　is　not
anything　alien　to　the　object；　but　rather　is　its　essential　nature；　or　that　things　and　the　thinking　of　them
—　our　language　too　expresses　their　kinship　—　are　explicitly　in　full　agreement；　thinking　in　its
immanent　determinations　and　the　true　nature　of　things　forming　one　and　the　same　content。

But　reflective　understanding　took　possession　of　philosophy。　We　must　know　exactly　what　is　meant
by　this　expression　which　moreover　is　often　used　as　a　slogan；　in　general　it　stands　for　the
understanding　as　abstracting；　and　hence　as　separating　and　remaining　fixed　in　its　separations。
Directed　against　reason；　it　behaves　as　ordinary　common　sense　and　imposes　its　view　that　truth　rests
on　sensuous　reality；　that　thoughts　are　only　thoughts；　meaning　that　it　is　sense　perception　which　first
gives　them　filling　and　reality　and　that　reason　left　to　its　own　resources　engenders　only　figments　of
the　brain。　In　this　self…renunciation　on　the　part　of　reason；　the　Notion　of　truth　is　lost；　it　is　limited　to
knowing　only　subjective　truth；　only　phenomena；　appearances；　only　something　to　which　the　nature
of　the　object　itself　does　not　correspond：　knowing　has　lapsed　into　opinion。

However；　this　turn　taken　by　cognition；　which　appears　as　a　loss　and　a　retrograde　step；　is　based　on
something　more　profound　on　which　rests　the　elevation　of　reason　into　the　loftier　spirit　of　modern
philosophy。　The　basis　of　that　universally　held　conception　is；　namely；　to　be　sought　in　the　insight　into
the　necessary　conflict　of　the　determinations　of　the　understanding　with　themselves。　The　reflection
already　referred　to　is　this；　to　transcend　the　concrete　immediate　object　and　to　determine　it　and
separate　it。　But　equally　it　must　transcend　these　its　separating　determinations　and　straightway
connect　them。　It　is　at　the　stage　of　this　connecting　of　the　determinations　that　their　conflict　emerges。
This　connecting　activity　of　reflection　belongs　in　itself　to　reason　and　the　rising　above　those
determinations　which　attains　to　an　insight　into　their　conflict　is　the　great　negative　step　towards　the
true　Notion　of　reason。　But　the　insight；　when　not　thorough…going；　commits　the　mistake　of　thinking
that　it　is　reason　which　is　in　contradiction　with　itself；　it　does　not　recognise　that　the　contradiction　is
precisely　the　rising　of　reason　above　the　limitations　of　the　understanding　and　the　resolving　of　them；
Cognition；　instead　of　taking　from　this　stage　the　final　step　into　the　heights；　has　fled　from　the
unsatisfactoriness　of　the　categories　of　the　understanding　to　sensuous　existence；　imagining　that　in
this　it　possesses　what　is　solid　and　self…consistent。　But　on　the　other　hand；　since　this　knowledge　is
self…confessedly　knowledge　only　of　appearances；　the　unsatisfactoriness　of　the　latter　is　admitted；
but　at　the　same　time　presupposed：　as　much　as　to　say　that　admittedly；　we　have　no　proper
knowledge　of　things…in…themselves　but　we　do　have　a　proper　knowledge　of　them　within　the　sphere
of　appearances；　as　if；　so　to　speak；　only　the　kind　of　objects　were　different；　and　one　kind；　namely
things…in…themselves；　did　not　fall　within　the　scope　of　our　knowledge　but　the　other　kind；
phenomena；　did。　This　is　like　attributing　to　someone　a　correct　perception；　with　the　rider　that
nevertheless　he　is　incapable　of　perceiving　what　is　true　but　only　what　is　false。　Absurd　as　this　would
be；　it　would　not　be　more　so　than　a　true　knowledge　which　did　not　know　the　object　as　it　is　in　itself。

The　criticism　of　the　forms　of　the　understanding　has　had　the　result　already　mentioned；　that　these
forms　do　not　apply　to　things…in…themselves。　This　can　have　no　other　meaning　than　that　these　forms
are　in　themselves　something　untrue。　But　then　if　they　are　'allowed　to　remain　valid　for　subjective
reason　and　experience；　the　criticism　has　not　produced　any　alteration　in　them：　they　are　left　in　the
same　shape　for　the　subject　knower　as　they　formerly　possessed　for　the　object。　If；　however；　they
are　inadequate　for　the　thing…in…itself；　still　less　must　the　understanding　to　which　they　are　supposed
to　belong　put　up　with　them　and　rest　content　with　them。　If　they　cannot　be　determinations　of　the
thing…in…itself；　still　less　can　they　be　determinations　of　the　understanding　to　which　one　ought　at　least
to　concede　the　dignity　of　a　thing…in…itself。　The　determinations　of　finite　and　infinite　conflict　in　the
same　way；　whether　they　are　applied　to　time　and　space；　to　the　world；　or　are　determinations　within
the　mind　—　just　as　black　and　white　produce　grey　whether　they　are　mixed　on　a　canvas　or　on　the
palette。　If　our　conception　of　the　world　is　dissolved　by　the　transference　to　it　of　the　determinations
of　infinite　and　finite；　still　more　is　spirit　itself；　which　contains　both　of　them；　inwardly
self…contradictory　and　self…dissolving：　it　is　not　the　nature　of　the　material　or　the　object　to　which　they
are　applied　or　in　which　they　occur　that　can　make　a　difference　for　it　is　only　through　those
determinations　and　in　accordance　with　them　that　the　object　contains　the　contradiction。

