concerning civil government-第21节

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that　might　act　separately；　whereby　the　force　of　the　public　would　be

under　different　commands；　which　would　be　apt　some　time　or　other　to

cause　disorder　and　ruin。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　XIII

　　　　　　　　Of　the　Subordination　of　the　Powers　of　the　Commonwealth



　　149。　THOUGH　in　a　constituted　commonwealth　standing　upon　its　own

basis　and　acting　according　to　its　own　nature…　that　is；　acting　for

the　preservation　of　the　community；　there　can　be　but　one　supreme　power；

which　is　the　legislative；　to　which　all　the　rest　are　and　must　be

subordinate；　yet　the　legislative　being　only　a　fiduciary　power　to　act

for　certain　ends；　there　remains　still　in　the　people　a　supreme　power　to

remove　or　alter　the　legislative；　when　they　find　the　legislative　act

contrary　to　the　trust　reposed　in　them。　For　all　power　given　with

trust　for　the　attaining　an　end　being　limited　by　that　end；　whenever

that　end　is　manifestly　neglected　or　opposed；　the　trust　must

necessarily　be　forfeited；　and　the　power　devolve　into　the　hands　of

those　that　gave　it；　who　may　place　it　anew　where　they　shall　think

best　for　their　safety　and　security。　And　thus　the　community　perpetually

retains　a　supreme　power　of　saving　themselves　from　the　attempts　and

designs　of　anybody；　even　of　their　legislators；　whenever　they　shall

be　so　foolish　or　so　wicked　as　to　lay　and　carry　on　designs　against

the　liberties　and　properties　of　the　subject。　For　no　man　or　society

of　men　having　a　power　to　deliver　up　their　preservation；　or

consequently　the　means　of　it；　to　the　absolute　will　and　arbitrary

dominion　of　another；　whenever　any　one　shall　go　about　to　bring　them

into　such　a　slavish　condition；　they　will　always　have　a　right　to

preserve　what　they　have　not　a　power　to　part　with；　and　to　rid

themselves　of　those　who　invade　this　fundamental；　sacred；　and

unalterable　law　of　self…preservation　for　which　they　entered　into

society。　And　thus　the　community　may　be　said　in　this　respect　to　be

always　the　supreme　power；　but　not　as　considered　under　any　form　of

government；　because　this　power　of　the　people　can　never　take　place　till

the　government　be　dissolved。

　　150。　In　all　cases　whilst　the　government　subsists；　the　legislative　is

the　supreme　power。　For　what　can　give　laws　to　another　must　needs　be

superior　to　him；　and　since　the　legislative　is　no　otherwise　legislative

of　the　society　but　by　the　right　it　has　to　make　laws　for　all　the　parts；

and　every　member　of　the　society　prescribing　rules　to　their　actions；

they　are　transgressed；　the　legislative　must　needs　be　the　supreme；

and　all　other　powers　in　any　members　or　parts　of　the　society　derived

from　and　subordinate　to　it。

　　151。　In　some　commonwealths　where　the　legislative　is　not　always　in

being；　and　the　executive　is　vested　in　a　single　person　who　has　also　a

share　in　the　legislative；　there　that　single　person；　in　a　very

tolerable　sense；　may　also　be　called　supreme；　not　that　he　has　in

himself　all　the　supreme　power；　which　is　that　of　law…making；　but

because　he　has　in　him　the　supreme　execution　from　whom　all　inferior

magistrates　derive　all　their　several　subordinate　powers；　or；　at　least；

the　greatest　part　of　them；　having　also　no　legislative　superior　to　him；

there　being　no　law　to　be　made　without　his　consent；　which　cannot　be

expected　should　ever　subject　him　to　the　other　part　of　the　legislative；

he　is　properly　enough　in　this　sense　supreme。　But　yet　it　is　to　be

observed　that　though　oaths　of　allegiance　and　fealty　are　taken　to

him；　it　is　not　to　him　as　supreme　legislator；　but　as　supreme　executor

of　the　law　made　by　a　joint　power　of　him　with　others；　allegiance

being　nothing　but　an　obedience　according　to　law；　which；　when　he

violates；　he　has　no　right　to　obedience；　nor　can　claim　it　otherwise

than　as　the　public　person　vested　with　the　power　of　the　law；　and　so

is　to　be　considered　as　the　image；　phantom；　or　representative　of　the

commonwealth；　acted　by　the　will　of　the　society　declared　in　its　laws；

and　thus　he　has　no　will；　no　power；　but　that　of　the　law。　But　when　he

quits　this　representation；　this　public　will；　and　acts　by　his　own

private　will；　he　degrades　himself；　and　is　but　a　single　private

person　without　power　and　without　will；　the　members　owing　no

obedience　but　to　the　public　will　of　the　society。

　　152。　The　executive　power　placed　anywhere　but　in　a　person　that　has

also　a　share　in　the　legislative　is　visibly　subordinate　and　accountable

to　it；　and　may　be　at　pleasure　changed　and　displaced；　so　that　it　is　not

the　supreme　executive　power　that　is　exempt　from　subordination；　but　the

