concerning civil government-第18节

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alone　as　shall　be　appointed　to　it　amongst　them；　and　by　such　rules　as

the　community；　or　those　authorised　by　them　to　that　purpose；　shall

agree　on。　And　in　this　we　have　the　original　right　and　rise　of　both

the　legislative　and　executive　power　as　well　as　of　the　governments

and　societies　themselves。

　　128。　For　in　the　state　of　Nature　to　omit　the　liberty　he　has　of

innocent　delights；　a　man　has　two　powers。　The　first　is　to　do　whatsoever

he　thinks　fit　for　the　preservation　of　himself　and　others　within　the

permission　of　the　law　of　Nature；　by　which　law；　common　to　them　all；

he　and　all　the　rest　of　mankind　are　one　community；　make　up　one

society　distinct　from　all　other　creatures；　and　were　it　not　for　the

corruption　and　viciousness　of　degenerate　men；　there　would　be　no　need

of　any　other；　no　necessity　that　men　should　separate　from　this　great

and　natural　community；　and　associate　into　lesser　combinations。　The

other　power　a　man　has　in　the　state　of　Nature　is　the　power　to　punish

the　crimes　committed　against　that　law。　Both　these　he　gives　up　when

he　joins　in　a　private；　if　I　may　so　call　it；　or　particular　political

society；　and　incorporates　into　any　commonwealth　separate　from　the　rest

of　mankind。

　　129。　The　first　power…　viz。；　of　doing　whatsoever　he　thought　fit　for

the　preservation　of　himself　and　the　rest　of　mankind；　he　gives　up　to　be

regulated　by　laws　made　by　the　society；　so　far　forth　as　the

preservation　of　himself　and　the　rest　of　that　society　shall　require；

which　laws　of　the　society　in　many　things　confine　the　liberty　he　had　by

the　law　of　Nature。

　　130。　Secondly；　the　power　of　punishing　he　wholly　gives　up；　and

engages　his　natural　force；　which　he　might　before　employ　in　the

execution　of　the　law　of　Nature；　by　his　own　single　authority；　as　he

thought　fit；　to　assist　the　executive　power　of　the　society　as　the　law

thereof　shall　require。　For　being　now　in　a　new　state；　wherein　he　is

to　enjoy　many　conveniencies　from　the　labour；　assistance；　and　society

of　others　in　the　same　community；　as　well　as　protection　from　its

whole　strength；　he　is　to　part　also　with　as　much　of　his　natural

liberty；　in　providing　for　himself；　as　the　good；　prosperity；　and　safety

of　the　society　shall　require；　which　is　not　only　necessary　but　just；

since　the　other　members　of　the　society　do　the　like。

　　131。　But　though　men　when　they　enter　into　society　give　up　the

equality；　liberty；　and　executive　power　they　had　in　the　state　of　Nature

into　the　hands　of　the　society；　to　be　so　far　disposed　of　by　the

legislative　as　the　good　of　the　society　shall　require；　yet　it　being

only　with　an　intention　in　every　one　the　better　to　preserve　himself；

his　liberty　and　property　（for　no　rational　creature　can　be　supposed

to　change　his　condition　with　an　intention　to　be　worse）；　the　power　of

the　society　or　legislative　constituted　by　them　can　never　be　supposed

to　extend　farther　than　the　common　good；　but　is　obliged　to　secure　every

one's　property　by　providing　against　those　three　defects　above

mentioned　that　made　the　state　of　Nature　so　unsafe　and　uneasy。　And

so；　whoever　has　the　legislative　or　supreme　power　of　any

commonwealth；　is　bound　to　govern　by　established　standing　laws；

promulgated　and　known　to　the　people；　and　not　by　extemporary　decrees；

by　indifferent　and　upright　judges；　who　are　to　decide　controversies

by　those　laws；　and　to　employ　the　force　of　the　community　at　home　only

in　the　execution　of　such　laws；　or　abroad　to　prevent　or　redress　foreign

injuries　and　secure　the　community　from　inroads　and　invasion。　And　all

this　to　be　directed　to　no　other　end　but　the　peace；　safety；　and

public　good　of　the　people。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　X

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　the　Forms　of　a　Commonwealth



