seven discourses on art-第23节

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　to　a　history　of　Luca　Jordano；　but　hence　appears　the　necessity　of　the　connoisseur's　knowing　in　what　consists　the　excellence　of　each　class；　in　order　to　judge　how　near　it　approaches　to　perfection。

Even　in　works　of　the　same　kind；　as　in　history　painting；　which　is　composed　of　various　parts；　excellence　of　an　inferior　species；　carried　to　a　very　high　degree；　will　make　a　work　very　valuable；　and　in　some　measure　compensate　for　the　absence　of　the　higher　kind　of　merits。　　It　is　the　duty　of　the　connoisseur　to　know　and　esteem；　as　much　as　it　may　deserve；　every　part　of　painting；　he　will　not　then　think　even　Bassano　unworthy　of　his　notice；　who；　though　totally　devoid　of　expression；　sense；　grace；　or　elegance；　may　be　esteemed　on　account　of　his　admirable　taste　of　colours；　which；　in　his　best　works；　are　little　inferior　to　those　of　Titian。

Since　I　have　mentioned　Bassano；　we　must　do　him　likewise　the　justice　to　acknowledge　that；　though　he　did　not　aspire　to　the　dignity　of　expressing　the　characters　and　passions　of　men；　yet；　with　respect　to　the　facility　and　truth　in　his　manner　of　touching　animals　of　all　kinds；　and　giving　them　what　painters　call　their　character；　few　have　ever　excelled　him。

To　Bassano　we　may　add　Paul　Veronese　and　Tintoret；　for　their　entire　inattention　to　what　is　justly　esteemed　the　most　essential　part　of　our　art；　the　expression　of　the　passions。　　Notwithstanding　these　glaring　deficiencies；　we　justly　esteem　their　works；　but　it　must　be　remembered　that　they　do　not　please　from　those　defects；　but　from　their　great　excellences　of　another　kind；　and　in　spite　of　such　transgressions。　　These　excellences；　too；　as　far　as　they　go；　are　founded　in　the　truth　of　general　nature。　　They　tell　the　truth；　though　not　the　whole　truth。

By　these　considerations；　which　can　never　be　too　frequently　impressed；　may　be　obviated　two　errors　which　I　observed　to　have　been；　formerly　at　least；　the　most　prevalent；　and　to　be　most　injurious　to　artists：　　that　of　thinking　taste　and　genius　to　have　nothing　to　do　with　reason；　and　that　of　taking　particular　living　objects　for　nature。

I　shall　now　say　something　on　that　part　of　taste　which；　as　I　have　hinted　to　you　before；　does　not　belong　so　much　to　the　external　form　of　things；　but　is　addressed　to　the　mind；　and　depends　on　its　original　frame；　or；　to　use　the　expression；　the　organisation　of　the　soul；　I　mean　the　imagination　and　the　passions。　　The　principles　of　these　are　as　invariable　as　the　former；　and　are　to　be　known　and　reasoned　upon　in　the　same　manner；　by　an　appeal　to　common　sense　deciding　upon　the　common　feelings　of　mankind。　　This　sense；　and　these　feelings；　appear　to　me　of　equal　authority；　and　equally　conclusive。

Now　this　appeal　implies　a　general　uniformity　and　agreement　in　the　minds　of　men。　　It　would　be　else　an　idle　and　vain　endeavour　to　establish　rules　of　art；　it　would　be　pursuing　a　phantom　to　attempt　to　move　affections　with　which　we　were　entirely　unacquainted。　　We　have　no　reason　to　suspect　there　is　a　greater　difference　between　our　minds　than　between　our　forms；　of　which；　though　there　are　no　two　alike；　yet　there　is　a　general　similitude　that　goes　through　the　whole　race　of　mankind；　and　those　who　have　cultivated　their　taste　can　distinguish　what　is　beautiful　or　deformed；　or；　in　other　words；　what　agrees　with　or　what　deviates　from　the　general　idea　of　nature；　in　one　case　as　well　as　in　the　other。

The　internal　fabric　of　our　mind；　as　well　as　the　external　form　of　our　bodies；　being　nearly　uniform；　it　seems　then　to　follow；　of　course；　that　as　the　imagination　is　incapable　of　producing　anything　originally　of　itself；　and　can　only　vary　and　combine　these　ideas　with　which　it　is　furnished　by　means　of　the　senses；　there　will　be；　of　course；　an　agreement　in　the　imaginations　as　in　the　senses　of　men。　　There　being　this　agreement；　it　follows　that　in　all　cases；　in　our　lightest　amusements　as　well　as　in　our　most　serious　actions　and　engagements　of　life；　we　must　regulate　our　affections　of　every　kind　by　that　of　others。　　The　well…disciplined　mind　acknowledges　this　authority；　and　submits　its　own　opinion　to　the　public　voice。

It　is　from　knowing　what　are　the　general　feelings　and　passions　of　mankind　that　we　acquire　a　true　idea　of　what　imagination　is；　though　it　appears　as　if　we　had　nothing　to　do　but　to　consult　our　own　particular　sensations；　and　these　were　sufficient　to　ensure　us　from　all　error　and　mistake。

