science of logic-第10节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！



This　result；　grasped　in　its　positive　aspect；　is　nothing　else　but　the　inner　negativity　of　the
determinations　as　their　self…moving　soul；　the　principle　of　all　natural　and　spiritual　life。？

But　if　no　advance　is　made　beyond　the　abstract　negative　aspect　of　dialectic；　the　result　is　only　the
familiar　one　that　reason　is　incapable　of　knowing　the　infinite；　a　strange　result　for　—　since　the　infinite
is　the　Reasonable　—　it　asserts　that　reason　is　incapable　of　knowing　the　Reasonable。

It　is　in　this　dialectic　as　it　is　here　understood；　that　is；　in　the　grasping　of　opposites　in　their　unity　or　of
the　positive　in　the　negative；　that　speculative　thought　consists。

It　is　the　most　important　aspect　of　dialectic；　but　for　thinking　which　is　as　yet　unpractised　and　unfree　it
is　the　most　difficult。　Such　thinking；　if　it　is　still　engaged　in　breaking　itself　of　the　habit　of　employing
sensuously　concrete　terms　and　of　ratiocination；　must　first　practise　abstract　thinking；　hold　fast
Notions　in　their　determinateness　and　learn　to　cognise　by　means　of　them。　An　exposition　of　logic　to
this　end　would；　in　its　method；　have　to　keep　to　the　division　of　the　subject　above…mentioned　and
with　regard　to　the　more　detailed　contents；　to　the　definitions　given　for　the　particular　Notions　without
touching　on　the　dialectical　aspect。　As　regards　its　external　'structure；　such　an　exposition　would
resemble　the　usual　presentation　of　this　science；　but　it　would　also　be　distinguished　from　it　with
respect　to　the　content　and　still　would　serve　for　practice　in　abstract　thinking；　though　not　in
speculative　thinking；　a　purpose　which　can　never　be　realised　by　the　logic　which　has　become
popular　through　the　addition　of　psychological　and　anthropological　material。　It　would　give　to　mind
the　picture　of　a　methodically　ordered　whole；　although　the　soul　of　the　structure；　the　method　（which
dwells　in　the　dialectical　aspect）　would　not　itself　appear　in　it。

Finally；　with　respect　to　education　and　the　relation　of　the　individual　to　logic；　I　would　further　remark
that　this　science；　like　grammar；　appears　in　two　different　aspects　or　values。　It　is　one　thing　for　him
who　comes　to　it　and　the　sciences　generally　for　the　first　time；　but　it　is　another　thing　for　him　who
comes　back　to　it　from　these　sciences。　He　who　begins　the　study　of　grammar　finds　in　its　forms　and
laws　dry　abstractions；　arbitrary　rules；　in　general　an　isolated　collection　of　definitions　and　terms
which　exhibit　only　the　value　and　significance　of　what　is　implied　in　their　immediate　meaning；　there　is
nothing　to　be　known　in　them　other　than　themselves。　On　the　other　hand；　he　who　has　mastered　a
language　and　at　the　same　time　has　a　comparative　knowledge　of　other　languages；　he　alone　can
make　contact　with　the　spirit　and　culture　of　a　people　through　the　grammar　of　its　language；　the　same
rules　and　forms　now　have　a　substantial；　living　value。　Similarly；　he　who　approaches　this　science　at
first　finds　in　logic　an　isolated　system　of　abstractions　which；　confined　within　itself；　does　not　embrace
within　its　scope　the　other　knowledges　and　sciences。　。。。　


On　the　contrary；　when　contrasted　with　the　wealth　of　the　world　as　pictorially　conceived；　with　the
apparently　real　content　of　the　other　sciences；　and　compared　with　the　promise　of　absolute　science
to　unveil　the　essential　being　of　this　wealth；　the　inner　nature　of　mind　and　the　world；　the　truth；　then
this　science　in　its　abstract　shape；　in　the　colourless；　cold　simplicity　of　its　pure　determinations　looks
as　if　it　could　achieve　anything　sooner　than　the　fulfilment　of　its　promise　and　seems　to　confront　that
richness　as　an　empty；　insubstantial　form。　The　first　acquaintance　with　logic　confines　its　significance
to　itself　alone；　its　content　passes　only　for　a　detached　occupation　with　the　determinations　of
thought；　alongside　which　other　scientific　activities　possess　on　their　own　account　a　matter　and
content　of　their　own；　on　which　logic　may　perhaps　have　a　formal　influence；　though　an　influence
which　comes　only　from　itself　and　which　if　necessary　can　of　course　also　be　dispensed　with　so　far　as
the　scientific　structure　and　its　study　are　concerned。

The　other　sciences　have　on　the　whole　discarded　the　correct　method；　that　is；　a　sequence　of
definitions；　axioms；　theorems　and　their　proofs；　etc。；　so…called　natural　logic　now　has　its　own　validity
in　the　sciences　and　manages　to　get　along　without　any　special　knowledge　of　the　nature　of　thought
itself。　But　the　matter　and　content　of　these　sciences　is　held　to　be　completely　independent　of　logic
and　also　has　more　appeal　for　sense；　feeling；　figurate　conception；　and　practical　interest　of　any　kind。　

