science of logic-第33节

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the　absolute　form　itself　and　consequently　also　adequate　to　it。　For　this　reason；　this　form　is　of　quite
another　nature　than　logical　form　is　ordinarily　taken　to　be。　It　is　already　on　its　own　account　truth；
since　this　content　is　adequate　to　its　form；　or　the　reality　to　its　Notion；　and　it　is　the　pure　truth
because　the　determinations　of　the　content　do　not　yet　have　the　form　of　an　absolute　otherness　or　of
absolute　immediacy。　When　Kant；　in　connection　with　logic　comes　to　discuss　the　old　and　famous
question：　what　is　truth？　he　first　of　all　presents　to　the　reader　as　a　triviality　the　explanation　of　the
term　as　the　agreement　of　cognition　with　its　object　a　definition　of　great；　indeed　of　supreme；　value。　If
we　remember　this　definition　in　connection　with　the　fundamental　assertion　of　transcendental
idealism；　that　reason　as　cognitive　is　incapable　of　apprehending　things…in…themselves；　that　reality
lies　absolutely　outside　the　Notion；　then　it　is　at　once　evident　that　a　reason　such　as　this　which　is
unable　to　put　itself　in　agreement　with　its　object；　the　things…in…themselves；　and　things…in…themselves
that　are　not　in　agreement　with　the　Notion　of　reason；　the　Notion　that　is　not　in　agreement　with
reality；　and　a　reality　that　does　not　agree　with　the　Notion；　are　untrue　conceptions。　If　Kant　had
considered　the　Idea　of　an　intuitive　understanding　in　the　light　of　the　above　definition　of　truth；　he
would　have　treated　that　Idea　which　expresses　the　required　agreement；　not　as　a　figment　of　thought
but　rather　as　the　truth。　

'What　we　require　to　know'　Kant　goes　on　to　say；　'is　a　universal　and　sure　criterion　of　any　cognition
whatever；　it　would　be　such　a　criterion　as　would　be　valid　for　all　cognitions　without　distinction　of
their　objects；　but　since　with　such　a　criterion　abstraction　would　be　made　from　all　content　of　the
cognition　（relation　to　its　object）　and　truth　concerns　precisely　this　content；　it　would　be　quite
impossible　and　absurd　to　ask　for　a　mark　of　the　truth　of　this　content　of　cognitions。'　Here；　the
usual　conception　of　the　formal　function　of　logic　is　expressed　very　definitely　and　the　argument
adduced　has　a　very　convincing　air。　But　first　of　all　it　is　to　be　observed　that　it　usually　happens　with
such　formal　ratiocination　that　it　forgets　in　its　discourse　the　very　point　on　which　it　has　based　its
argument　and　of　which　it　is　speaking。　It　is　alleged　that　it　would　be　absurd　to　ask　for　the　criterion　of
the　truth　of　the　content　of　cognition；　but　according　to　the　definition　it　is　not　the　content　that
constitutes　the　truth；　but　the　agreement　of　the　content　with　the　Notion。　A　content　such　as　is　here
spoken　of；　without　the　Notion；　is　something　notionless；　and　hence　without　essential　being；
certainly　we　cannot　ask　for　the　criterion　of　the　truth　of　such　a　content；　but　for　the　very　opposite
reason；　not；　that　is；　because　the　content；　as　something　notionless；　is　not　the　required　agreement；
but　simply　because　it　cannot　be　anything　more　than　a　mere　truthless　opinion。　Let　us　leave　on　one
side　the　content　which　causes　the　confusion　here　the　confusion　into　which　formalism　falls　whenever
it　sets　out　to　explain　something　and　which　makes　it　say　the　opposite　of　what　it　intends　and　let　us
stop　at　the　abstract　view　that　logic　is　only　formal　and；　in　fact；　abstracts　from　all　content；　we　then
have　a　one…sided　cognition　which　is　not　to　contain　any　object；　an　empty；　blank　form　which
therefore　is　no　more　an　agreement　for　an　agreement　essentially　requires　two　terms　then　it　is　truth。
In　the　a　priori　synthesis　of　the　Notion；　Kant　possessed　a　higher　principle　in　which　a　duality　in　a
unity　could　be　cognised；　a　cognition；　therefore；　of　what　is　required　for　truth；　but　the　material　of
sense；　the　manifold　of　intuition；　was　too　strong　for　him　and　he　was　unable　to　get　away　from　it　to　a
consideration　of　the　Notion　and　the　categories　in　and　for　themselves　and　to　a　speculative　method
of　philosophising。　

