science of logic-第66节

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itself；　shows　itself　to　be　the　other　of　itself。　

Taken　quite　generally；　this　determination　can　be　taken　to　mean　that　what　is　at　first　immediate　now
appears　as　mediated；　related　to　an　other；　or　that　the　universal　appears　as　a　particular。　Hence　the
second　term　that　has　thereby　come　into　being　is　the　negative　of　the　first；　and　if　we　anticipate　the
subsequent　progress；　the　first　negative。　The　immediate；　from　this　negative　side；　has　been
extinguished　in　the　other；　but　the　other　is　essentially　not　the　empty　negative；　the　nothing；　that　is
taken　to　be　the　usual　result　of　dialectic；　rather　is　it　the　other　of　the　first；　the　negative　of　the
immediate；　it　is　therefore　determined　as　the　mediated　…　contains　in　general　the　determination　of　the
first　within　itself。　Consequently　the　first　is　essentially　preserved　and　retained　even　in　the　other。　To
hold　fast　to　the　positive　in　its　negative；　in　the　content　of　the　presupposition；　in　the　result；　this　is　the
most　important　feature　in　rational　cognition；　at　the　same　time　only　the　simplest　reflection　is　needed
to　convince　one　of　the　absolute　truth　and　necessity　of　this　requirement　and　so　far　as　examples　of
the　proof　of　this　are　concerned；　the　whole　of　logic　consists　solely　of　such。　

Accordingly；　what　we　now　have　before　us　is　the　mediated；　which　to　begin　with；　or；　if　it　is　likewise
taken　immediately；　is　also　a　simple　determination；　for　as　the　first　has　been　extinguished　in　it；　only
the　second　is　present。　Now　since　the　first　also　is　contained　in　the　second；　and　the　latter　is　the　truth
of　the　former；　this　unity　can　be　expressed　as　a　proposition　in　which　the　immediate　is　put　as
subject；　and　the　mediated　as　its　predicate；　for　example；　the　finite；　one　is　infinite；　one　is　many；　the
individual　is　the　universal。　However；　the　inadequate　form　of　such　propositions　is　at　once　obvious。
In　treating　of　the　judgement　it　has　been　shown　that　its　form　in　general；　and　most　of　all　the
immediate　form　of　the　positive　judgement；　is　incapable　of　holding　within　its　grasp　speculative
determinations　and　truth。　The　direct　supplement　to　it；　the　negative　judgement；　would　at　least　have
to　be　added　as　well。　In　the　judgement　the　first；　as　subject；　has　the　illusory　show　of　a
self…dependent　subsistence；　whereas　it　is　sublated　in　its　predicate　as　in　its　other；　this　negation　is
indeed　contained　in　the　content　of　the　above　propositions；　but　their　positive　form　contradicts　the
content；　consequently　what　is　contained　in　them　is　not　posited　…　which　would　be　precisely　the
purpose　of　employing　a　proposition。　

The　second　determination；　the　negative　or　mediated；　is　at　the　same　time　also　the　mediating
determination。　It　may　be　taken　in　the　first　instance　as　a　simple　determination；　but　in　its　truth　it　is　a
relation　or　relationship；　for　it　is　the　negative；　but　the　negative　of　the　positive；　and　includes　the
positive　within　itself。　It　is　therefore　the　other；　but　not　the　other　of　something　to　which　it　is　indifferent
…　in　that　case　it　would　not　be　an　other；　nor　a　relation　or　relationship　…　rather　it　is　the　other　in　its
own　self；　the　other　of　an　other；　therefore　it　includes　its　own　other　within　it　and　is　consequently　as
contradiction；　the　posited　dialectic　of　itself。　Because　the　first　or　the　immediate　is　implicitly　the
Notion；　and　consequently　is　also　only　implicitly　the　negative；　the　dialectical　moment　with　it　consists
in　positing　in　it　the　difference　that　it　implicitly　contains。　The　second；　on　the　contrary；　is　itself　the
determinate　moment；　the　difference　or　relationship；　therefore　with　it　the　dialectical　moment　consists
in　positing　the　unity　that　is　contained　in　it。　

If　then　the　negative；　the　determinate；　relationship；　judgement；　and　all　the　determinations　falling
under　this　second　moment　do　not　at　once　appear　on　their　own　account　as　contradiction　and　as
dialectical。　this　is　solely　the　fault　of　a　thinking　that　does　not　bring　its　thoughts　together。　For　the
material；　the　opposed　determinations　in　one　relation；　is　already　posited　and　at　hand　for　thought。
But　formal　thinking　makes　identity　its　law；　and　allows　the　contradictory　content　before　it　to　sink
into　the　sphere　of　ordinary　conception；　into　space　and　time；　in　which　the　contradictories　are　held
asunder　in　juxtaposition　and　temporal　succession　and　so　come　before　consciousness　without
reciprocal　contact。　

On　this　point；　formal　thinking　lays　down　for　its　principle　that　contradiction　is　unthinkable：　but　as　a
matter　of　fact　the　thinking　of　contradiction　is　the　essential　moment　of　the　Notion。　Formal　thinking
does　in　fact　think　contradiction；　only　it　at　once　looks　away　from　it；　and　in　saying　that　it　is
unthinkable　it　merely　passes　over　from　it　into　abstract　negation。　

