science of logic-第67节
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external arrangement; has made the said form tedious and given it a bad name。 Yet the triteness of
this use of it cannot detract from its inner worth and we must always value highly the discovery of
the shape of the rational; even though it was at first uncomprehended。
Now more precisely the third is the immediate; but the immediate resulting from sublation of
mediation; the simple resulting from sublation of difference; the positive resulting from sublation
of the negative; the Notion that has realised itself by means of its otherness and by the sublation of
this reality has become united with itself; and has restored its absolute reality; its simple relation to
itself。 This result is therefore the truth。 It is equally immediacy and mediation; but such forms of
judgement as: the third is immediacy and mediation; or it is the unity of them; are not capable of
grasping it; for it is not a quiescent third; but; precisely as this unity; is self…mediating movement
and activity。 As that with which we began was the universal; so the result is the individual; the
concrete; the subject; what the former is in itself the latter is now equally for itself; the universal is
posited in the subject。 The first two moments of the triplicity are abstract; untrue moments which
for that very reason are dialectical; and through this their negativity make themselves into the
subject。 The Notion itself is for us; in the first instance; alike the universal that is in itself; and the
negative that is for itself; and also the third; that which is both in and for itself; the universal that
runs through all the moments of he syllogism; but the third is the conclusion; in which the Notion
through its negativity is mediated with itself and thereby posited for itself as the universal and the
identity of its moments。
Now this result; as the whole that has withdrawn into and is identical with itself; has given itself
again the form of immediacy。 Hence it is now itself the same thing as the starting…point had
determined itself to be。 As simple self…relation it is a universal; and in this universality; the
negativity that constituted its dialectic and mediation has also collapsed into simple
determinateness which can again be a beginning。 It may seem at first sight that this cognition of
the result is an analysis of it and therefore must again dissect these determinations and the process
by which it has come into being and been examined。 But if the treatment of the subject matter is
actually carried out in this analytic manner; it belongs to that stage of the Idea considered above;
to the cognition of enquiry; which merely states of its subject matter what is; but not the necessity
of its concrete identity and the Notion of it。 But though the method of truth which comprehends the
subject matter is; as we have shown; itself analytic; for it remains entirely within the Notion; yet it is
equally synthetic; for through the Notion the subject matter is determined dialectically and as an
other。 On the new foundation constituted by the result as the fresh subject matter; the method
remains the same as with the previous subject matter。 The difference is concerned solely with the
relationship of the foundation as such; true; it is now likewise a foundation; but its immediacy is
only a form; since it was a result as well; hence its determinateness as content is no longer
something merely picked up; but something deduced and proved。
It is here that the content of cognition as such first enters into the circle of consideration; since; as
deduced; it now belongs to the method。 The method itself by means of this moment expands itself
into a system。 At first the beginning had to be; for the method; wholly indeterminate in respect of
content; to this extent it appears as the merely formal soul; for and by which the beginning was
determined simply and solely in regard to its form; namely; as the immediate and the universal。
Through the movement we have indicated; the subject matter has obtained for itself a
determinateness that is a content; because the negativity that has withdrawn into simplicity is the
sublated form; and as simple determinateness stands over against its development; and first of all
over against its very opposition to universality。
Now as this determinateness is the proximate truth of the indeterminate beginning; it condemns the
latter as something imperfect; as well as the method itself that; in starting from that beginning; was
merely formal。 This can be expressed as the now specific demand that the beginning; since it is
itself a determinate relatively to the determinateness of the result; shall be taken not as an
immediate but as something mediated and deduced。 This may appear as the demand for an infinite
retrogression in proof and deduction; just as from the fresh beginning that has been obtained; a
result likewise emerges from the method in its course; so that the advance equally rolls onwards to
infinity。
It has been shown a number of times that the infinite progress as such belongs to reflection that is
without the Notion; the absolute method; which has the Notion for its soul and content; cannot
lead into that。 At first sight; even such beginnings as being; essence; universality; seem to be of
such a kind as to possess the complete universality and absence of content demanded for a wholly
formal beginning; as it is supposed to be; and therefore; as absolutely first beginnings; demand and
admit of no further regress。 As they are pure relations to self; immediate and indeterminate; they
do not of course possess within themselves the difference which in any other kind of beginning; is
directly posited between the universality of its form and its content。 But it is the very
indeterminateness which the above logical beginnings have for their sole content that constitutes
their determinateness; this consists; namely; in their negativity as sublated mediation; the
particularity of this gives even their indeterminateness a particularity by which being; essence; and
universality are distinguished from one another。 The determinateness then which belongs to them
if they are taken by themselves is their immediate determinateness; just as much as the
determinateness of any other kind of content; and therefore requires a deduction; for the method it
is a matter of indifference whether the determinateness be taken as determinateness of form or of
content。 That a content has been determined by the first of its results is not in fact for the method;
the beginning of a new mode; the method remains neither more nor less formal than before。 For
since it is the absolute form; the Notion that knows itself and everything as Notion; there is no
content that could stand over against it and determine it to be a one…sided external form。
Consequently; just as the absence of content in the above beginnings does not make them absolute
beginnings; so too it is not the content as such that could lead the method into the infinite progress
forwards or backwards。 From one aspect; the determinateness which the method creates for
itself in its result is the moment by means of which the method is self…mediation and converts the
immediate beginning into something mediated。 But conversely; it is through the
determinateness that this mediation of the method runs its course; it returns through a content as
through an apparent other of itself to its beginning in such a manner that not only does it restore
that beginning … as a determinate beginning however … but the result is no less the sublated
determinateness; and so too the restoration of the first immediacy in which it began。 This it
accomplishes as a system of totality。 We have still to consider it in this determination。
We have shown that the determinateness which was a result is itself; by virtue of the form of
simplicity into which it has withdrawn; a fresh beginning; as this beginning is distinguished from its
predecessor precisely by that determinateness; cognition rolls onwards from content to content
First of all; this advance is determined as beginning from simple determinatenesses the succeeding
ones becoming ever richer and more concrete。 For the result contains its beginning and its course
has enriched it by a fresh determinateness。 The universal constitutes the foundation; the advance is
therefore not to be taken as a flowing from one other to the next other。 In the absolute method the
Notion maintains itself in its otherness。 the universal in its particularisation; in judgement and reality;
at each stage of its further determination it raises the entire mass of its preceding content; and by
its dialectical advance it not only does not lose anything or leave anything behind; but carries along
with it all it has gained; and inwardly enriches and consolidates itself。
This expansion may be regarded as the moment of content; and in the whole as the first premise;
the universal is communicated to the wealth of content; immediately maintained in it。 But the
relationship has also its second; negative or dialectical side。 The enrichment proceeds in the
necessity of the Notion; it is held by it; and each determination is a r