Logic　being　the　science　of　the　absolute　form；　this　formal　science；　in　order　to　be　true；　must　possess
in　its　own　self　a　content　adequate　to　its　form；　and　all　the　more；　since　the　formal　element　of　logic　is
the　pure　form；　and　therefore　the　truth　of　logic　must　be　the　pure　truth　itself。　Consequently　this
formal　science　must　be　regarded　as　possessing　richer　determinations　and　a　richer　content　and　as
being　infinitely　more　potent　in　its　influence　on　the　concrete　than　is　usually　supposed。　The　laws　of
logic　by　themselves　（not　counting　the　heterogeneous　accretions　of　applied　logic　and　the　rest　of　the
psychological　and　anthropological　material）　are　commonly　restricted；　apart　from　the　law　of
contradiction；　to　some　meagre　propositions　concerning　the　conversion　of　judgements　and　the
forms　of　syllogisms。　Even　here　the　forms　which　come　up　for　treatment　as　well　as　their　further
modifications　are　only；　as　it　were；　historically　taken　up；　they　are　not　subjected　to　criticism　to
determine　whether　they　are　in　and　for　themselves　true。　Thus；　for　example；　the　form　of　the　positive
judgement　is　accepted　as　something　perfectly　correct　in　itself；　the　question　whether　such　a
judgement　is　true　depending　solely　on　the　content。　Whether　this　form　is　in　its　own　self　a　form　of
truth；　whether　the　proposition　it　enunciates；　the　individual　is　a　universal；　is　not　inherently
dialectical；　is　a　question　that　no　one　thinks　of　investigating。　It　is　straightway　assumed　that　this
judgement　is；　on　its　own　account；　capable　of　containing　truth　and　that　the　proposition　enunciated
by　any　positive　judgement　is　true；　although　it　is　directly　evident　that　it　lacks　what　is　required　by　the
definition　of　truth；　namely；　the　agreement　of　the　Notion　and　its　object；　if　the　predicate；　which　here
is　the　universal；　is　taken　as　the　Notion；　and　the　subject；　which　is　the　individual；　is　taken　as　the
object；　then　the　one　does　not　agree　with　the　other。　But　if　the　abstract　universal　which　is　the
predicate　falls　short　of　constituting　a　Notion；　for　a　Notion　certainly　implies　something　more；　and　if；
too；　a　subject　of　this　kind　is　not　yet　much　more　than　a　grammatical　one；　how　should　the　judgement
possibly　contain　truth　seeing　that　either　its　Notion　and　object　do　not　agree；　or　it　lacks　both　Notion
and　object？　On　the　contrary；　then；　what　is　impossible　and　absurd　is　to　attempt　to　grasp　the　truth
in　such　forms　as　the　positive　judgement　and　the　judgement　generally。　Just　as　the　Kantian
philosophy　did　not　consider　the　categories　in　and　for　themselves　but　declared　them　to　be　finite
determinations　incapable　of　containing　truth；　on　the　wrong　ground　that　they　are　subjective　forms　of
self…consciousness；　still　less　did　that　philosophy　subject　to　criticism　the　forms　of　the　Notion　which
are　the　content　of　ordinary　logic；　on　the　contrary；　it　has　adopted　a　portion　of　them；　namely；　the
functions　of　judgement；　for　the　determination　of　the　categories　and　accepted　them　as　valid
presuppositions。　Even　if　we　are　to　see　in　logical　forms　nothing　more　than　formal　functions　of
thought；　they　would　for　that　very　reason　be　worthy　of　investigation　to　ascertain　how　far；　on　their
own　account；　they　correspond　to　the　truth。　A　logic　that　does　not　perform　this　task　can　at　most
claim　the　value　of　a　descriptive　natural　history　of　the　phenomena　of　thinking　just　as　they　occur。　It　is
an　infinite　merit　of　Aristotle；　one　that　must　fill　us　with　the　highest　admiration　for　the　powers　of　that
genius；　that　he　was　the　first　to　undertake　this　description。　It　is　necessary　however　to　go　further　and
to　ascertain　both　the　systematic　connection　of　these　forms　and　their　value。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Division　

The　foregoing　consideration　of　the　Notion　shows　it　to　be　the　unity　of　being　and　essence。　Essence
is　the　first　negation　of　being；　which　has　thereby　become　illusory　being；　the　Notion　is　the　second
negation　or　the　negation　of　this　negation；　and　is　therefore　being　once　more；　but　being　that　has
been　restored　as　the　infinite　mediation　and　negativity　of　being　within　itself。　Consequently；　being
and　essence　in　the　Notion　no　longer　have　the　same　determination　that　they　had　as　being　and
essence；　nor　are　they　merely　in　a　unity　such　that　each　has　an　illusory　being　in　the　other。　Therefore
the　Notion　does　not　differentiate　itself　into　these　determinations。　It　is　the　truth　of　the　relationship　of
substance　in　which　being　and　essence　achieve　the　fulfilment　of　their　self…subsistence　and　their
determination　through　each　other。　The　truth　of　substantiality　proved　to　be　the　substantial　identity
which　is　no　less　a　positedness　and　only　as　such　is　substantial　identity。　The　positedness　is　a
determinate　being　and　differentiation；　consequently；　in　the　Notion；　being…in…and…for…itself　has
attained　a　true　and　adequate　reality；　for　the　positedness　is　itself　being…in…and…for…itself。　This
positedness　constitutes　the　difference　of　the　Notion　within　itself；　because　the　positedness　is
immediately　being…in…and…for…itself；　the　different　moments　of　the　Notion　are　themselves　the
whole　Notion；　universal　in　their　determinateness　and　identical　with　their　negation。

This；　now；　is　the　very　Notion　of　the　Notion。　But　it　is　as　yet　only　its　Notion；　or；　this　Notion　is　itself
only　the　Notion。　Because　it　is　equally　being…in…and…for…self　and　also　a　positedness；　or　the　absolute
substance　that　manifests　th