science of logic-第57节

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determination　rests　the　difference　between　what　the　Notion　is　in　itself　or　as　subjective　and　what
it　is　when　submerged　in　objectivity；　and　then　in　the　Idea　of　life。　

In　the　latter　it　is　indeed　distinguished　from　its　external　reality　and　posited　for　itself；　yet　this　its
being…for…self　it　possesses　only　as　the　identity　that　is　a　relation　to　itself　as　submerged　in　its
subjugated　objectivity；　or　to　itself　as　indwelling；　substantial　form。　The　elevation　of　the　Notion
above　life　means　that　its　reality　is　the　Notion　form　liberated　into　universality。　Through　this
judgement　the　Idea　is　duplicated　into　the　subjective　Notion　whose　reality　is　the　Notion　itself；　and
into　the　objective　Notion　that　is　in　the　form　of　life。　Thinking；　spirit；　self…consciousness；　are
determinations　of　the　Idea　where　it　has　itself　for　object；　and　its　determinate　being；　that　is；　the
determinateness　of　its　being；　is　its　own　difference　from　itself。　

The　metaphysics　of　the　spirit；　or；　as　it　was　more　commonly　expressed；　of　the　soul　revolved
round　the　determinations　of　substance；　simplicity；　immateriality　…　determinations　in　which　the
general　idea　of　spirit　taken　from　empirical　consciousness；　was　laid　down　as　subject；　and　it　was
then　asked；　What　predicates　agree　with　our　observations？　This　kind　of　procedure　could　get　no
further　than　the　procedure　of　physics；　which　reduces　the　world　of　phenomena　to　general　laws　and
reflective　determinations　since　it　too　was　based　on　spirit　merely　in　its　phenomenal　aspect；　in　fact
this　procedure　was　bound　to　fall　short　even　of　the　scientific　character　of　physics。　

Since　spirit　is　not　only　infinitely　richer　than　nature；　but　also；　its　essence　is　constituted　by　the
absolute　unity　of　opposites　in　the　Notion；　it　exhibits　in　its　phenomenal　aspect　and　relation　to
externality　contradiction　in　its　extreme　form。　Consequently；　it　must　be　possible　to　adduce　an
experience　in　support　of　each　of　the　opposed　reflective　determinations；　or　starting　from　experience
it　must　be　possible　to　arrive　at　opposite　determinations　by　way　of　formal　syllogistic　reasoning。　

Since　the　predicates　immediately　yielded　by　spirit's　phenomenal　aspect　in　the　first　instance　still
belong　to　empirical　Psychology；　there　only　remain；　strictly　speaking；　for　the　metaphysical
consideration；　the　wholly　inadequate　determinations　of　reflection。　Kant；　in　his　criticism　of　rational
psychology　adheres　to　this　metaphysics；　insisting　that；　in　so　far　as　rational　psychology　purports　to
be　a　rational　science；　the　smallest　addition　from　observation　to　the　general　idea　of
selfconsciousness　would　transform　that　science　into　an　empirical　one　and　mar　its　rational　purity
and　its　independence　of　all　experience。　Consequently；　on　this　view；　nothing　is　left　but　the　simple
representation；　'I'；　a　representation　devoid　of　any　content　of　its　own；　of　which　we　cannot　even　say
that　it　is　a　notion　but　a　mere　consciousness　that　accompanies　every　notion。　Now　according　to
the　further　Kantian　conclusions；　by　this　'I'；　or　if　you　like；　it　（the　thing）　that　thinks；　nothing　further　is
represented　than　a　transcendental　subject　of　thoughts　=　x；　which　is　cognised　only　through　the
thoughts　which　are　its　predicates；　and　of　which；　taken　in　its　isolation；　we　can　never　have　the　least
conception。　In　this　context；　the　'I'　has　the　inconvenience；　to　use　Kant's　own　expression　that　we
must　already　make　use　of　it　whenever　we　want　make　any　judgement　about　it；　for　it　is　not　so
much　a　single　representation　by　which　a　particular　object　is　distinguished；　but　rather　a　form　of
representation　in　general　in　so　far　as　this　is　to　be　called　cognition。　Now　the　paralogism　committed
by　rational　psychology；　says　Kant；　consists　in　this；　that　modes　of　self…consciousness　in　thinking　are
converted　into　notions　of　the　understanding　as　applied　to　an　object；　that　the　'I　think'　is　taken　as
a　thinking　being；　a　thing…in…itself；　and　that　in　this　way；　from　the　fact　that　I　always　occur　in
consciousness　as　a　subject；　and　that　too　as　a　singular　subject；　identical　in　all　the　multiplicity　of
representation；　and　distinguishing　myself　from　the　latter　as　from　something　external　to　me；　the
unjustified　inference　is　drawn　that　the　'I'　is　a　substance；　and　further　a　qualitatively　simple　being；
and　a　one；　and　something　that　has　a　real　existence　independently　of　the　things　of　time　and　space。　

