science of logic-第65节

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procedure　of　the　finite　cognition　of　the　understanding　here　is　to　take　up　again；　equally　externally；
what　it　has　left　out　in　its　creation　of　the　universal　by　a　process　of　abstraction。　
The　absolute　method；　on　the　contrary；　does　not　behave　like　external　reflection　but　takes　the
determinate　element　from　its　own　subject　matter；　since　it　is　itself　that　subject　matter's　immanent
principle　and　soul。　This　is　what　Plato　demanded　of　cognition；　that　it　should　consider　things　in　and
for　themselves；　that　is；　should　consider　them　partly　in　their　universality；　but　also　that　it　should　not
stray　away　from　them　catching　at　circumstances；　examples　and　comparisons；　but　should　keep
before　it　solely　the　things　themselves　and　bring　before　consciousness　what　is　immanent　in　them。　

The　method　of　absolute　cognition　is　to　this　extent　analytic。　That　it　finds　the　further　determination
of　its　initial　universal　simply　and　solely　in　that　universal；　is　the　absolute　objectivity　of　the　Notion；　of
which　objectivity　the　method　is　the　certainty。　But　the　method　is　no　less　synthetic；　since　its　subject
matter；　determined　immediately　as　a　simple　universal；　by　virtue　of　the　determinateness　which　it
possesses　in　its　very　immediacy　and　universality；　exhibits　itself　as　an　other。　
This　relation　of　differential　elements　which　the　subject　matter　thus　is　within　itself；　is　however　no
longer　the　same　thing　as　is　meant　by　synthesis　in　finite　cognition；　the　mere　fact　of　the　subject
matter's　no　less　analytic　determination　in　general；　that　the　relation　is　relation　within　the　Notion；
completely　distinguishes　it　from　the　latter　synthesis。　
This　no　less　synthetic　than　analytic　moment　of　judgement；　by　which　the　universal　of　the　beginning
of　its　own　accord　determines　itself　as　the　other　of　itself；　is　to　be　named　the　dialectical　moment。


　　　　　　　　　　＇Lenin's　Summary　of　Dialectics　appears　at　this　point　in　Lenin's　annotations＇

Dialectic　is　one　of　those　ancient　sciences　that　have　been　most　misunderstood　in　the　metaphysics　of
the　moderns；　as　well　as　by　popular　philosophy　in　general；　ancient　and　modern　alike。　
Diogenes　Laertius　says　of　Plato　that；　just　as　Thales　was　the　founder　of　natural　philosophy　and
Socrates　of　moral　philosophy；　so　Plato　was　the　founder　of　the　third　science　pertaining　to
philosophy；　namely；　dialectic　…　a　service　which　the　ancient　world　esteemed　his　highest；　but　which
often　remains　quite　overlooked　by　those　who　have　most　to　say　about　him。　
Dialectic　has　often　been　regarded　as　an　art；　as　though　it　rested　on　a　subjective　talent　and　did　not
belong　to　the　objectivity　of　the　Notion。　The　shape　it　takes　and　the　result　it　reaches　in　Kantian
philosophy　have　already　been　pointed　out　in　the　specific　examples　of　the　Kantian　view　of　it。　It
must　be　regarded　as　a　step　of　infinite　importance　that　dialectic　is　once　more　recognised　as
necessary　to　reason；　although　the　result　to　be　drawn　from　it　must　be　the　opposite　of　that　arrived　at
by　Kant。　

Besides　the　fact　that　dialectic　is　generally　regarded　as　contingent；　it　usually　takes　the　following
more　precise　form。　It　is　shown　that　there　belongs　to　some　subject　matter　or　other；　for　example　the
world；　motion；　point；　and　so　on；　some　determination　or　other；　for　example　（taking　the　objects　in
the　order　named）；　finite　in　space　or　time；　presence　in　this　place；　absolute　negation　of　space；　but
further；　that　with　equal　necessity　the　opposite　determination　also　belongs　to　the　subject　matter；　for
example；　infinity　in　space　and　time；　non…presence　in　this　place；　relation　to　space　and　so　spatiality。
The　older　Eleatic　school　directed　its　dialectic　chiefly　against　motion。　Plato　frequently　against　the
general　ideas　and　notions　of　his　time；　especially　those　of　the　Sophists；　but　also　against　the　pure
categories　and　the　determinations　of　reflection；　the　more　cultivated　scepticism　of　a　later　period
extended　it　not　only　to　the　immediate　so…called　facts　of　consciousness　and　maxims　of　common　life；
but　also　to　all　the　notions　of　science。　

Now　the　conclusion　drawn　from　dialectic　of　this　kind　is　in　general　the　contradiction　and　nullity　of
the　assertion　made。　But　this　conclusion　can　be　drawn　in　either　of　two　senses　either　in　the　objective
sense；　that　the　subject　matter　which　in　such　a　manner　contradicts　itself　cancels　itself　out　and　is　null
and　void　…　this　was；　for　example；　the　conclusion　of　the　Eleatics；　according　to　which　truth　was
denied；　for　example；　to　the　world；　to　motion；　to　the　point；　or　in　the　subjective　sense；　that　cognition
is　defective。　

