science of logic-第31节

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the　logical　element　are　declared　to　be　something　merely　formal　which；　since　it　abstracts　from　the
content；　does　not　contain　truth。　

Now；　in　the　first　place；　as　regards　the　relation　of　the　understanding　or　the　Notion　to　the　stages
presupposed　by　it；　the　form　of　these　stages　is　determined　by　the　particular　science　under
consideration。　In　our　science；　that　of　pure　logic；　these　stages　are　being　and　essence。　In
psychology　the　antecedent　stages　are　feeling　and　intuition；　and　then　ideation　generally。　In　the
phenomenology　of　spirit；　which　is　the　doctrine　of　consciousness；　the　ascent　to　the　understanding
is　through　the　stages　of　sensuous　consciousness　and　then　perception。　Kant　presupposes　only
feeling　and　intuition。　How　incomplete　to　begin　with　this　scale　of　stages　is　is　revealed　by　the　fact
that　he　himself　adds　as　an　appendix　to　the　transcendental　logic　or　doctrine　of　the　understanding　a
treatise　on　the　concepts　of　reflection　a　sphere　lying　between　intuition　and　the　understanding
or　being　and　the　Notion。　

About　these　stages　themselves　it　must　be　remarked；　first　of　all；　that　the　forms　of　intuition；　ideation
and　the　like　belong　to　the　self…conscious　spirit　which；　as　such；　does　not　fall　to　be　considered　in　the
science　of　logic。　It　is　true　that　the　pure　determinations　of　being；　essence　and　the　Notion　constitute
the　ground　plan　and　the　inner　simple　framework　of　the　forms　of　the　spirit；　spirit　as　intuiting　and
also　as　sensuous　consciousness　is　in　the　form　of　immediate　being；　and；　similarly；　spirit　as　ideating
and　as　perceiving　has　risen　from　being　to　the　stage　of　essence　or　reflection。　But　these　concrete
forms　as　little　concern　the　science　of　logic　as　do　the　concrete　forms　assumed　by　the　logical
categories　in　nature；　which　would　be　space　and　time；　then　space　and　time　self…filled　with　a
content　as　inorganic　nature；　and　lastly；　organic　nature。　


Similarly　here；　too；　the　Notion　is　to　be　regarded　not　as　the　act　of　the　self…conscious　understanding；
not　as　the　subjective　understanding；　but　as　the　Notion　in　its　own　absolute　character　which
constitutes　a　stage　of　nature　as　well　as　of　spirit。　Life；　or　organic　nature；　is　the　stage　of　nature　at
which　the　Notion　emerges；　but　as　blind；　as　unaware　of　itself　and　unthinking；　the　Notion　that　is
self…conscious　and　thinks　pertains　solely　to　spirit。　But　the　logical　form　of　the　Notion　is　independent
of　its　non…spiritual；　and　also　of　its　spiritual；　shapes。　The　necessary　premonition　on　this　point　has
already　been　given　in　the　Introduction。　It　is　a　point　that　must　not　wait　to　be　established　within　logic
itself　but　must　be　cleared　up　before　that　science　is　begun。
　

Now　whatever　may　be　the　forms　of　the　stages　which　precede　the　Notion；　we　come　secondly　to
the　relation　in　which　the　Notion　is　thought　to　these　forms。　The　conception　of　this　relation　both
in　ordinary　psychology　and　in　the　Kantian　transcendental　philosophy　is　that　the　empirical　material；
the　manifold　of　intuition　and　representation；　first　exists　on　its　own　account；　and　that　then　the
understanding　approaches　it；　brings　unity　into　it　and　by　abstraction　raises　it　to　the　form　of
universality。　The　understanding　is　in　this　way　an　intrinsically　empty　form　which；　on　the　one　hand；
obtains　a　reality　through　the　said　given　content　and；　on　the　other　hand；　abstracts　from　that
content；　that　is　to　say；　lets　it　drop　as　something　useless；　but　useless　only　for　the　Notion。　In　both
these　actions　the　Notion　is　not　the　independent　factor；　not　the　essential　and　true　element　of　the
prior　given　material；　on　the　contrary；　it　is　the　material　that　is　regarded　as　the　absolute　reality；　which
cannot　be　extracted　from　the　Notion。　

