science of logic-第50节
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examine the sole question to which philosophic interest demands an answer; namely; which of the
two principles possesses truth in and for itself; but for this point of view it makes no difference
whether the principles are to be regarded as objective; which means here; externally existing
determinations of nature; or as mere maxims of a subjective cognition; rather; that is a subjective;
that is; a contingent conjunction which; as the occasion demands; applies one or the other maxim
according as it holds it to be appropriate to the given objects; but without further enquiry into the
truth of these determinations themselves; whether these are determinations of the objects or of
cognition。
However unsatisfactory; therefore; the discussion of the teleological principle is in respect of its
essential point of view; nevertheless the position that Kant gives to it is worthy of note。 In ascribing
it to a reflective judgment; he makes it a connecting middle term between the universal of
reason and theindividual of intuition; further; he distinguishes this reflective judgment from the
determining judgment; the latter merely subsuming the particular under the universal。 Such a
universal which merely subsumes; is an abstraction which only becomes concrete in something
else; in the particular。 End; on the contrary; is the concrete universal; which possesses in its own
self the moment of particularity and externality and is therefore active and the urge to repel itself
from itself。 The Notion; as end; is of course an objective judgment in which one determination;
the subject; namely the concrete Notion; is selfdetermined; while the other is not merely a
predicate but external objectivity。 But the end relation is not for that reason a reflective judging
that considers external objects only according to a unity; as though an intelligence had given this
unity for the convenience of our cognitive faculty; on the contrary it is the absolute truth that
judges objectively and determines external objectivity absolutely。 Thus the end relation is more
than judgment; it is the syllogism of the self…subsistent free Notion that unites itself with itself
through objectivity。
End has shown itself to be the third to mechanism and chemism it is their truth。 Since it still stands
within the sphere of objectivity; or of the immediacy of the total Notion; it is still affected by
externality as such and is confronted by an objective world to which it relates itself。 From this side;
mechanical causality; which in general is to be taken as including chemism; still makes its
appearance in this end relation which is the external one; but as subordinate to it and as
sublated in and for itself。 As regards the more precise relationship; the mechanical object is; as an
immediate totality; indifferent to its being determined; and on the other hand is equally indifferent to
being a determinant。 This external determinedness has now developed into self…determination and
accordingly the Notion; which in the object was merely the inner; or what is the same thing;
merely the outer Notion; is now posited; end is; in the first instance; just this very Notion that is
external to the Notion of mechanism。 Thus for chemism too; end is the self…determining principle
which brings back into the unity of the Notion the external determinedness by which it is
conditioned。 From this can be seen the nature of the subordination of the two previous forms of
the objective process; the other; which in them lies in the infinite progress; is the Notion posited at
first as external to them; which is end; not only is the Notion their substance; but externality; too; is
for them an essential moment constituting their determinateness。 Thus mechanical or chemical
technique; through its character of being externally determined; offers itself spontaneously to the
end relation; which we have now to consider more closely。
A。 The Subjective End
In the centrality of the objective sphere; which is an indifference to determinateness; the
subjective Notion has first rediscovered and posited the negative point of unity; but in chemism
it has posited the objectivity of the Notion determinations by which it is first posited as
concrete objective Notion。 Its determinateness or simple difference now possesses within itself
the determinateness of externality; and its simple unity is consequently the unity that repels itself
from itself and in so doing maintains itself。 End therefore is the subjective Notion as an essential
effort and urge to posit itself externally。 In this process it is exempt from transition。 It is neither a
force expressing itself nor a substance and cause manifesting itself in accidents and effects。 Force
that has not expressed itself is only an abstract inner; that is; it is only in its expression; to which it
must be solicited; that it has a determinate being。
Similarly with cause and substance; since they have actuality only in the accidents and the effect;
their activity is transition; against which they do not maintain themselves in freedom。 End may
indeed also be defined as force and cause; but these expressions fulfil only an incomplete side of
its significance; if they are to be predicated of it as it truly is; they can be predicated only in a way
that sublates their Notion: as a force that solicits itself to expression; as a cause that is cause of
itself; or whose effect is immediately cause。
When purposiveness is ascribed to an intelligence; as was mentioned above; then in doing so
regard is had to the specific element of the content。 But in general end is to be taken as the
rational in its concrete existence。 It manifests rationality because it is the concrete Notion;
which holds the objective difference within its absolute unity。 It is therefore essentially in its
own self syllogism。 It is the self…equal universal and this; as containing self…repellent negativity; is in
the first instance universal; and therefore as yet indeterminate; activity; but because this is
negative relation…to…self it determines itself immediately; giving itself the moment of particularity;
which; as likewise the totality of the form reflected into itself; is content as against the
posited differences of the form。 Equally immediately this negativity; through its relation…to…self; is
absolute reflection of the form into itself and individuality。 On the one hand this reflection is the
inner universality of the subject; while on the other it is a reflection outwards; and to this extent
end is still a subjective end and its activity is directed against external objectivity。
For end is the Notion that has come to itself in objectivity; the determinateness it has given itself in
that sphere is that of objective indifference to and externality of its determinedness; its
self…repellent negativity is; therefore; one whose moments; being determinations only of the Notion
itself; also have the form of objective indifference to one another。 Even in the formal judgement;
subject and predicate are determined as self…subsistent in their relationship; but their
self…subsistence is so far only abstract universality。 It has now attained the determination of
objectivity; but as moment of the Notion; this complete difference is enclosed within the simple
unity of the Notion。 Now in so far as end is this total reflection of objectivity into itself and is so
immediately; in the first place; the self…determination or particularity as simple reflection into self
is distinct from the concrete form; and is a determinate content。 From this side; end is finite;
although in respect of its form it is infinite subjectivity。 Secondly; because its determinateness has
the form of subjective indifference; it has the shape of a presupposition; and from this side its
finitude consists in its being confronted by an objective; mechanical and chemical world to which
its activity relates itself as to something already there; its self…determining activity is thus; in its
identity; immediately external to itself and as much reflection outwards as reflection…into…self。 To
this extent end still has a genuinely extramundane existence — to the extent; namely; that it is
confronted by this objectivity; just as the latter on the other hand confronts it as a mechanical and
chemical whole not yet determined and pervaded by the end。
Accordingly; the movement of end can now be expressed as having for its aim to sublate its
presupposition; that is the immediacy of the object; and to posit the object as determined by the
Notion。 This negative attitude towards the object is just as much a negative attitude towards itself;
a sublating of the subjectivity of the end。 Positively; it is the realisation of the end; namely; the
union of objective being with it; so that this being; which; as a moment of the end is immediately
the determinateness identical with it; shall appear as external determinateness; and conversely the
objective as presupposition shall instead be posited as determined by the Notion。 End is in its
own self the urge to realise itself; the determinateness of the moments of the Notion is externality;
but their simplicity in the unity of the Noti