science of logic-第30节

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negation　of　the　determinateness；　and　the　Notion　as　this　equality　with　itself　is　the　universal。　But　this
identity　has　equally　the　determination　of　negativity；　it　is　the　negation　or　determinateness　which　is
self…related；　thus　the　Notion　is　the　individual。　Each　of　them；　the　universal　and　the　individual；　is　the
totality；　each　contains　within　itself　the　determination　of　the　other　and　therefore　these　totalities　are
one　and　one　only；　just　as　this　unity　is　the　differentiation　of　itself　into　the　free　illusion　of　this
duality…of　a　duality　which；　in　the　difference　of　the　individual　and　the　universal；　appears　as　a
complete　opposition；　yet　an　opposition　which　is　so　entirely　illusory　that　in　thinking　and　enunciating
the　one；　the　other　also　is　immediately　thought　and　enunciated。

The　foregoing　is　to　be　regarded　as　the　Notion　of　the　Notion。　It　may　seem　to　differ　from　what　is
elsewhere　understood　by　'notion'　and　in　that　case　we　might　be　asked　to　indicate　how　that　which
we　have　here　found　to　be　the　Notion　is　contained　in　other　conceptions　or　explanations。　On　the
one　hand；　however；　there　can　be　no　question　of　a　confirmation　based　on　the　authority　of　the
ordinary　understanding　of　the　term；　in　the　science　of　the　Notion　its　content　and　character　can　be
guaranteed　solely　by　the　immanent　deduction　which　contains　its　genesis　and　which　already　lies
behind　us。　On　the　other　hand；　the　Notion　as　here　deduced　must；　of　course；　be　recognisable　in
principle　in　what　is　elsewhere　presented　as　the　concept　of　the　Notion。　But　it　is　not　so　easy　to
discover　what　others　have　said　about　the　nature　of　the　Notion。　For　in　the　main　they　do　not
concern　themselves　at　all　with　the　question；　presupposing　that　everyone　who　uses　the　word
…automatically　knows　what　it　means。　Latterly；　one　could　have　felt　all　the　more　relieved　from　any
need　to　trouble　about　the　Notion　since；　just　as　it　was　the　fashion　for　a　while　to　say　everything　bad
about　the　imagination；　and　then　the　memory；　so　in　philosophy　it　became　the　habit　some　time　ago；　a
habit　which　in　some　measure　still　exists；　to　heap　every　kind　of　slander　on　the　Notion；　on　what　is
supreme　in　thought；　while　the　incomprehensible　and　non…comprehension　are；　on　the　contrary；
regarded　as　the　pinnacle　of　science　and　morality。　I　will　confine　myself　here　to　a　remark　which　may
help　one　to　grasp　the　notions　here　developed　and　may　make　it　easier　to　find　one's　bearings　in
them。　The　Notion；　when　it　has　developed　into　a　concrete　existence　that　is　itself　free；　is　none　other
than　the　I　or　pure　self…consciousness。　True；　I　have　notions；　that　is　to　say；　determinate　notions；　but
the　I　is　the　pure　Notion　itself　which；　as　Notion；　has　come　into　existence。　When；　therefore；
reference　is　made　to　the　fundamental　determinations　which　constitute　the　nature　of　the　I；　we　may
presuppose　that　the　reference　is　to　something　familiar；　that　is；　a　commonplace　of　our　ordinary
thinking。　But　the　I　is；　first；　this　pure　self…related　unity；　and　it　is　so　not　immediately　but　only　as
making　abstraction　from　all　determinateness　and　content　and　withdrawing　into　the　freedom　of
unrestricted　equality　with　itself。　As　such　it　is　universality；　a　unity　that　is　unity　with　itself　only
through　its　negative　attitude；　which　appears　as　a　process　of　abstraction；　and　that　consequently
contains　all　determinedness　dissolved　in　it。　Secondly；　the　I　as　self…related　negativity　is　no　less
immediately　individuality　or　is　absolutely　determined；　opposing　itself　to　all　that　is　other　and
excluding　it…individual　personality。　This　absolute　universality　which　is　also　immediately　an
absolute　individualisation；　and　an　absolutely　determined　being；　which　is　a　pure　positedness　and
is　this　absolutely　determined　being　it　only　through　its　unity　with　the　positedness；　this　constitutes
the　nature　of　the　I…　as　well　as　of　the　Notion；　neither　the　one　nor　the　other　can　be　truly
comprehended　unless　the　two　indicated　moments　are　grasped　at　the　same　time　both　in　their
abstraction　and　also　in　their　perfect　unity。

When　one　speaks　in　the　ordinary　way　of　the　understanding　possessed　by　the　I；　one　understands
thereby　a　faculty　or　property　which　stands　in　the　same　relation　to　the　I　as　the　property　of　a　thing
does　to　the　thing　itself；　that　is；　to　an　indeterminate　substrate　that　is　not　the　genuine　ground　and　the
determinant　of　its　property。　According　to　this　conception　I　possess　notions　and　the　Notion；　just　as
I　also　possess　a　coat；　complexion；　and　other　external　properties。　
　

