science of logic-第41节

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the　judgment　in　which　it　was　lost　in　the　extremes。　Through　this　impregnation　of　the　copula　the
judgment　has　become　the　syllogism。




THE　DOCTRINE　OF　THE　NOTION
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Section　One：　Subjectivity
Chapter　3　The　Syllogism

We　have　found　the　syllogism　to　be　the　restoration　of　the　Notion　in　the　judgment；　and
consequently　the　unity　and　truth　of　both。　The　Notion　as　such　holds　its　moments　sublated　in　unity；
in　the　judgment　this　unity　is　internal　or；　what　is　the　same　thing；　external；　and　the　moments；　although
related；　are　posited　as　self…subsistent　extremes。　In　the　syllogism　the　Notion　determinations　are
like　the　extremes　of　the　judgment；　and　at　the　same　time　their　determinate　unity　is　posited。

Thus　the　syllogism　is　the　completely　posited　Notion；　it　is　therefore　the　rational。　The　understanding
is　regarded　as　the　faculty　of　the　determinate　Notion　which　is　held　fast　in　isolation　by　abstraction
and　the　form　of　universality。　But　in　reason　the　determinate　Notions　are　posited　in　their　totality
and　unity。　Therefore；　not　only　is　the　syllogism　rational；　but　everything　rational　is　a　syllogism。
The　syllogistic　process　has　for　a　long　time　been　ascribed　to　reason；　yet　on　the　other　hand　reason　in
and　for　itself；　rational　principles　and　laws；　are　spoken　of　in　such　a　way　that　it　is　not　clear　what　is
the　connection　between　the　former　reason　which　syllogises　and　the　latter　reason　which　is　the
source　of　laws　and　other　eternal　truths　and　absolute　thoughts。　If　the　former　is　supposed　to　be
merely　formal　reason；　while　the　latter　is　supposed　to　be　creative　of　content；　then　according　to　this
distinction　it　is　precisely　the　form　of　reason；　the　syllogism；　that　must　not　be　lacking　in　the　latter。
Nevertheless；　to　such　a　degree　are　the　two　commonly　held　apart；　and　not　mentioned　together；　that
it　seems　as　though　the　reason　of　absolute　thoughts　was　ashamed　of　the　reason　of　the　syllogism　and
as　though　it　was　only　in　deference　to　tradition　that　the　syllogism　was　also　adduced　as　an　activity　of
reason。　Yet　it　is　obvious；　as　we　have　just　remarked；　that　the　logical　reason；　if　it　is　regarded　as
formal　reason；　must　essentially　be　recognisable　also　in　the　reason　that　is　concerned　with　a　content；
the　fact　is　that　no　content　can　be　rational　except　through　the　rational　form。　In　this　matter　we　cannot
look　for　any　help　in　the　common　chatter　about　reason；　for　this　refrains　from　stating　what　is　to　be
understood　by　reason；　this　supposedly　rational　cognition　is　mostly　so　busy　with　its　objects　that　it
forgets　to　cognise　reason　itself　and　only　distinguishes　and　characterises　it　by　the　objects　that　it
possesses。　If　reason　is　supposed　to　be　the　cognition　that　knows　about　God；　freedom；　right　and
duty；　the　infinite；　unconditioned；　supersensuous；　or　even　gives　only　ideas　and　feelings　of　these
objects；　then　for　one　thing　these　latter　are　only　negative　objects；　and　for　another　thing　the　first
question　still　remains；　what　it　is　in　all　these　objects　that　makes　them　rational。　It　is　this；　that　the
infinitude　of　these　objects　is　not　the　empty　abstraction　from　the　finite；　not　the　universality　that　lacks
content　and　determinateness；　but　the　universality　that　is　fulfilled　or　realised；　the　Notion　that　is
determinate　and　possesses　its　determinateness　in　this　true　way；　namely；　that　it　differentiates　itself
within　itself　and　is　the　unity　of　these　fixed　and　determinate　differences。　It　is　only　thus　that　reason
rises　above　the　finite；　conditioned；　sensuous；　call　it　what　you　will；　and　in　this　negativity　is
essentially　pregnant　with　content；　for　it　is　the　unity　of　determinate　extremes；　as　such；　however；
the　rational　is　nothing　but　the　syllogism。

Now　the　syllogism；　like　the　judgment；　is　in　the　first　instance　immediate；　hence　its　determinations
are　simple；　abstract　determinatenesses；　in　this　form　it　is　the　syllogism　of　the　understanding。　If
we　stop　short　at　this　form　of　the　syllogism；　then　the　rationality　in　it；　although　undoubtedly　present
and　posited；　is　not　apparent。　The　essential　feature　of　the　syllogism　is　the　unity　of　the　extremes；　the
middle　term　which　unites　them；　and　the　ground　which　supports　them。　Abstraction；　in　holding
rigidly　to　the　self…subsistence　of　the　extremes；　opposes　this　unity　to　them　as　a　determinateness
which　likewise　is　fixed　and　self…subsistent；　and　in　this　way　apprehends　it　rather　as　non…unity　than
as　unity。　The　expression　middle　term　is　taken　from　spatial　representation　and　contributes　its　share
to　the　stopping　short　at　the　mutual　externality　of　the　terms。　Now　if　the　syllogism　consists　in　the
unity　of　the　extremes　being　posited　in　it；　and　if；　all　the　same；　this　unity　is　simply　taken　on　the　one
hand　as　a　particular　on　its　own；　and　on　the　other　hand　as　a　merely　external　relation；　and　non…unity
is　made　the　essential　relationship　of　the　syllogism；　then　the　reason　which　constitutes　the　syllogism
contributes　nothing　to　rationality。

