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　again；　and　by　tearing　off　as　well　the　skins　as　the　wool　of　those　that　are　scabbed；　whereas　Almighty　God　will　rather　require　the　blood　even　of　them　that　have　been　devoured；　from　the　shepheards　themselves。　　　　　26。　Wherefore　if　the　Minister　should　lose　part　of　the　Tythes　of　those　whom　he　suffers　to　dissent　from　the　Church；　（the　defector　not　saving；　but　the　State　wholly　gaining　them）　and　the　defector　paying　some　pecuniary　Mulct　for　his　Schisme；　and　withall　himself　defraying　the　charge　of　his　new　particular　Church　and　Pastorage；　me　thinks　the　burthen　would　be　thus　more　equally　born。　　　　　27。　Besides；　the　judicious　world　do　not　believe　our　Clergy　can　deserve　the　vaste　preferments　they　have；　onely　because　they　preach；　give　a　better　accompt　of　Opinions　concerning　Religion　then　others；　or　can　express　their　conceptions　in　the　words　of　the　Fathers；　or　the　Scriptures；　etc。　Whereas　certainly　the　great　honour　we　give　them；　is　for　being　patterns　of　holiness；　for　shewing　by　their　own　self…denials；　mortifications；　and　austerities；　that　'tis　possible　for　us　to　imitate　them　in　the　precepts　of　God；　for　if　it　were　but　for　their　bare　Pulpit…discourses；　some　men　might　think　there　is　ten　thousand　times　as　much　already　printed　as　can　be　necessary；　and　as　good　as　any　that　ever　hereafter　may　be　expected。　And　it　is　much　suspected；　that　the　Discipline　of　the　Cloisters　hath　kept　up　the　Roman　Religion；　which　the　Luxury　of　the　Cardinals　and　Prelates　might　have　destroyed。　　　　　28。　The　substance　therefore　of　all　we　have　said　in　this　discourse　concerning　the　Church　is；　that　it　would　make　much　for　its　peace；　if　the　Nursery　of　Ministers　be　not　too　bigg；　that　Austerities　in　the　Priests　lives　would　reconcil　them　to　the　people；　and　that　it　is　not　unrasonable；　that　when　the　whole　Church　suffers　by　the　defection　of　her　Members；　that　the　Pastours　of　it　by　bearing　a　small　part　should　be　made　sensible　of　the　loss；　the　manner　and　measures　of　all　which　I　leave　unto　those　unto　whom　it　belongs。　　　　　29。　Concerning　Penalties　and　Penal　Laws　I　shall　adde　but　this；　that　the　abuse　of　them　is；　when　they　are　made　not　to　keep　men　from　sin；　but　to　draw　them　into　punishment；　and　when　the　Executors　of　the　keep　them　hid　until　a　fault　be　done；　and　then　shew　them　terrible　to　the　poor　immalcious　offender：　Just　like　Centiels；　who　never　shew　men；　the　advertisements　against　pissing　near　their　Guards；　till　they　have　catcht　them　by　the　coats　for　the　forfeiture　the　claim。

