the essays of montaigne, v16-第8节

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life；　and　for　that　reason　it　is　that；　if　I　were　now　compelled　to　choose；
I　should　sooner；　I　think；　consent　to　lose　my　sight；　than　my　hearing　and
speech。　　The　Athenians；　and　also　the　Romans；　kept　this　exercise　in　great
honour　in　their　academies；　the　Italians　retain　some　traces　of　it　to　this
day；　to　their　great　advantage；　as　is　manifest　by　the　comparison　of　our
understandings　with　theirs。　　The　study　of　books　is　a　languishing　and
feeble　motion　that　heats　not；　whereas　conversation　teaches　and　exercises
at　once。　　If　I　converse　with　a　strong　mind　and　a　rough　disputant；　he
presses　upon　my　flanks；　and　pricks　me　right　and　left；　his　imaginations
stir　up　mine；　jealousy；　glory；　and　contention；　stimulate　and　raise　me　up
to　something　above　myself；　and　acquiescence　is　a　quality　altogether
tedious　in　discourse。　　But；　as　our　mind　fortifies　itself　by　the
communication　of　vigorous　and　regular　understandings；　'tis　not　to　be
expressed　how　much　it　loses　and　degenerates　by　the　continual　commerce　and
familiarity　we　have　with　mean　and　weak　spirits；　there　is　no　contagion
that　spreads　like　that；　I　know　sufficiently　by　experience　what　'tis　worth
a　yard。　　I　love　to　discourse　and　dispute；　but　it　is　with　but　few　men；　and
for　myself；　for　to　do　it　as　a　spectacle　and　entertainment　to　great
persons；　and　to　make　of　a　man's　wit　and　words　competitive　parade　is；　in
my　opinion；　very　unbecoming　a　man　of　honour。

Folly　is　a　bad　quality；　but　not　to　be　able　to　endure　it；　to　fret　and　vex
at　it；　as　I　do；　is　another　sort　of　disease　little　less　troublesome　than
folly　itself；　and　is　the　thing　that　I　will　now　accuse　in　myself。　　I　enter
into　conference；　and　dispute　with　great　liberty　and　facility；　forasmuch
as　opinion　meets　in　me　with　a　soil　very　unfit　for　penetration；　and
wherein　to　take　any　deep　root；　no　propositions　astonish　me；　no　belief
offends　me；　though　never　so　contrary　to　my　own；　there　is　no　so　frivolous
and　extravagant　fancy　that　does　not　seem　to　me　suitable　to　the　production
of　human　wit。　　We；　who　deprive　our　judgment　of　the　right　of　determining；
look　indifferently　upon　the　diverse　opinions；　and　if　we　incline　not　our
judgment　to　them；　yet　we　easily　give　them　the　hearing：　Where　one　scale　is
totally　empty；　I　let　the　other　waver　under　an　old　wife's　dreams；　and　I
think　myself　excusable；　if　I　prefer　the　odd　number；　Thursday　rather　than
Friday；　if　I　had　rather　be　the　twelfth　or　fourteenth　than　the　thirteenth
at　table；　if　I　had　rather；　on　a　journey；　see　a　hare　run　by　me　than　cross
my　way；　and　rather　give　my　man　my　left　foot　than　my　right；　when　he　comes
to　put　on　my　stockings。　　All　such　reveries　as　are　in　credit　around　us；
deserve　at　least　a　hearing：　for　my　part；　they　only　with　me　import
inanity；　but　they　import　that。　　Moreover；　vulgar　and　casual　opinions　are
something　more　than　nothing　in　nature；　and　he　who　will　not　suffer　himself
to　proceed　so　far；　falls；　peradventure；　into　the　vice　of　obstinacy；　to
avoid　that　of　superstition。

The　contradictions　of　judgments；　then；　neither　offend　nor　alter；　they
only　rouse　and　exercise；　me。　We　evade　correction；　whereas　we　ought　to
offer　and　present　ourselves　to　it；　especially　when　it　appears　in　the　form
of　conference；　and　not　of　authority。　　At　every　opposition；　we　do　not
consider　whether　or　no　it　be　dust；　but；　right　or　wrong；　how　to　disengage
ourselves：　instead　of　extending　the　arms；　we　thrust　out　our　claws。　　I
could　suffer　myself　to　be　rudely　handled　by　my　friend；　so　much　as　to　tell
me　that　I　am　a　fool；　and　talk　I　know　not　of　what。　　I　love　stout
expressions　amongst　gentle　men；　and　to　have　them　speak　as　they　think；　we
must　fortify　and　harden　our　hearing　against　this　tenderness　of　the
ceremonious　sound　of　words。　I　love　a　strong　and　manly　familiarity　and
conversation：　a　friendship　that　pleases　itself　in　the　sharpness　and
vigour　of　its　communication；　like　love　in　biting　and　scratching：　it　is
not　vigorous　and　generous　enough；　if　it　be　not　quarrelsome；　if　it　be
civilised　and　artificial；　if　it　treads　nicely　and　fears　the　shock：

　　　　　　　〃Neque　enim　disputari　sine　reprehensione　potest。〃

　　　　　＇〃Neither　can　a　man　dispute；　but　he　must　contradict。〃
　　　　　（Or：）　〃Nor　can　people　dispute　without　reprehension。〃
　　　　　　Cicero；　De　Finib。；　i。　8。＇

