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nature is to be seen; cannot as a fact be seen by us。 Now we suppose



that the heavens are of necessity impossible to destroy and to



dissolve; whereas the result of the present argument would be to do



away with this necessity。 For it is natural and possible for a



motion to exist greater than the force by dint of which the earth is



at rest; or than that by dint of which Fire and Aether are moved。 If



then there are superior motions; these will be dissolved in succession



by one another: and if there actually are not; but might possibly be



(for the earth cannot be infinite because no body can possibly be



infinite); there is a possibility of the heavens being dissolved。



For what is to prevent this coming to pass; unless it be impossible?



And it is not impossible unless the opposite is necessary。 This



difficulty; however; we will discuss elsewhere。



  To resume; must there be something immovable and at rest outside



of what is moved; and no part of it; or not? And must this necessarily



be so also in the case of the universe? Perhaps it would be thought



strange were the origin of movement inside。 And to those who so



conceive it the word of Homer would appear to have been well spoken:



  'Nay; ye would not pull Zeus; highest of all from heaven to the



plain; no not even if ye toiled right hard; come; all ye gods and



goddesses! Set hands to the chain'; for that which is entirely



immovable cannot possibly be moved by anything。 And herein lies the



solution of the difficulty stated some time back; the possibility or



impossibility of dissolving the system of the heavens; in that it



depends from an original which is immovable。



  Now in the animal world there must be not only an immovable without;



but also within those things which move in place; and initiate their



own movement。 For one part of an animal must be moved; and another



be at rest; and against this the part which is moved will support



itself and be moved; for example; if it move one of its parts; for one



part; as it were; supports itself against another part at rest。



  But about things without life which are moved one might ask the



question whether all contain in themselves both that which is at



rest and that which initiates movement; and whether they also; for



instance fire; earth; or any other inanimate thing; must support



themselves against something outside which is at rest。 Or is this



impossible and must it not be looked for rather in those primary



causes by which they are set in motion? For all things without life



are moved by something other; and the origin of all things so moved



are things which move themselves。 And out of these we have spoken



about animals (for they must all have in themselves that which is at



rest; and without them that against which they are supported); but



whether there is some higher and prime mover is not clear; and an



origin of that kind involves a different discussion。 Animals at any



rate which move themselves are all moved supporting themselves on what



is outside them; even when they inspire and expire; for there is no



essential difference between casting a great and a small weight; and



this is what men do when they spit and cough and when they breathe



in and breathe out。



                                 5







  But is it only in that which moves itself in place that there must



be a point at rest; or does this hold also of that which causes its



own qualitative changes; and its own growth? Now the question of



original generation and decay is different; for if there is; as we



hold; a primary movement; this would be the cause of generation and



decay; and probably of all the secondary movements too。 And as in



the universe; so in the animal world this is the primary movement;



when the creature attains maturity; and therefore it is the cause of



growth; when the creature becomes the cause of its own growth; and the



cause too of alteration。 But if this is not the primary movement



then the point at rest is not necessary。 However; the earliest



growth and alteration in the living creature arise through another and



by other channels; nor can anything possibly be the cause of its own



generation and decay; for the mover must exist before the moved; the



begetter before the begotten; and nothing is prior to itself。



                                 6







  Now whether the soul is moved or not; and how it is moved if it be



moved; has been stated before in our treatise concerning it。 And since



all inorganic things are moved by some other thing… and the manner



of the movement of the first and eternally moved; and how the first



mover moves it; has been determined before in our Metaphysics; it



remains to inquire how the soul moves the body; and what is the origin



of movement in a living creature。 For; if we except the movement of



the universe; things with life are the causes of the movement of all



else; that is of all that are not moved by one another by mutual



impact。 And so all their motions have a term or limit; inasmuch as the



movements of things with life have such。 For all living things both



move and are moved with some object; so that this is the term of all



their movement; the end; that is; in view。 Now we see that the



living creature is moved by intellect; imagination; purpose; wish; and



appetite。 And all these are reducible to mind and desire。 For both



imagination and sensation are on common ground with mind; since all



three are faculties of judgement though differing according to



distinctions stated elsewhere。 Will; however; impulse; and appetite;



are all three forms of desire; while purpose belongs both to intellect



and to desire。 Therefore the object of desire or of intellect first



initiates movement; not; that is; every object of intellect; only



the end in the domain of conduct。 Accordingly among goods that which



moves is a practical end; not the good in its whole extent。 For it



initiates movement only so far as something else is for its sake; or



so far as it is the object of that which is for the sake of



something else。 And we must suppose that a seeming good may take the



room of actual good; and so may the pleasant; which is itself a



seeming good。 From these considerations it is clear that in one regard



that which is eternally moved by the eternal mover is moved in the



same way as every living creature; in another regard differently;



and so while it is moved eternally; the movement of living creatures



has a term。 Now the eternal beautiful; and the truly and primarily



good (which is not at one time good; at another time not good); is too



divine and precious to be relative to anything else。 The prime mover



then moves; itself being unmoved; whereas desire and its faculty are



moved and so move。 But it is not necessary for the last in the chain



of things moved to move something else; wherefore it is plainly



reasonable that motion in place should be the last of what happens



in the region of things happening; since the living creature is



moved and goes forward by reason of desire or purpose; when some



alteration has been set going on the occasion of sensation or



imagination。



                                 7







  But how is it that thought (viz。 sense; imagination; and thought



proper) is sometimes followed by action; sometimes not; sometimes by



movement; sometimes not? What happens seems parallel to the case of



thinking and inferring about the immovable objects of science。 There



the end is the truth seen (for; when one conceives the two



premisses; one at once conceives and comprehends the conclusion);



but here the two premisses result in a conclusion which is an



action… for example; one conceives that every man ought to walk; one



is a man oneself: straightway one walks; or that; in this case; no man



should walk; one is a man: straightway one remains at rest。 And one so



acts in the two cases provided that there is nothing in the one case



to compel or in the other to prevent。 Again; I ought to create a good;



a house is good: straightway I make a house。 I need a covering; a coat



is a covering: I need a coat。 What I need I ought to make; I need a



coat: I make a coat。 And the conclusion I must make a coat is an



action。 And the action goes back to the beginning or first step。 If



there is to be a coat; one must first have B; and if B then A; so



one gets A to begin with。 Now that the action is the conclusion is



clear。 But the premisses of action are of two kinds; of the good and



of the possible。



  And as in some cases of speculative inquiry we suppress one



premise so here the mind does not stop to consider at all an obvious



minor premise; for example if walking is good for man; one does not



dwell upon the minor 'I am a man'。 A

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