Now　the　negativity　just　considered　constitutes　the　turning　point　of　the　movement　of　the　Notion。　It
is　the　simple　point　of　the　negative　relation　to　self；　the　innermost　source　of　all　activity　of　all　animate
and　spiritual　self…movement；　the　dialectical　soul　that　everything　true　possesses　and　through　which
alone　it　is　true；　for　on　this　subjectivity　alone　rests　the　sublating　of　the　opposition　between　the
Notion　and　reality；　and　the　unity　that　is　truth。　The　second　negative；　the　negative　of　the　negative；　at
which　we　have　arrived；　is　this　sublating　of　the　contradiction；　but　just　as　little　as　the　contradiction　is
it　an　act　of　external　reflection；　but　rather　the　innermost；　most　objective　moment　of　life　and　spirit
through　which　a　subject；　a　person；　a　free　being；　exists。　

The　relation　of　the　negative　to　itself　is　to　be　regarded　as　the　second　premise　of　the　whole
syllogism。　If　the　terms　analytic　and　synthetic　are　employed　as　opposites；　the　first　premise　may
be　regarded　as　the　analytic　moment；　for　in　it　the　immediate　stands　in　immediate　relationship　to　its
other　and　therefore　passes　over；　or　rather　has　passed　over；　into　it　…　although　this　relation；　as
already　remarked；　is　also　synthetic；　precisely　because　that　into　which　it　passes　over　is　its　other。
The　second　premise　here　under　consideration　may　be　defined　as　synthetic；　since　it　is　the　relation
of　the　differentiated　term　as　such　to　the　term　from　which　it　is　differentiated。　Just　as　the　first
premise　is　the　moment　of　universality　and　communication；　so　the　second　is　determined　by
individuality；　which　in　its　relation　to　its　other　is　primarily　exclusive；　for　itself；　and　different。　The
negative　appears　as　the　mediating　element；　since　it　includes　within　it　itself　and　the　immediate
whose　negation　it　is。　So　far　as　these　two　determinations　are　taken　in　some　relationship　or　other　as
externally　related；　the　negative　is　only　the　formal　mediating　element；　but　as　absolute　negativity　the
negative　moment　of　absolute　mediation　is　the　unity　which　is　subjectivity　and　soul。　

In　this　turning　point　of　the　method；　the　course　of　cognition　at　the　same　time　returns　into　itself。　As
self…sublating　contradiction　this　negativity　is　the　restoration　of　the　first　immediacy；　of　simple
universality；　for　the　other　of　the　other；　the　negative　of　the　negative；　is　immediately　the　positive；　the
identical；　the　universal。　If　one　insists　on　counting；　this　second　immediate　is；　in　the　course　of　the
method　as　a　whole；　the　third　term　to　the　first　immediate　and　the　mediated。　It　is　also；　however；　the
third　term　to　the　first　or　formal　negative　and　to　absolute　negativity　or　the　second　negative；　now　as
the　first　negative　is　already　the　second　term；　the　term　reckoned　as　third　can　also　be　reckoned　as
fourth；　and　instead　of　a　triplicity；　the　abstract　form　may　be　taken　as　a　quadruplicity；　in　this　way；
the　negative　or　the　difference　is　counted　as　a　duality。　The　third　or　fourth　is　in　general　the　unity　of
the　first　and　second　moments；　of　the　immediate　and　the　mediated。　

That　it　is　this　unity；　as　also　that　the　whole　form　of　the　method　is　a　triplicity；　is；　it　is　true；　merely　the
superficial　external　side　of　the　mode　of　cognition；　but　to　have　demonstrated　even　this；　and　that　too
in　a　more　specific　application　…　for　it　is　well　known　that　the　abstract　number　form　itself　was
advanced　at　quite　an　early　period；　but；　in　the　absence　of　the　Notion；　without　result　…　must　also　be
regarded　as　an　infinite　merit　of　the　Kantian　philosophy。
　

The　syllogism；　which　is　threefold；　has　always　been　recognised　as　the　universal　form　of　reason；　but
for　one　thing　it　counted　generally　for　a　quite　external　form　that　did　not　determine　the　nature　of　the
content；　and　for　another　thing；　since　it　progresses　in　the　formal　sense　merely　in　the　understanding's
determination　of　identity；　it　lacks　the　essential　dialectical　moment　of　negativity；　yet　this　moment
enters　into　the　triplicity　of　determinations　because　the　third　is　the　unity　of　the　first　two；　and　these；
since　they　are　different；　can　be　in　the　unity　only　as　sublated　determinations。　Formalism　has；　it　is
true；　also　taken　possession　of　triplicity　and　adhered　to　its　empty　schema；　the　shallow　ineptitude
and　barrenness　of　modern　philosophic　construction　so…called；　that　consists　in　nothing　but　fastening
this　schema　on　to　everything　without　Notion　and　immanent　determination　and　employing　it　for　an
external　arrangement；　has　made　the　said　form　tedious　and　given　it　a　bad　name。　Yet　the　triteness　of
this　use　of　it　cannot　detract　from　its　inner　worth　and　we　m