　　132。　THE　majority　having；　as　has　been　showed；　upon　men's　first

uniting　into　society；　the　whole　power　of　the　community　naturally　in

them；　may　employ　all　that　power　in　making　laws　for　the　community

from　time　to　time；　and　executing　those　laws　by　officers　of　their　own

appointing；　and　then　the　form　of　the　government　is　a　perfect

democracy；　or　else　may　put　the　power　of　making　laws　into　the　hands

of　a　few　select　men；　and　their　heirs　or　successors；　and　then　it　is

an　oligarchy；　or　else　into　the　hands　of　one　man；　and　then　it　is　a

monarchy；　if　to　him　and　his　heirs；　it　is　a　hereditary　monarchy；　if

to　him　only　for　life；　but　upon　his　death　the　power　only　of

nominating　a　successor；　to　return　to　them；　an　elective　monarchy。　And

so　accordingly　of　these　make　compounded　and　mixed　forms　of　government；

as　they　think　good。　And　if　the　legislative　power　be　at　first　given

by　the　majority　to　one　or　more　persons　only　for　their　lives；　or　any

limited　time；　and　then　the　supreme　power　to　revert　to　them　again；　when

it　is　so　reverted　the　community　may　dispose　of　it　again　anew　into　what

hands　they　please；　and　so　constitute　a　new　form　of　government；　for　the

form　of　government　depending　upon　the　placing　the　supreme　power；　which

is　the　legislative；　it　being　impossible　to　conceive　that　an　inferior

power　should　prescribe　to　a　superior；　or　any　but　the　supreme　make

laws；　according　as　the　power　of　making　laws　is　placed；　such　is　the

form　of　the　commonwealth。

　　133。　By　〃commonwealth〃　I　must　be　understood　all　along　to　mean　not

a　democracy；　or　any　form　of　government；　but　any　independent

community　which　the　Latins　signified　by　the　word　civitas；　to　which　the

word　which　best　answers　in　our　language　is　〃commonwealth；〃　and　most

properly　expresses　such　a　society　of　men　which　〃community〃　does　not

（for　there　may　be　subordinate　communities　in　a　government）；　and　〃city〃

much　less。　And　therefore；　to　avoid　ambiguity；　I　crave　leave　to　use　the

word　〃commonwealth〃　in　that　sense；　in　which　sense　I　find　the　word　used

by　King　James　himself；　which　I　think　to　be　its　genuine

signification；　which；　if　anybody　dislike；　I　consent　with　him　to　change

it　for　a　better。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　XI

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　the　Extent　of　the　Legislative　Power



　　134。　THE　great　end　of　men's　entering　into　society　being　the

enjoyment　of　their　properties　in　peace　and　safety；　and　the　great

instrument　and　means　of　that　being　the　laws　established　in　that

society；　the　first　and　fundamental　positive　law　of　all　commonwealths

is　the　establishing　of　the　legislative　power；　as　the　first　and

fundamental　natural　law　which　is　to　govern　even　the　legislative。

Itself　is　the　preservation　of　the　society　and　（as　far　as　will

consist　with　the　public　good）　of　every　person　in　it。　This

legislative　is　not　only　the　supreme　power　of　the　commonwealth；　but

sacred　and　unalterable　in　the　hands　where　the　community　have　once

placed　it。　Nor　can　any　edict　of　anybody　else；　in　what　form　soever

conceived；　or　by　what　power　soever　backed；　have　the　force　and

obligation　of　a　law　which　has　not　its　sanction　from　that　legislative

which　the　public　has　chosen　and　appointed；　for　without　this　the　law

could　not　have　that　which　is　absolutely　necessary　to　its　being　a

law；　the　consent　of　the　society；　over　whom　nobody　can　have　a　power

to　make　laws*　but　by　their　own　consent　and　by　authority　received

from　them；　and　therefore　all　the　obedience；　which　by　the　most　solemn

ties　any　one　can　be　obliged　to　pay；　ultimately　terminates　in　this

supreme　power；　and　is　directed　by　those　laws　which　it　enacts。　Nor

can　any　oaths　to　any　foreign　power　whatsoever；　or　any　domestic

subordinate　power；　discharge　any　member　of　the　society　from　his

obedience　to　the　legislative；　acting　pursuant　to　their　trust；　nor

oblige　him　to　any　obedience　contrary　to　the　laws　so　enacted　or　farther

than　they　do　allow；　it　being　ridiculous　to　imagine　one　can　be　tied

ultimately　to　obey　any　power　in　the　society　which　is　not　the　supreme。



　　*　〃The　lawful　power　of　making　laws　to　command　whole　politic

societies　of　men；　belonging　so　properly　unto　the　same　entire

societies；　that　for　any　prince　or　potentate；　of　what　kind　soever

upon　earth；　to　exercise　the　same　of　himself；　and　not　by　express

commission　immediately　and　personally　received　from　God；　or　else　by

authority　derived　at　the　first　from　their　consent；　upon　whose

persons　they　impose　laws；　it　is　no　better　than　mere　tyranny。　Laws　they

are　not；　therefore；　which　public　approbation　hath　not　made　so。〃

Hooker；　ibid。　10。

　　〃Of　this　point；　therefore；　we　are　to　note　that　such　men　naturally

have　no　full　and　perfect　power　to　command　whole　politic　multitudes

of　men；　therefore　utterly　without　our　consent　we　could　in　such　sort　be

at　no　man's　commandment　living。　And　to　be　commanded；　we　do　consent

when　that　society；　whereof　we　be　a　part；　hath　at　any　time　before

consented；　without　revoking　the　same　after　by　the　like　universal

agreement。

　　〃Laws　therefore　human；　of　what　kind　soever；　are　available　by

consent。〃　Hooker；　Ibid。



　　135。　Though　the　legislative；　whether　placed　in　one　or　more；

whether　it　be　always　in　being　or　only　by　intervals；　though　it　be　the

supreme　power　in　every　commonwealth；　yet；　first；　it　is　not；　nor　can

possibly　be；　absolutely　arbitrary　over　the　lives　and　fortunes　of　the

people。　For　it　being　but　the　joint　power　of　every　member　of　the

society　given　up　to　that　person　or　assembly　which　is　legislator；　it

can　be　no　mo