supreme　executive　power　vested　in　one；　who　having　a　share　in　the

legislative；　has　no　distinct　superior　legislative　to　be　subordinate

and　accountable　to；　farther　than　he　himself　shall　join　and　consent；　so

that　he　is　no　more　subordinate　than　he　himself　shall　think　fit；

which　one　may　certainly　conclude　will　be　but　very　little。　Of　other

ministerial　and　subordinate　powers　in　a　commonwealth　we　need　not

speak；　they　being　so　multiplied　with　infinite　variety　in　the　different

customs　and　constitutions　of　distinct　commonwealths；　that　it　is

impossible　to　give　a　particular　account　of　them　all。　Only　thus　much

which　is　necessary　to　our　present　purpose　we　may　take　notice　of

concerning　them；　that　they　have　no　manner　of　authority；　any　of　them；

beyond　what　is　by　positive　grant　and　commission　delegated　to　them；　and

are　all　of　them　accountable　to　some　other　power　in　the　commonwealth。

　　153。　It　is　not　necessary…　no；　nor　so　much　as　convenient…　that　the

legislative　should　be　always　in　being；　but　absolutely　necessary　that

the　executive　power　should；　because　there　is　not　always　need　of　new

laws　to　be　made；　but　always　need　of　execution　of　the　laws　that　are

made。　When　the　legislative　hath　put　the　execution　of　the　laws　they

make　into　other　hands；　they　have　a　power　still　to　resume　it　out　of

those　hands　when　they　find　cause；　and　to　punish　for　any

mal…administration　against　the　laws。　The　same　holds　also　in　regard

of　the　federative　power；　that　and　the　executive　being　both　ministerial

and　subordinate　to　the　legislative；　which；　as　has　been　shown；　in　a

constituted　commonwealth　is　the　supreme；　the　legislative　also　in

this　case　being　supposed　to　consist　of　several　persons；　for　if　it　be　a

single　person　it　cannot　but　be　always　in　being；　and　so　will；　as

supreme；　naturally　have　the　supreme　executive　power；　together　with　the

legislative；　may　assemble　and　exercise　their　legislative　at　the

times　that　either　their　original　constitution　or　their　own　adjournment

appoints；　or　when　they　please；　if　neither　of　these　hath　appointed

any　time；　or　there　be　no　other　way　prescribed　to　convoke　them。　For　the

supreme　power　being　placed　in　them　by　the　people；　it　is　always　in

them；　and　they　may　exercise　it　when　they　please；　unless　by　their

original　constitution　they　are　limited　to　certain　seasons；　or　by　an

act　of　their　supreme　power　they　have　adjourned　to　a　certain　time；

and　when　that　time　comes　they　have　a　right　to　assemble　and　act　again。

　　154。　If　the　legislative；　or　any　part　of　it；　be　of　representatives；

chosen　for　that　time　by　the　people；　which　afterwards　return　into　the

ordinary　state　of　subjects；　and　have　no　share　in　the　legislative　but

upon　a　new　choice；　this　power　of　choosing　must　also　be　exercised　by

the　people；　either　at　certain　appointed　seasons；　or　else　when　they　are

summoned　to　it；　and；　in　this　latter　case；　the　power　of　convoking　the

legislative　is　ordinarily　placed　in　the　executive；　and　has　one　of

these　two　limitations　in　respect　of　time：…　that　either　the　original

constitution　requires　their　assembling　and　acting　at　certain

intervals；　and　then　the　executive　power　does　nothing　but　ministerially

issue　directions　for　their　electing　and　assembling　according　to　due

forms；　or　else　it　is　left　to　his　prudence　to　call　them　by　new

elections　when　the　occasions　or　exigencies　of　the　public　require　the

amendment　of　old　or　making　of　new　laws；　or　the　redress　or　prevention

of　any　inconveniencies　that　lie　on　or　threaten　the　people。

　　155。　It　may　be　demanded　here；　what　if　the　executive　power；　being

possessed　of　the　force　of　the　commonwealth；　shall　make　use　of　that

force　to　hinder　the　meeting　and　acting　of　the　legislative；　when　the

original　constitution　or　the　public　exigencies　require　it？　I　say；

using　force　upon　the　people；　without　authority；　and　contrary　to　the

trust　put　in　him　that　does　so；　is　a　state　of　war　with　the　people；

who　have　a　right　to　reinstate　their　legislative　in　the　exercise　of

their　power。　For　having　erected　a　legislative　with　an　intent　they

should　exercise　the　power　of　making　laws；　either　at　certain　set　times；

or　when　there　is　need　of　it；　when　they　are　hindered　by　any　force

from　what　is　so　necessary　to　the　society；　and　wherein　the　safety　and

preservation　of　the　people　consists；　the　people　have　a　right　to　remove

it　by　force。　In　all　states　and　conditions　the　true　remedy　of　force

without　authority　is　to　oppose　force　to　it。　The　use　of　force　without

authority　always　puts　him　that　uses　it　into　a　state　of　war　as　the

aggressor；　and　renders　him　liable　to　be　treated　accordingly。

　　156。　The　power　of　assembling　and　dismissing　the　legislative；

placed　in　the　executive；　gives