science of logic-第15节

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regarded　as　forces　of　empirical　matter；　are　also　based　on　the　pure　determinations　here　considered
of　the　one　and　the　many　and　their　inter…relationships；　which；　because　these　names　are　most
obvious；　I　have　called　repulsion　and　attraction。

Kant's　method　in　the　deduction　of　matter　from　these　forces；　which　he　calls　a　construction；　when
looked　at　more　closely　does　not　deserve　this　name；　unless　any　exercise　of　reflection；　even
analytical　reflection；　is　to　be　called　a　construction；　and　later　philosophers　of　nature　have　in　fact
given　the　name　of　construction　to　the　shallowest　reasoning　and　the　most　baseless　concoction　of
unbridled　imagination　and　thoughtless　reflection…and　it　is　especially　for　the　so…called　factors　of
attraction　and　repulsion　that　such　philosophers　have　shown　a　predilection。

For　Kant's　method　is　basically　analytical；　not　constructive。　He　presupposes　the　idea　of　matter　and
then　asks　what　forces　are　required　to　maintain　the　determinations　he　has　presupposed。　Thus；　on
the　one　hand；　he　demands　the　force　of　attraction　because；　properly　speaking；　through　repulsion
alone　and　without　attraction　matter　could　not　exist；'　and　on　the　other　hand　he　derives　repulsion；
too；　from　matter　and　gives　as　the　reason　that　we　think　of　matter　as　impenetrable；　since　it　presents
itself　under　this　category　to　the　sense　of　touch　by　which　it　manifests　itself　to　us。　Consequently；　he
proceeds；　repulsion　is　at　once　thought　in　the　concept　of　matter　because　it　is　immediately　given
therein；　whereas　attraction　is　added　to　the　concept　syllogistically。　But　these　syllogisms；　too；　are
based　on　what　has　just　been　said；　namely；　that　matter　which　possessed　repulsive　force　alone；
would　not　exhaust　our　conception　of　matter。　

It　is　evident　that　this　is　the　method　of　a　cognition　which　reflects　on　experience；　which　first
perceives　the　determinations　in　a　phenomenon；　then　makes　these　the　fondation；　and　for　their
so…called　explanation　asumes　correspnding　basic　elements　or　forces　which　are　suppoed　to
produce　those　determinations　of　the　phenomenon。

With　respect　to　this　difference　as　to　the　way　in　which　cognition　finds　the　forces　of　repulsion　and
attraction　in　matter；　Kant　further　remarks　that　the　force　of　attraction　certainly　just　as　much　belongs
to　the　concept　of　matter　'although　it　is　not　contained　in　it'；　this　last　expression　is　italicised　by
Kant。　However；　it　is　hard　to　perceive　what　this　difference　is　supposed　to　be；　for　a　determination
which　belongs　to　the　concept　of　anything　must　be　truly　contained　in　it。

What　causes　the　difficulty　and　gives　rise　to　this　vain　subterfuge；　is　that　Kant　from　the　start
one…sidedly　attributes　to　the　concept　of　matter　only　the　determination　of　impenetrability；　which　we
are　supposed　to　perceive　by　the　sense　of　touch；　for　which　reason　the　force　of　repulsion　as　the
holding　off　of　an　other　from　itself　is　immediately　given。　But　if；　further；　the　existence　of　matter　is
supposed　to　be　impossible　without　attraction；　then　this　assertion　is　based　on　a　conception　of
matter　taken　from　sense　perception；　consequently；　the　determination　of　attraction；　too；　must　come
within　the　range　of　sense　perception。　It　is　indeed　easy　to　perceive　that　matter；　besides　its
being…for…self；　which　sublates　the　being…for…other　（offers　resistance）；　has　also　a　relation　between
its　self…determined　parts；　a　spatial　extension　and　cohesion；　and　in　rigidity　and　solidity　the
cohesion　is　very　firm。　Physics　explains　that　the　tearing　apart；　etc。；　of　a　body　requires　a　force　which
shall　be　stronger　than　the　mutual　attraction　of　the　parts　of　the　body。　From　this　observation
reflection　can　just　as　directly　derive　the　force　of　attraction　or　assume　it　as　given；　as　it　did　with　the
force　of　repulsion。　In　point　of　fact；　if　we　consider　Kant's　arguments　from　which　the　force　of
attraction　is　supposed　to　be　deduced　（the　proof　of　the　proposition　that　the　possibility　of　matter
requires　a　force　of　attraction　as　a　second　fundamental　force；　loc。　cit。）；　it　is　apparent　that　their　sole
content　is　this；　that　through　repulsion　alone　matter　would　not　be　spatial　Matter　being　presupposed
as　filling　space；　it　is　credited　with　continuity；　the　ground　of　which　is　assumed　to　be　the　force　of
attraction。