One　way　of　understanding　the　latter　sense　of　the　conclusion　is　that　it　is　only　this　dialectic　that
imposes　on　us　the　trick　of　an　illusion。　This　is　the　common　view　of　so…called　sound　common　sense
which　takes　its　stand　on　the　evidence　of　the　senses　and　on　customary　conceptions　and
judgements。　Sometimes　it　takes　this　dialectic　lightly；　as　when　Diogenes　the　cynic　exposes　the
hollowness　of　the　dialectic　of　motion　by　silently　walking　up　and　down；；　but　often　it　flies　into　a
passion；　seeing　it　in　perhaps　a　piece　of　sheer　foolery；　or；　when　morally　important　objects　are
concerned；　an　outrage　that　tries　to　unsettle　what　is　essentially　established　and　teaches　how　to
supply　wickedness　with　grounds。　This　is　the　view　expressed　in　the　Socratic　dialectic　against　that　of
the　Sophists；　and　this　is　the　indignation　which；　turned　in　the　opposite　direction；　cost　even　Socrates
his　life。　The　vulgar　refutation　that　opposes　to　thinking；　as　did　Diogenes；　sensuous　consciousness
and　imagines　that　in　the　latter　it　possesses　the　truth；　must　be　left　to　itself；　but　in　so　far　as　dialectic
abrogates　moral　determinations；　we　must　have　confidence　in　reason　that　it　will　know　how　to
restore　them　again；　but　restore　them　in　their　truth　and　in　the　consciousness　of　their　right；　though
also　of　their　limitations。　Or　again；　the　conclusion　of　subjective　nullity　may　mean　that　it　does　not
affect　dialectic　itself；　but　rather　the　cognition　against　which　it　is　directed　and　in　the　view　of
scepticism　and　likewise　of　the　Kantian　philosophy；　cognition　in　general。　

The　fundamental　prejudice　in　this　matter　is　that　dialectic　has　only　a　negative　result；　a　point　which
will　presently　be　more　precisely　defined。　First　of　all　as　regards　the　above…mentioned　form　in　which
dialectic　is　usually　presented；　it　is　to　be　observed　that　according　to　that　form　the　dialectic　and　its
result　affect　the　subject　matter　under　consideration　or　else　subjective　cognition；　and　declare
either　the　latter　or　the　subject　matter　to　be　null　and　void；　while　on　the　other　hand　the
determinations　exhibited　in　the　subject　matter　as　in　a　third　thing　receive　no　attention　and　are
presupposed　as　valid　on　their　own　account。　

It　is　an　infinite　merit　of　the　Kantian　Philosophy　to　have　drawn　attention　to　this　uncritical　procedure
and　by　so　doing　to　have　given　the　impetus　to　the　restoration　of　logic　and　dialectic　in　the　sense　of
the　examination　of　the　determinations　。of　thought　in　and　for　themselves。　
The　subject　matter　kept　apart　from　thinking　and　the　Notion；　is　an　image　or　even　a　name；　it　is　in　the
determinations　of　thought　and　the　Notion　that　it　is　what　it　is。　Therefore　these　determinations　are　in
fact　the　sole　thing　that　matters；　they　are　the　true　subject　matter　and　content　of　reason；　and　anything
else　that　one　understands　by　subject　matter　and　content　in　distinction　from　them　as　value　only
through　them　and　in　them。　It　must　not　therefore　be　considered　the　fault　of　a　subject　matter　or　of
cognition　that　these　determinations；　through　their　constitution　and　an　external　connection；　show
themselves　dialectical。　On　that　assumption；　the　subject　matter　or　the　cognition　is　represented　as　a
subject　into　which　the　determinations　in　the　form　of　predicates；　properties；　self…subsistent
universals；　are　introduced　in　such　a　manner　that；　fixed　and　correct　as　they　are　by　themselves；　they
are　brought　into　dialectical　relationships　and　contradiction　only　by　extraneous　and　contingent
connection　in　and　by　a　third　thing。　This　kind　of　external　and　fixed　subject　of　imagination　and
understanding　and　these　abstract　determinations；　far　from　meriting　the　status　of　ultimates；　of
secure　and　permanent　substrates；　are　rather　to　be　regarded　as　themselves　immediate；　as　just　that
kind　of　presupposed　and　initial　immediate　that；　as　was　shown　above；　must　in　its　own　essential
nature　＇in　and　for　itself＇　submit　to　dialectic；　because　it　is　to　be　taken　as　in　itself　the　Notion。　

Thus　all　the　oppositions　that　are　assumed　as　fixed；　as　for　example　finite　and　infinite；　individual　and
universal；　are　not　in　contradiction　through；　say；　an　external　connection；　on　the　contrary；　as　an
examination　of　their　nature　has　shown；　they　are　in　and　for　themselves　a　transition；　the　synthesis　and
the　subject　in　which　they　appear　is　the　product　of　their　Notion's　own　reflection。　If　a　consideration
that　ignores　the　Notion　stops　short　at　their　external　relationship；　isolates　them　and　leaves　them　as
fixed　presuppositions；　it　is　the　Notion；　on　the　contrary；　that　keeps　them　steadily　in　view；　moves
them　as　their　soul　and　brings　out　their　dialectic。　

Now　this　is　the　very　standpoint　indicated　above　from　which　a　universal　first；　considered　in　and　for
itself；　shows　itself　to　be　the　other　of　itself。　

Ta