At　first；　therefore；　logic　must　indeed　be　learnt　as　something　which　one　understands　and　sees　into
quite　well　but　in　which；　at　the　beginning；　one　feels　the　lack　of　scope　and　depth　and　a　wider
significance。　It　is　only　after　profounder　acquaintance　with　the　other　sciences　that　logic　ceases　to　be
for　subjective　spirit　a　merely　abstract　universal　an　reveals　itself　as　the　universal　which　embraces
within　itself　the　wealth　of　the　particular　—　just　as　the　same　proverb；　in　the　mouth　of　a　youth　who
understands　it　quite　well；　does　not　possess　the　wide　range　of　meaning　which　it　has　in　the　mind　of　a
man　with　the　experience　of　a　lifetime　behind　him；　for　who；　the　meaning　is　expressed　in　all　its
power。　Thus　the　value　of　logic　is　only　apprehended　when　it　is　preceded　by　experience　of　the
sciences；　it　then　displays　itself　to　mind　as　the　universal　truth；　not　as　a　particular　knowledge
alongside　other　matters　and　realities；　but　as　the　essential　being　of　all　these　latter。　？

Now　although　the　mind　is　not　conscious　of　this　power　of　logic　at　the　beginning　of　its　study；　it　none
the　less　receives　within　itself　through　such　study　the　power　which　leads　it　into　all　truth。　The　system
of　logic　is　the　realm　of　shadows；　the　world　of　simple　essentialities　freed　from　all　sensuous
concreteness。　The　study　of　this　science；　to　dwell　and　labour　in　this　shadowy　realm；　is　the　absolute
culture　and　discipline　of　consciousness。　In　logic；　consciousness　is　busy　with　something　remote
from　sensuous　intuitions　and　aims；　from　feelings；　from　the　merely　imagined　world　of　figurate
conception。　Considered　from　its　negative　aspect；　this　business　consists　in　holding　off　the
contingency　of　ordinary　thinking　and　the　arbitrary　selection　of　particular　grounds　—　or　their
opposites　—　as　valid。

But　above　all；　thought　acquires　thereby　self…reliance　and　independence。　It　becomes　at　home　in
abstractions　and　in　progressing　by　means　of　Notions　free　from　sensuous　substrata；　develops　an
unsuspected　power　of　assimilating　in　rational　form　all　the　various　knowledges　and　sciences　in　their
complex　variety；　of　grasping　and　retaining　them　in　their　essential　character；　stripping　them　of　their
external　features　and　in　this　way　extracting　from　them　the　logical　element；　or　what　is　the　same
thing；　filling　the　abstract　basis　of　Logic　acquired　by　study　with　the　substantial　content　of　absolute
truth　and　giving　it　the　value　of　a　universal　which　no　longer　stands　as　a　particular　alongside　other
particulars　but　includes　them　all　within　its　grasp　and　is　their　essence；　the　absolutely　True。

　　　　　　　　　　　　GENERAL　DIVISION　OF　LOGIC

From　what　has　been　said　about　the　Notion　of　this　science　and　where　its　justification　is　to　be
found；　it　follows　that　the　general　division　of　it　here　can　only　be　provisional；　can　be　given；　as　it
were；　only　in　so　far　as　the　author　is　already　familiar　with　the　science　and　consequently　is
historically　in　a　position　to　state　here　in　advance　the　main　distinctions　which　will　emerge　in　the
development　of　the　Notion。

Still；　the　attempt　can　be　made　to　promote　an　understanding　beforehand　of　what　is　requisite　for
such　a　division；　even　though　in　doing　so　we　must　have　recourse　to　an　application　of　the　method
which　will　only　be　fully　understood　and　justified　within　the　science　itself。　We　must　therefore　point
out　at　the　start　that　we　are　presupposing　that　the　division　must　be　connected　with　the　Notion；　or
rather　must　be　implicit　in　the　Notion　itself。　The　Notion　is　not　indeterminate　but　is　in　its　own　self
determinate；　the　division；　however；　expresses　this　its　determinateness　as　developed；　it　is　the
judgement　of　the　Notion；　not　a　judgement　about　some　object　or　other　picked　up　from　outside；
but　the　judging；　that　is；　determining；　of　the　Notion　in　its　own　self。　

The　quality　of　being　right…angled；　acute…angled　or　equilateral；　according　to　which　triangles　are
classified；　is　not　implicit　in　the　determinateness　of　the　triangle　itself；　that　is；　not　in　what　is　usually
called　the　Notion　of　the　triangle；　just　as　little　as　there　is　implicit　in　what　passes　for　the　Notion　of
animal　as　such；　or　of　the　mammal；　bird；　etc。　the　determinations　governing　the　classification　into
mammal；　bird；　etc。；　and　the　subdivision　of　these　classes　into　other　species。　Such　determinations
are　taken　from　elsewhere　and　are　annexed　to　such　so…called　Notion　from　outside。　In　the
philosophical　treatment　of　classification　or　division；　the　Notion　itself　must　show　that　it　is　itself　the
course　of　those　determinations。

But　in　the　Introduction；　the　Notion　of　logic　was　itself　stated　to　be　the　result　of　a　preceding　science；
and　so　here；　too；　it　is　a　presupposition。　In　accord