The　forms　of　objective　thinking；　therefore；　have　been　removed　by　this　criticism　only　from　the　thing；
but　they　have　been　left　in　the　subject　just　as　they　were　originally。　That　is　to　say；　this　criticism　did
not　consider　these　forms　on　their　own　merits　and　according　to　their　own　peculiar　content；　but
simply　took　them　as　accepted　starting　points　from　subjective　logic：　so　that　there　was　no　question
of　an　immanent　deduction　of　them　as　forms　of　subjective　logic；　still　less　of　a　dialectical
consideration　of　them。

Transcendental　idealism　in　its　more　consistent　development；　recognised　the　nothingness　of　the
spectral　thing…in…itself　left　over　by　the　Kantian　philosophy；　this　abstract　shadow　divorced　from　all
content；　and　intended　to　destroy　it　completely。　This　philosophy　also　made　a　start　at　letting　reason
itself　exhibit　its　own　determinations。　But　this　attempt；　because　it　proceeded　from　a　subjective
standpoint；　could　not　be　brought　to　a　successful　conclusion。？　Later　this　standpoint；　and　with　it　too
the　attempt　to　develop　the　content　of　pure　science；　was　abandoned。

But　what　is　commonly　understood　by　logic　is　considered　without　any　reference　whatever　to
metaphysical　significance。　This　science　in　its　present　state　has；　it　must　be　admitted；　no　content　of　a
kind　which　the　ordinary　consciousness　would　regard　as　a　reality　and　as　a　genuine　subject　matter。
But　it　is　not　for　this　reason　a　formal　science　lacking　significant　truth。　Moreover；　the　region　of　truth
is　not　to　be　sought　in　that　matter　which　is　missing　in　logic；　a　deficiency　to　which　the
unsatisfactoriness　of　the　science　is　usually　attributed。　The　truth　is　rather　that　the　insubstantial　nature
of　logical　forms　originates　solely　in　the　way　in　which　they　are　considered　and　dealt　with。　When
they　are　taken　as　fixed　determinations　and　consequently　in　their　separation　from　each　other　and
not　as　held　together　in　an　organic　unity；　then　they　are　dead　forms　and　the　spirit　which　is　their　living；
concrete　unity　does　not　dwell　in　them。　As　thus　taken；　they　lack　a　substantial　content　—　a　matter
which　would　be　substantial　in　itself。　The　content　which　is　missing　in　the　logical　forms　is　nothing　else
than　a　solid　foundation　and　a　concretion　of　these　abstract　determinations；　and　such　a　substantial
being　for　them　is　usually　sought　outside　them。　

But　logical　reason　itself　is　the　substantial　or　real　being　which　holds　together　within　itself　every
abstract　determination　and　is　their　substantial；　absolutely　concrete　unity。　One　need　not　therefore
look　far　for　what　is　commonly　called　a　matter；　if　logic　is　supposed　to　lack　a　substantial　content；
then　the　fault　does　not　lie　with　its　subject　matter　but　solely　with　the　way　in　which　this　subject
matter　is　grasped。

In　Phenomenology　of　Mind；　I　have　exhibited　consciousness　in　its　movement　onwards　from　the
first　immediate　opposition　of　itself　and　the　object　to　absolute　knowing。　The　path　of　this　movement
goes　through　every　form　of　the　relation　of　consciousness　to　the　object　and　has　the　Notion　of
science　of　its　result。

This　Notion　therefore　（apart　from　the　fact　that　it　emerges　within　logic　itself）　needs　no　justification
here　because　it　has　received　it　in　that　work；　and　it　cannot　be　justified　in　any　other　way　than　by　this
emergence　in　consciousness；　all　the　forms　of　which　are　resolved　into　this　Notion　as　into　their　truth。
To　establish　or　explain　the　Notion　of　science　ratiocinatively　can　at　most　achieve　this；　that　a　general
idea　of　the　Notion　is　presented　to　our　thinking　and　a　historical　knowledge　of　it　is　produced；　but　a
definition　of　science　—　or　more　precisely　of　logic　—　has　its　proof　solely　in　the　already　mentioned
necessity　of　its　emergence　in　consciousness。　The　definition　with　which　any　science　makes　an
absolute　beginning。　cannot　contain　anything　other　than　the　precise　and　correct　expression　of　what
is　imagined　to　be　the　accepted　and　familiar　subject　matter　and　aim　of　the　science。　That
precisely　this　is　what　is　imagined　is　an　historical　asseveration　in　respect　of　which　one　can　only
appeal　to　such　and　such　as　recognised　fact