A　knowledge　of　the　disposition　and　character　of　the　human　mind　can　be　acquired　only　by　experience：　　a　great　deal　will　be　learned；　I　admit；　by　a　habit　of　examining　what　passes　in　our　bosoms；　what　are　our　own　motives　of　action；　and　of　what　kind　of　sentiments　we　are　conscious　on　any　occasion。　　We　may　suppose　a　uniformity；　and　conclude　that　the　same　effect　will　be　produced　by　the　same　cause　in　the　minds　of　others。　　This　examination　will　contribute　to　suggest　to　us　matters　of　inquiry；　but　we　can　never　be　sure　that　our　own　sensations　are　true　and　right　till　they　are　confirmed　by　more　extensive　observation。

One　man　opposing　another　determines　nothing　but　a　general　union　of　minds；　like　a　general　combination　of　the　forces　of　all　mankind；　makes　a　strength　that　is　irresistible。　　In　fact；　as　he　who　does　not　know　himself　does　not　know　others；　so　it　may　be　said　with　equal　truth；　that　he　who　does　not　know　others　knows　himself　but　very　imperfectly。

A　man　who　thinks　he　is　guarding　himself　against　Prejudices　by　resisting　the　authority　of　others；　leaves　open　every　avenue　to　singularity；　vanity；　self…conceit；　obstinacy；　and　many　other　vices；　all　tending　to　warp　the　judgment　and　prevent　the　natural　operation　of　his　faculties。

This　submission　to　others　is　a　deference　which　we　owe；　and　indeed　are　forced　involuntarily　to　pay。

In　fact　we　are　never　satisfied　with　our　opinions　till　they　are　ratified　and　confirmed　by　the　suffrages　of　the　rest　of　mankind。　　We　dispute　and　wrangle　for　ever；　we　endeavour　to　get　men　to　come　to　us　when　we　do　not　go　to　them。

He　therefore　who　is　acquainted　with　the　works　which　have　pleased　different　ages　and　different　countries；　and　has　formed　his　opinion　on　them；　has　more　materials　and　more　means　of　knowing　what　is　analogous　to　the　mind　of　man　than　he　who　is　conversant　only　with　the　works　of　his　own　age　or　country。　　What　has　pleased；　and　continues　to　please；　is　likely　to　please　again：　　hence　are　derived　the　rules　of　art；　and　on　this　immovable　foundation　they　must　ever　stand。

This　search　and　study　of　the　history　of　the　mind　ought　not　to　be　confined　to　one　art　only。　　It　is　by　the　analogy　that　one　art　bears　to　another　that　many　things　are　ascertained　which　either　were　but　faintly　seen；　or；　perhaps；　would　not　have　been　discovered　at　all　if　the　inventor　had　not　received　the　first　hints　from　the　practices　of　a　sister　art　on　a　similar　occasion。　　The　frequent　allusions　which　every　man　who　treats　of　any　art　is　obliged　to　draw　from　others　in　order　to　illustrate　and　confirm　his　principles；　sufficiently　show　their　near　connection　and　inseparable　relation。

All　arts　having　the　same　general　end；　which　is　to　please；　and　addressing　themselves　to　the　same　faculties　through　the　medium　of　the　senses；　it　follows　that　their　rules　and　principles　must　have　as　great　affinity　as　the　different　materials　and　the　different　organs　or　vehicles　by　which　they　pass　to　the　mind　will　permit　them　to　retain。

We　may　therefore　conclude　that　the　real　substance；　as　it　may　be　called；　of　what　goes　under　the　name　of　taste；　is　fixed　and　established　in　the　nature　of　things；　that　there　are　certain　and　regular　causes　by　which　the　imagination　and　passions　of　men　are　affected；　and　that　the　knowledge　of　these　causes　is　acquired　by　a　laborious　and　diligent　investigation　of　nature；　and　by　the　same　slow　progress　as　wisdom　or　knowledge　of　every　kind；　however　instantaneous　its　operations　may　appear　when　thus　acquired。

It　has　been　often　observed　that　the　good　and　virtuous　man　alone　can　acquire　this　true　or　just　relish；　even　of　works　of　art。　　This　opinion　will　not　appear　entirely　without　foundation　when　we　consider　that　the　same　habit　of　mind　which　is　acquired　by　our　search　after　truth　in　the　more　serious　duties　of　life；　is　only　transferred　to　the　pursuit　of　lighter　amusements：　　the　same　disposition；　the　same　desire　to　find　something　steady；　substantial；　and　durable；　on　which　the　mind　can　lean；　as　it　were；　and　rest　with　safety。　　The　subject　only　is　changed。　　We　pursue　the　same　method　in　our　search　after　the　idea　of　beauty　and　perfection　in　each；　of　virtue；　by　looking　forwards　beyond　ourselves　to　society；　and　to　the　whole；　of　arts；　by　extending　our　views　in　the　same　manner　to　all　ages　and　all　times。

Every　art；　like　our　own；　has　in　its　composition　fluctuating　as　well　as　fixed　principles。　　It　is　an　attentive　inquiry　into　their　difference　that　will　enable　us　to　determine　how　far　we　are　influenced　by　custom　and　habit；　and　what　is　fixed　in　the　nature　of　things。

To　distinguish　how　much　has　solid　foundation；　we　may　have　recourse　to　the　same　proof　by　which　some　hold　wit　ought　to　be　triedwhether　it　preserves　itself　when　translated。　　That　wit　is　false　which　can　subsist　only　in　one　language；　and　that　picture　which　pleases　only　one　age　or　one　nation；　owes　its　reception　to　some　local　or　accidental　association　of　ideas。

We　may　apply　this　to　every　custom　and　habit　of　life。　　Thus　the　general　principles　of　urbanit