Now　if　the　merit　of　such　a　construction　of　matter　were　at　most　that　of　an　analysis　（though　a　merit
diminished　by　the　faulty　exposition）；　still　the　fundamental　thought；　namely；　the　derivation　of　matter
from　these　two　opposite　determinations　as　its　fundamental　forces；　must　always　be　highly
esteemed。　Kant　is　chiefly　concerned　to　banish　the　vulgar　mechanistic　way　of　thinking　which　stops
short　at　the　one　determination　of　impenetrability；　of　self…determined　and　self…subsistent　puncticity；
and　converts　into　something　external　the　opposite　determination；　the　relation　of　matter　within
itself　or　the　relation　of　a　plurality　of　matters；　which　in　turn　are　regarded　as　particular　ones…a　way　of
thinking　which；　as　Kant　says；　will　admit　no　motive　forces　except　pressure　and　thrust；　that　is；　only
action　from　without。　This　external　manner　of　thinking　always　presupposes　motion　as　already
externally　present　in　matter；　and　it　does　not　occur　to　it　to　regard　motion　as　something　immanent
and　to　comprehend　motion　itself　in　matter；　which　latter　is　thus　assumed　as；　on　its　own　account；
motionless　and　inert。　This　stand…point　has　before　it　only　ordinary　mechanics；　not　immanent　and
free　motion。　It　is　true　that　Kant　sublates　this　externality　in　so　far　as　he　makes　attraction　（the
relation　of　matters　to　one　another　in　so　far　as　these　are　assumed　as　separated　from　one　another；
or　matter　generally　in　its　self…externality）　a　force　of　matter　itself；　still；　on　the　other　hand；　his　two
fundamental　forces　within　matter　remain　external　to　and　completely　independent　of　each　other。

The　fixed　difference　of　these　two　forces　attributed　to　them　from　that　external　standpoint　is　no　less
null　than　any　other　distinction　must　show　itself　to　be　which；　in　respect　of　its　specific　content；　is
made　into　something　supposedly　fixed；　because　these　forces　are　only　moments　which　pass　over
into　each　other；　as　we　saw　above　when　they　were　considered　in　their　truth。　I　go　on　to　consider
these　other　distinctions　as　they　are　stated　by　Kant。

He　defines　the　force　of　attraction　as　a　penetrative　force　by　which　one　bit　of　matter　can　act　directly
on　the　parts　of　another　even　beyond　the　area　of　contact；　the　force　of　repulsion；　on　the　other　hand；
he　defines　as　a　surface　force　through　which　bits　of　matter　can　act　on　each　other　only　in　the
common　area　of　contact。　The　reason　adduced　that　the　latter　can　be　only　a　surface　force　is　as
follows：　'The　parts　in　contact　each　limit　the　sphere　of　action　of　the　other；　and　the　force　of
repulsion　cannot　move　any　more　distant　part　except　through　the　agency　of　the　intervening　parts；　an
immediate　action　of　one　part　of　matter　on　another　passing　right　across　these　intervening　parts　by
forces　of　expansion　（which　means　here；　forces　of　repulsion）　is　impossible。'

But　here　we　must　remember　that　in　assuming　'nearer'　or　'more　distant'　parts　of　matter；　the　same
distinction　would　likewise　arise　with　respect　to　attraction；　namely；　that　though　one　atom　acted　on
another；　yet　a　third；　more　distant　atom　（between　which　and　the　first　atom；　the　second　atom　would
be）；　would　first　enter　into　the　sphere　of　attraction　of　the　intervening　atom　nearer　to　it；　therefore　the
first　atom　would　not　have　an　immediate；　simple　action　on　the　third；　from　which　it　would　follow
that　the　action　of　the　force　of　attraction；　like　that　of　repulsion；　is　equally　mediated。　Further；　the
genuine　penetration　of　the　force　of　attraction　could　of　necessity　consist　only　in　this；　that　every
part　of　matter　was　in　and　for　itself　attractive；　not　that　a　certain　number　of　atoms　behaved　passively
and　only　one　atom　actively。　But　we　must　at　once　remark　with　respect　to　the　force　of　repulsion
itself　that　in　the　passage　quoted；　'parts　in　contact'　are　mentioned　which　implies　solidity　and
continuity　of　a　matter　already　finished　and　complete　which　would　not　permit　the　passage
through　it　of　a　repelling　force。　But　this　solidity　of　matter　in　which　parts　are　in　contact　and　are　no
longer　separated　by　the　void　already　presupposes　that　the　force　of　repulsion　is　sublated；　according
to　the　sensuous　conception　of　repulsion　which　prevails　here；　parts　in　contact　are　to　be　taken　as
those　which　do　not　repel　each　other。　It　therefore　follows；　quite　tautologically；　that　where　repulsion
is　assumed　to　be　not；　there　no　repulsion　can　take　place。　But　from　this　nothing　else　follows　which
could　serve　to　determine　the　force　of　repulsion。　However；　reflection　on　the　statement　that　parts　in
contact　are　in　contact　only　in　so　far　as　they　hold　themselves　apart；　leads　directly　to　the　conclusion
that　the　force　of　repulsion　is　not　merely　on　the　surface　of　matter　but　within　the　sphere　which　was
supposed　to　be　only　a　sphere　of　attraction。

Kant　assumes　further　that　'through　the　force　of　attraction；　matter　only　occupies　space　but　does　not
fill　it'；　and　'because　matter　through　the　force　of　attraction　does　not　fill　space；　this　force　can　act
across　empty　space　since　there　is　no　intervening　matter　to　limit　it'。　This　distinction　is　much　the　same
as　the　one　mentioned　abo