I　have　drawn　out　this　exposition　in　some　detail；　because　it　shows　clearly　the　nature　of　the　previous
metaphysics　of　the　soul　and　especially；　too；　the　nature　of　the　criticism　by　which　it　was　made
obsolete。　The　former　aimed　at　determining　the　abstract　essence　of　the　soul；　in　doing　so；　it　started
originally　from　observation　and　converted　the　empirical　universality　of　observation　and　the　wholly
external　reflective　determination　attaching　to　the　individuality　of　the　actual；　into　the　form　of　the
above…mentioned　determinations　of　essence。　Kant　in　his　criticism　had　generally　in　mind　only　the
state　of　the　metaphysics　of　his　time；　which　in　the　main　adhered　to　these　abstract；　one…sided
determinations　wholly　devoid　of　dialectic；　the　genuinely　speculative　ideas　of　older　philosophers　on
the　notion　of　spirit　he　neither　heeded　nor　examined。　In　his　criticism　then　of　those　determinations；　he
followed　quite　simply　Hume's　style　of　scepticism；　that　is　to　say；　he　holds　fast　to　the　'I'　as　it　appears
in　self…consciousness；　from　which；　however；　since　it　is　its　essence　…　the　thing…in…itself　…　that　we　are
to　cognise；　…　everything　empirical　must　be　omitted；　nothing　then　is　left　but　this　phenomenon　of　the
'I　think'　that　accompanies　every　representation　…　of　which　'I　think'　we　have　not　the　slightest
conception。　

Certainly；　it　must　be　conceded　that　we　have　not　the　least　conception　the　'I'；　or　of　anything
whatever；　not　even　of　the　Notion　itself；　so　long　as　we　do　not　really　think；　but　stop　short　at　the
simple；　fixed　general　idea　and　the　name。　It　is　an　odd　thought　…　if　it　can　be　called　a　thought　at　all　…
that　I　must　already　make　use　of　the　'I'　in　order　to　judge　of　the　'l'；　the　'I'　that　makes　use　of
selfconsciousness　as　a　means　in　order　to　judge；　this　is　indeed　an　x　of　which；　as　well　as　of　the
relationship　of　such　'making　use'；　we　cannot　have　the　slightest　conception。　But　surely　it　is　ridiculous
to　call　this　nature　of　self…consciousness；　namely；　that　the　'I'　thinks　itself；　that　the　'I'　cannot　be
thought　without　its　being　the　'I'　that　thinks；　an　inconvenience　and；　as　though　there　was　a　fallacy　in
it；　a　circle。　It　is　this　relationship　through　which；　in　immediate　self…consciousness；　the　absolute；
eternal　nature　of　self…consciousness　and　the　Notion　itself　manifests　itself；　and　manifests　itself　for
this　reason；　that　selfconsciousness　is　just　the　existent　pure　Notion；　and　therefore　empirically
perceptible；　the　absolute　relation…to…self　that；　as　a　separating　judgement；　makes　itself　its　own
object　and　is　solely　this　process　whereby　it　makes　itself　a　circle。　

A　stone　does　not　have　this　inconvenience；　when　it　is　to　be　thought　or　judged　it　does　not　stand　in
its　own　way。　It　is　relieved　from　the　burden　of　making　use　of　itself　for　this　task；　it　is　something　else
outside　it　that　must　give　itself　this　trouble。　

Kant's　Critique　of　Rational　Psychology

A　The　Idea　of　the　True

The　subjective　Idea　is　in　the　first　instance　an　urge。　For　it　is　the　contradiction　of　the　Notion　to　have
itself　for　object　and　to　be　its　own　reality；　yet　without　the　object　being　an　other；　that　is；
self…subsistent　over　against　it；　or　without　the　difference　of　the　Notion　from　itself　possessing　at　the
same　time　the　essential　determination　of　diversity　and　indifferent　existence。　The　specific　nature　of
this　urge　is　therefore　to　sublate　its　own　subjectivity；　to　make　its　first；　abstract　reality　into　a　concrete
one　and　to　fill　it　with　the　content　of　the　world　presupposed　by　its　subjectivity。　

From　the　other　side；　this　urge　is　determined　in　the　following　manner：　the　Notion　is；　it　is　true；　the
absolute　certainty　of　itself；　but　its　being…for…self　is　confronted　by　its　presupposition　of　a　world
having　the　form　of　implicit　being；　but　a　world　whose　indifferent　otherness　has　for　the
self…certainty　of　the　Notion　the　value　merely　of　an　unessentiality；　it　is　thus　the　urge　to　sublate　this
otherness　and　to　intuit　in　the　object　its　identity　with　itself。　This　reflection…into　self　is　the　sublated
opposition；　and　the　individuality　which　initially　appears　as　the　presupposed　implicit　being　of　a
world　is　now　posited　as　individuality　and　made　actual　for　the　subject；　accordingly　the
reflection…into…self　is　the　self…identity　of　the　form　restored　out　of　the　opposition　…　an　identity　that　is
therefore　determined　as　indifferent　to　the　form　in　its　distinctiveness　and　is　content。　

This　urge　is　therefore　the　urge　to　truth　in　so　far　as　truth　is　in　cognition；　accordingly　to　truth　in　its
proper　sense　as　theoretical　Idea。　Objective　truth　is　no　doubt　the　Idea　itself　as　the　reality　that
corresponds　to　the　Notion；　and　to　this　extent　an　object　may　or　may　not　possess　truth；　but；　on　the
other　hand；　the　more　precise　meaning　of　truth　is　that　it　is　truth　for　or　in　the　subjective　Notion；　in
knowing。　It　is　the　relation　of　the　Notion　judgement　which　showed　itself　to　be　the　formal
judgement　of　truth；　in　it；　namely；　the　pr