Now　Kant　went　beyond　this　external　relation　of　the　understanding；　as　the　faculty　of　notions　and　of
the　Notion　itself；　to　the　I。　It　is　one　of　the　profoundest　and　truest　insights　to　be　found　in　the
Critique　of　Pure　Reason　that　the　unity　which　constitutes　the　nature　of　the　Notion　is　recognised　as
the　original　synthetic　unity　of　apperception；　as　unity　of　the　I　think；　or　of　self…consciousness。
This　proposition　constitutes　the　so…called　transcendental　deduction　of　the　categories；　but　this　has
always　been　regarded　as　one　of　the　most　difficult　parts　of　the　Kantian　philosophy；　doubtless　for　no
other　reason　than　that　it　demands　that　we　should　go　beyond　the　mere　representation　of　the
relation　in　which　the　I　stands　to　the　understanding；　or　notions　stand　to　a　thing　and　its　properties
and　accidents；　and　advance　to　the　thought　of　that　relation。　An　object；　says　Kant；　is　that　in　the
notion　of　which　the　manifold　of　a　given　intuition　is　unified。　But　all　unifying　of　representations
demands　a　unity　of　consciousness　in　the　synthesis　of　them。　Consequently　it　is　this　unity　of
consciousness　which　alone　constitutes　the　connection　of　the　representations　with　the　object　and
therewith　their　objective　validity　and　on　which　rests　even　the　possibility　of　the　understanding。
Kant　distinguishes　this　unity　from　the　subjective　unity　of　consciousness；　the　unity　of
representation　whereby　I　am　conscious　of　a　manifold　as　either　simultaneous　or　successive；　this
being　dependent　on　empirical　conditions。　On　the　other　hand；　the　principles　of　the　objective
determination　of　notions　are；　he　says；　to　be　derived　solely　from　the　principle　of　the
transcendental　unity　of　apperception。　Through　the　categories　which　are　these　objective
determinations；　the　manifold　of　given　representations　is　so　determined　as　to　be　brought　into　the
unity　of　consciousness。　According　to　this　exposition；　the　unity　of　the　notion　is　that　whereby
something　is　not　a　mere　mode　of　feeling；　an　intuition；　or　even　a　mere　representation；　but　is　an
object；　and　this　objective　unity　is　the　unity　of　the　ego　with　itself。　In　point　of　fact；　the
comprehension　of　an　object　consists　in　nothing　else　than　that　the　ego　makes　it　its　own；　pervades
it　and　brings　it　into　its　own　form；　that　is；　into　the　universality　that　is　immediately　a
determinateness；　or　a　determinateness　that　is　immediately　universality。　As　intuited　or　even　in
ordinary　conception；　the　object　is　still　something　external　and　alien。　When　it　is　comprehended；
the　being…in…and…for…self　which　it　possesses　in　intuition　and　pictorial　thought　is　transformed　into　a
positedness；　the　I　in　thinking　it　pervades　it。　


But　it　is　only　as　it　is　in　thought　that　the　object　is　truly　in　and　for　itself；　in　intuition　or　ordinary
conception　it　is　only　an　Appearance。　Thought　sublates　the　immediacy　with　which　the　object　at
first　confronts　us　and　thus　converts　the　object　into　a　positedness；　but　this　its　positedness　is　its
being…in…and…for…self；　or　its　objectivity。　The　object　therefore　has　its　objectivity　in　the　Notion　and
this　is　the　unity　of　self…consciousness　into　which　it　has　been　received；　consequently　its　objectivity；
or　the　Notion；　is　itself　none　other　than　the　nature　of　self…consciousness；　has　no　other　moments　or
determinations　than　the　I　itself。　

Thus　we　are　justified　by　a　cardinal　principle　of　the　Kantian　philosophy　in　referring　to　the　nature　of
the　I　in　order　to　learn　what　the　Notion　is。　But　conversely；　it　is　necessary　for　this　purpose　to　have
grasped　the　Notion　of　the　I　as　stated　above。　If　we　cling　to　the　mere　representation　of　the　I　as　it
floats　before　our　ordinary　consciousness；　then　the　I　is　only　the　simple　thing；　also　called　soul；　in
which　the　Notion　inheres　as　a　possession　or　property。　This　representation　which　makes　no
attempt　to　comprehend　either　the　I　or　the　Notion　cannot　serve　to　facilitate　or　bring　nearer　the
comprehension　of　the　Notion。　

The　Kantian　exposition　cited　above　contains　two　other　features　which　concern　the　Notion　and
necessitate　some　further　observations　In　the　first　place；　the　stage　of　the　understanding　is　supposed
to　be　preceded　by　the　stages　of　feeling　and　intuition；　and　it　is　an　essential　proposition　of　the
Kantian　transcendental　philosophy　that　without　intuitions　notions　are　empty　and　are　valid　solely
as　relations　of　the　manifold　given　by　intuition。　Secondly；　the　Notion　has　been　declared　to　be　the
objective　element　of　knowledge；　and　as　such；　the　truth。　But　on　the　other　hand；　the　Notion　is
taken　as　something　merely　subjective　from　which　we　cannot　extract　reality；　by　which　is　to　be
understood　objectivity；　since　reality　is　contrasted　with　subjectivity；　and；　in　general；　the　Notion　and
the　logical　element　are　declared　to　be　something　merely　formal　which；　since　it　abstracts　from　the
content；　does　not