When　any　one　contradicts　me；　he　raises　my　attention；　not　my　anger：　I
advance　towards　him　who　controverts；　who　instructs　me；　the　cause　of　truth
ought　to　be　the　common　cause　both　of　the　one　and　the　other。　　What　will
the　angry　man　answer？　　Passion　has　already　confounded　his　judgment；
agitation　has　usurped　the　place　of　reason。　　It　were　not　amiss　that　the
decision　of　our　disputes　should　pass　by　wager：　that　there　might　be　a
material　mark　of　our　losses；　to　the　end　we　might　the　better　remember
them；　and　that　my　man　might　tell　me：　〃Your　ignorance　and　obstinacy　cost
you　last　year；　at　several　times；　a　hundred　crowns。〃　　I　hail　and　caress
truth　in　what　quarter　soever　I　find　it；　and　cheerfully　surrender　myself；
and　open　my　conquered　arms　as　far　off　as　I　can　discover　it；　and；　provided
it　be　not　too　imperiously；　take　a　pleasure　in　being　reproved；　and
accommodate　myself　to　my　accusers；　very　often　more　by　reason　of　civility
than　amendment；　loving　to　gratify　and　nourish　the　liberty　of　admonition
by　my　facility　of　submitting　to　it；　and　this　even　at　my　own　expense。

Nevertheless；　it　is　hard　to　bring　the　men　of　my　time　to　it：　they　have　not
the　courage　to　correct；　because　they　have　not　the　courage　to　suffer
themselves　to　be　corrected；　and　speak　always　with　dissimulation　in　the
presence　of　one　another：　I　take　so　great　a　pleasure　in　being　judged　and
known；　that　it　is　almost　indifferent　to　me　in　which　of　the　two　forms　I　am
so：　my　imagination　so　often　contradicts　and　condemns　itself；　that　'tis
all　one　to　me　if　another　do　it；　especially　considering　that　I　give　his
reprehension　no　greater　authority　than　I　choose；　but　I　break　with　him；
who　carries　himself　so　high；　as　I　know　of　one　who　repents　his　advice；
if　not　believed；　and　takes　it　for　an　affront　if　it　be　not　immediately
followed。　　That　Socrates　always　received　smilingly　the　contradictions
offered　to　his　arguments；　a　man　may　say　arose　from　his　strength　of
reason；　and　that；　the　advantage　being　certain　to　fall　on　his　side；　he
accepted　them　as　a　matter　of　new　victory。　　But　we　see；　on　the　contrary；
that　nothing　in　argument　renders　our　sentiment　so　delicate；　as　the
opinion　of　pre…eminence；　and　disdain　of　the　adversary；　and　that；　in
reason；　'tis　rather　for　the　weaker　to　take　in　good　part　the　oppositions
that　correct　him　and　set　him　right。　　In　earnest；　I　rather　choose　the
company　of　those　who　ruffle　me　than　of　those　who　fear　me；　'tis　a　dull　and
hurtful　pleasure　to　have　to　do　with　people　who　admire　us　and　approve　of
all　we　say。　　Antisthenes　commanded　his　children　never　to　take　it　kindly
or　for　a　favour；　when　any　man　commended　them。　　I　find　I　am　much　prouder
of　the　victory　I　obtain　over　myself；　when；　in　the　very　ardour　of　dispute；
I　make　myself　submit　to　my　adversary's　force　of　reason；　than　I　am　pleased
with　the　victory　I　obtain　over　him　through　his　weakness。　　In　fine；　I
receive　and　admit　of　all　manner　of　attacks　that　are　direct；　how　weak
soever；　but　I　am　too　impatient　of　those　that　are　made　out　of　form。　　I
care　not　what　the　subject　is；　the　opinions　are　to　me　all　one；　and　I　am
almost　indifferent　whether　I　get　the　better　or　the　worse。　　I　can
peaceably　argue　a　whole　day　together；　if　the　argument　be　carried　on　with
method；　I　do　not　so　much　require　force　and　subtlety　as　order；　I　mean　the
order　which　we　every　day　observe　in　the　wranglings　of　shepherds　and　shop…
boys；　but　never　amongst　us：　if　they　start　from　their　subject；　'tis　out　of
incivility；　and　so　'tis　with　us；　but　their　tumult　and　impatience　never
put　them　out　of　their　theme；　their　argument　still　continues　its　course；
if　they　interrupt；　and　do　not　stay　for　one　another；　they　at　least
understand　one　another。　　Any　one　answers　too　well　for　me；　if　he　answers
what　I　say：　when　the　dispute　is　irregular　and　disordered；　I　leave　the
thing　itself；　and　insist　upon　the　form　with　anger　and　indiscretion；
falling　into　wilful；　malicious；　and　imperious　way　of　disputation；　of
which　I　am　afterwards　ashamed。　　'Tis　impossible　to　deal　fairly　with　a
fool：　my　judgment　is　not　only　corrupted　under　the　hand　of　so　impetuous　a
master；　but　my　conscience　also。

Our　disputes　ought　to　be　interdicted　and　punished　as　well　as　other　verbal
crimes：　what　vice　do　they　not　raise　and　heap　up；　being　always　governed
and　commanded　by　passion？　　We　first　quarrel　with　their　reasons；　and　then
with　the　men。　　We　only　learn　to　dispute　that　we　may　contradict；　and　so；
every　one　contradicting　and　being　contradicted；　it　falls　out　that　the
fruit　of　disputation　is　to　lose　and　annihilate　truth。　　Therefore　it　is
that　Plato　in　his　Republic　prohibits　this　exercise　to　fools　and　ill…bred
people。　　To　what　end　do　you　go　about　to　inquire　of　him；　who　knows　nothing
to　the　purpose？　　A　man　does　no　injury　to　the　subject；　when　he　leaves　it
to　seek　how　he　may　treat　it；　I　do　not　mean　by　an　artificial　and
scholastic　way；　but　by　a　natural　one；　with　a　sound　understanding。　　What
will　it　be　in　the　end？　　One　flies　to　the　east；　the　other　to　the　west；
they　lose　the　principal；　dispersing　it　in　the　crowd　of　inci