First；　the　syllogism　of　existence　in　which　the　terms　are　thus　immediately　and　abstractly
determined；　demonstrates　in　itself　（since；　like　the　judgment；　it　is　their　relation）　that　they　are　not　in
fact　such　abstract　terms；　but　that　each　contains　the　relation　to　the　other　and　that　the　middle　term
is　not　particularity　as　opposed　to　the　determinations　of　the　extremes　but　contains　these　terms
posited　in　it。

Through　this　its　dialectic　it　is　converted　into　the　syllogism　of　reflection；　into　the　second　syllogism。
The　terms　of　this　are　such　that　each　essentially　shows　in；　or　is　reflected　into；　the　other；　in　other
words　they　are　posited　as　mediated；　which　they　are　supposed　to　be　in　accordance　with　the　nature
of　the　syllogism　in　general。

Thirdly；　in　that　this　reflecting　or　mediatedness　of　the　extremes　is　reflected　into　itself；　the　syllogism
is　determined　as　the　syllogism　of　necessity；　in　which　the　mediating　element　is　the　objective　nature
of　the　thing。　As　this　syllogism　determines　the　extremes　of　the　Notion　equally　as　totalities；　the
syllogism　has　attained　to　the　correspondence　of　its　Notion　or　the　middle　term；　and　its　existence　of
the　difference　of　its　extremes；　that　is；　it　has　attained　to　its　truth　and　in　doing　so　has　passed　out　of
subjectivity　into　objectivity。

A　The　Syllogism　of　Existence

1。　The　syllogism　in　its　immediate　form　has　for　its　moments　the　determinations　of　the　Notion　as
immediate。　Hence　they　are　the　abstract　determinatenesses　of　form；　which　are　not　yet　developed
by　mediation　into　concretion；　but　are　only　single　determinatenesses。　The　first　syllogism　is；
therefore；　strictly　the　formal　syllogism。　The　formalism　of　the　syllogising　process　consists　in
stopping　short　at　the　determination　of　this　first　syllogism。　The　Notion；　differentiated　into　its
abstract　moments；　has　individuality　and　universality　for　its　extremes；　and　appears　itself　as　the
particularity　standing　between　them。　On　account　of　their　immediacy　they　are　merely　self…related
determinatenesses；　and　one　and　all　a　single　content。　Particularity　constitutes　the　middle　term　in
the　first　instance　since　it　unites　immediately　within　itself　the　two　moments　of　individuality　and
universality。　On　account　of　its　determinateness　it　is　on　the　one　hand　subsumed　under　the　universal；
while　on　the　other　hand　the　individual；　as　against　which　it　possesses　universality；　is　subsumed
under　it。　But　this　concretion　is　in　the　first　instance　merely　a　duality　of　aspect；　on　account　of　the
immediacy　in　which　the　middle　term　presents　itself　in　the　immediate　syllogism。　it　appears　as　a
simple　determinateness；　and　the　mediation　which　it　constitutes　is　not　yet　posited。　Now　the
dialectical　movement　of　the　syllogism　of　existence　consists　in　the　positing　in　its　moments　of　the
mediation　that　alone　constitutes　the　syllogism。

（a）　First　Figure　of　the　Syllogism　I…P…U

（b）　The　Second　Figure　P…I…U　

（c）　The　Third　Figure　I…U…P　

（d）　The　Fourth　Figure　U…U…U　

B　The　Syllogism　of　Reflection

The　course　of　the　qualitative　syllogism　has　sublated　what　was　abstract　in　its　terms　with　the　result
that　the　term　has　posited　itself　as　a　determinateness　in　which　the　other　determinateness　is　also
reflected。　Besides　the　abstract　terms；　the　syllogism　also　contains　their　relation；　and　in　the
conclusion　this　relation　is　posited　as　mediated　and　necessary；　therefore　each　determinateness　is　in
truth　posited　not　as　an　individual；　separate　one；　but　as　a　relation　to　the　other；　as　a　concrete
determinateness。

The　middle　term　was　abstract　particularity；　by　itself　a　simple　determinateness；　and　was　a　middle
term　only　externally　and　relatively　to　the　self…subsistent　extremes。　Now　it　is　posited　as　the　totality
of　the　terms；　as　such　it　is　the　posited　unity　of　the　extremes；　but　in　the　first　instance　it　is　the　unity　of
reflection　which　embraces　them　within　itself…an　inclusion　which；　as　the　first　sublating　of　immediacy
and　the　first　relating　of　the　terms；　is　not　yet　the　absolute　identity　of　the　Notion。

The　extremes　are　the　determinations　of　the　judgment　of　reflection；　individuality　proper　and
universality　as　a　connective　determination　or　a　reflection　embracing　a　manifold　within　itself。　But
the　individual　subject　also　contains；　as　we　have　seen　in　the　case　of　the　judgment　of　reflection；
besides　the　bare　individuality　which　belongs　to　form；　determinateness　as　unive