Now　it　must　certainly　be　admitted　that　the　Notion　as　such　is　not　yet　complete；　but　must　rise　to　the
Idea　which　alone　is　the　unity　of　the　Notion　and　reality；　and　this　must　be　shown　in　the　sequel　to　be
the　spontaneous　outcome　of　the　nature　of　the　Notion　itself。　For　the　reality　which　the　Notion
gives　itself　must　not　be　received　by　it　as　something　external　but　must；　in　accordance　with　the
requirement　of　the　science；　be　derived　from　the　Notion　itself。　But　the　truth　is　that　it　is　not　the
material　given　by　intuition　and　representation　that　ought　to　be　vindicated　as　the　real　in　contrast　to
the　Notion。　People　often　say；　'It　is　only　a　notion；'　contrasting　the　notion　not　only　with　the　Idea　but
with　sensuous；　spatial　and　temporal；　palpable　reality　as　something　more　excellent　than　the　Notion；
and　then　the　abstract　is　held　to　be　of　less　account　than　the　concrete　because　it　lacks　so　much　of
this　kind　of　material。　In　this　view；　to　abstract　means　to　select　from　the　concrete　object　for　our
subjective　purposes　this　or　that　mark　without　thereby　detracting　from　the　worth　and　status　of
the　many　other　properties　and　features　left　out　of　account；　on　the　contrary；　these　as　real　retain
their　validity　completely　unimpaired；　only　they　are　left　yonder；　on　the　other　side；　thus　it　is　only　the
inability　of　the　understanding　to　assimilate　such　wealth　that　compels　it　to　content　itself　with　the
impoverished　abstraction。　Now　to　regard　the　given　material　of　intuition　and　the　manifold　of
representation　as　the　real　in　contrast　to　what　is　thought；　to　the　Notion；　is　a　view；　the
abandonment　of　which　is　not　only　a　condition　of　philosophising　but　is　already　presupposed　by
religion；　for　how　can　there　be　any　need　for　religion；　how　can　religion　have　any　meaning；　if　the
fleeting　and　superficial　phenomena　of　the　world　of　sensuous　particulars　are　still　regarded　as　the
truth？　But　philosophy　gives　a　reasoned　insight　into　the　true　state　of　the　case　with　regard　to　the
reality　of　sensuous　being；　it　assumes　the　stages　of　feeling　and　intuition　as　precedent　to　the
understanding　in　so　far　as　they　are　conditions　of　its　genesis；　but　only　in　the　sense　that　it　is
conditioned　by　their　reality。　Abstract　thinking；　therefore；　is　not　to　be　regarded　as　a　mere　setting
aside　of　the　sensuous　material；　the　reality　of　which　is　not　thereby　impaired；　rather　is　it　the　sublating
and　reduction　of　that　material　as　mere　phenomenal　appearance　to　the　essential；　which　is
manifested　only　in　the　Notion。　


Of　course；　if　what　is　taken　up　into　the　Notion　from　the　concrete　phenomenon　is　to　serve　only　as　a
mark　or　sign；　it　certainly　may　be　any　mere　random　sensuous　particular　determination　of　the
object；　selected　from　the　others　on　the　basis　of　any　random　external　interest　and　of　a　similar　kind
and　nature　as　the　rest。　

A　capital　misunderstanding　which　prevails　on　this　point　is　that　the　natural　principle　or　the
beginning　which　forms　the　starting　point　in　the　natural　evolution　or　in　the　history　of　the
developing　individual；　is　regarded　as　the　truth；　and　the　first　in　the　Notion。　Now　in　the　order　of
nature；　intuition　or　being　are　undoubtedly　first；　or　are　the　condition　for　the　Notion；　but　they　are　not
on　that　account　the　absolutely　unconditioned；　on　the　contrary；　their　reality　is　sublated　in　the　Notion
and　with　it；　too；　the　illusory　show　they　possessed　of　being　the　conditioning　reality。　When　it　is　a
question；　not　of　truth　but　merely　of　history；　as　in　pictorial　and　phenomenal　thinking；　we　need　not
of　course　go　beyond　merely　narrating　that　we　start　with　feelings　and　intuitions　and　that　from　the
manifold　of　these　the　understanding　extracts　a　universality　or　an　abstraction　and　naturally　requires
for　this　purpose　the　said　substrate　of　feelings　and　intuitions　which；　in　this　process　of　abstraction；
remains　for　representation　in　the　same　complete　reality　with　which　it　first　presented　itself。　But
philosophy　is　not　meant　to　be　a　narration　of　happenings　but　a　cognition　of　what　is　true　in　them；
and　further；　on　the　basis　of　this　cognition；　to　comprehend　that　which；　in　the　narrative；　appears　as　a
mere　happening。

If　the　superficial　conception　of　what　the　Notion　is；　leaves　all　manifoldness　outside　the　Notion　and
attributes　to　the　latter　only　the　form　of　abstract　universality　or　the　empty　identity　of　reflection；　we
can　at　once　appeal　to　the　fact　that　quite　apart　from　the　view　here　propounded；　the　statement　or
definition　of　a　notion　expressly　includes　not　only　the　genus；　which　itself　is；　properly　speaking；　more
than　a　purely　abstract　universality；　but　also　the　specific　determinateness。　If　one　would　but　reflect
attentively　on　the　meaning　of　this　fact；　one　would　see　that　differentiation　must　be　regarded　as　an
equally　essential　moment　of　the　Notion。　Kant　has　introduced　this　consideration　by　the　extremely
important　thought　that　there　are　synthetic　judgements　a　priori。　This　original　synthesis　of
apperception　is　one　of　the　most　profound　principles　for　speculative　development；　it　contains　the
beginning　of　a　true　apprehension　of　the　nature　of　the　Notion　and　is　completely　opposed　to　that
empty　identity　or　abstract　universality　which　is　not　within　itself　a　synthesis。　The　further
development；　however；　does　not　fulfil　the　promise　of　the　beginning。　The　very　expression　synthesis
easily　recalls　the　conception　of　an　external　unity　and　a　mere　combination　of　entities　that　are
intrinsically　separate。　Then；　again；　the　Kantian　philosophy　has　not　got　beyond　the　psychological
reflex　of　the　Notion　and　has　reverted　once　more　to　the　assertion　that　the　Notion　is　permanently
conditioned　by　a　mani