Chapter　11

Of　Monopolies　and　Offices

　　　　Monopoly　（as　the　word　signifies）　is　the　sole　selling　power；　which　whosoever　hath　can　vend　the　commodity　whereupon　he　hath　this　power；　either　qualified　as　himself　　pleases；　or　at　what　price　he　pleaseth；　or　both；　within　the　limits　of　his　Commission。　　　　　2。　The　great　example　of　a　Monopoly　is　the　King　of　France　his　Gabel　upon　Salt；　whereby　he　sells　that　for　sixty　which　costs　him　but　one；　now　Salt　being　a　thing　of　universal　use　to　all　degrees　of　men；　and　scarce　more　to　the　poor　then　the　rich；　it　seems　to　be　of　the　same　effect　with　the　simplest。　Poll…money　abovementioned；　in　case　all　men　spent　equally　or　it；　or　if　men　be　forced　to　take　it　whether　they　spend　it　or　not；　as　in　some　places　they　are。　But　if　men　spend　or　eat　Salt　unequally；　as　they　commonly　do；　nor　are　bound　to　take　or　pay　for　more　then　they　spend；　then　is　no　other　than　an　accumulative　Excize；　especially　if　the　salt　be　all　of　one　uniform　goodness；　otherwise　it　is　a　distinct　species　of　Leavy；　viz。　a　monopoly。　　　　　3。　The　use　or　pretence　of　instituting　a　Monopoly　is；　　　　　First；　Right　of　Invention；　forasmuch　as　the　Laws　do　reward　Inventions；　by　granting　them　a　Monopoly　of　them　for　a　certain；　（as　here　in　England　for　fourteen　years）　for　thereby　the　Inventor　is　rewarded　more　or　less　according　to　the　acceptance　which　his　Inventory　findes　amongst　men。　　　　　Where　note　by　the　way；　that　few　new　Inventions　were　ever　rewarded　by　a　Monopoly；　for　although　the　Inventor　oftentimes　drunk　with　opinion　of　his　own　merit；　thinks　all　the　world　will　invade　and　incroach　upon　him；　yet　I　have　observed；　that　the　generality　of　men　will　scarce　be　hired　to　make　use　of　new　practices；　which　themselves　have　not　throughly　tried；　and　which　length　of　time　hath　not　vindicated　from　latent　inconveniences；　so　as　when　a　new　Invention　is　first　propounded；　in　the　beginning　every　man　objects；　and　the　poor　Inventor　runs　the　Gantloop　of　all　petulent　wits；　every　man　finding　his　several　flaw；　no　man　approving　it；　unless　mended　according　to　his　own　advice：　Now　not　one　of　an　hundred　out…lives　this　torture；　and　those　that　do；　are　at　length　so　changed　by　the　various　contribances　of　others；　that　not　any　one　man　can　pretend　to　the　Invention　of　the　whole；　nor　well　agree　about　their　respective　shares　in　the　parts。　And　moreover；　this　commonly　is　so　long　a　doing；　that　the　poor　Inventor　is　either　dead；　or　disabled　by　the　debts　contracted　to　pursue　his　design；　and　withall　railed　upon　as　a　Projector；　or　worse；　by　those　who　joyned　their　money　in　partnership　with　his　wit；　so　as　the　said　Inventor　and　his　pretences　are　wholly　lost　and　vanisht。　　　　　Secondly；　a　Monopoly　may　be　of　real　use　for　a　time；　viz。　at　the　first　introducing　of　a　new　Manufacture；　whrein　is　much　nicety　to　make　it　well；　and　which　the　generality　of　men　cannot　judge　of　as　to　the　performance。　As　for　example；　suppose　there　were　some　most　approved　Medicament　which　one　certain　man　could　make　most　exacltly　well；　although　several　others　could　also　make　the　same　less　perfectly：　in　this　case　this　same　chief　Artist　may　be　allowed　a　Monopoly　for　a　time；　viz。　until　others　have　had　experience　enough　under　him；　how　to　make　the　Medicament　as　well　as　himself。　First；　because　the　world　may　not　have　Medicament　variously　made；　when　as　they　can　neither　discern　the　diffrence　by　their　senses；　nor　judge　of　the　effects　thereof　a　posteriori；　by　their　reasons。　Secondly；　because　others　may　be　fully　instructed　by　him　that　can　best　do　it：　and　thirdly；　because　he　may　have　a　reward　for　such　his　communications：　But　forasmuch　as　by　Monopolies　of　this　kinde；　great　Leavies　are　seldom　made；　they　are　scarce　pertinent　to　our　design。　　　　　Offices　instituted　by　the　State　of　Fees　of　their　own　appointment；　are　of　parallel　nature　to　Monopolies；　the　one　relating　to　actions　and　employments　as　the　other　to　things；　and　have　the　same　to　be　said　for　and　against　them　as　Monopolies　have。　　　　　As　a　Kingdom　encreaseth　and　flourisheth；　so　doth　variety　of　things；　of　actions；　and　even　of　words　encrease　also；　for　we　see　that　the　language　of　the　most　flourishing　Empires　was　ever　the　more　copious　and　elegant；　and　that　of　mountainous　Cantons　the　contrary：　Now　as　the　actions　of　this　Kingdom　encreased；　so　did　the　Offices　（that　is；　the　power　and　faculty　of　solely　executing　and　performing　the　said　actions）　encrease　likewise；　and　on　the　contrary；　as　the　business　of　Offices　encreased；　so　did　the　difficulty　and　danger　of　discharging　them　amiss　decrease　proportionably：　from　whence　'tis　come　to　pass；　that　the　Offices　which　at　their　first　erecting　were　not　performed　but　by　the　ablest；　most　inventive；　and　versatile　Instruments；　（such　as　could　wrestle　with　all　emergent　difficulties；　and　collect　Rules　and　Axioms　out　of　the　Series　of　their　own　Observations；　（with　reference　to　the　various　casualties　of　their　employments）　whereby　to　direct　Posterity）　are　now　performed　by　the　most　ordinary；　formal；　pack…horse　Deputies　and　Sub…Deputies。　　　　　And　whereas　at　first　such　large　Fees　were　allowed　as　（considering　even　the　paucity　of　them　which　might　then　be　received）　should　compensate　the　Art；　Trust；　and　Industry　of　the　Administratour；　yet　the　large　said　Fees　are　still　continued；　although　the　skill　and　trust　be　lessened；　and　the　number　of　the　said　Fees　so　extreamly　multiplyed：　so　as　now　the　profits　of　such　Officers　（being　become　cleer；　and　the　work　so　easie　as　any　man　is　capable　of　it；　even　those　that　never　saw　it；）　are　bought　and　sold　for　Years　or　Lives；　as　any　other　Annuity　may　be；　and　withal；　the　splendor　arising　from　the　easie　gaines　of　those　places　in　Courts　of　Justice；　is　called　the　Flourishing　of　the　Law；　which　certainly　flourisheth　best；　when　the　Professors　and　Ministers　of　it　have　least　to　do。　And　moreover；　when　the　burthen　and　uselessness　of　such　an　Office　is　taken　notice　of；　'tis　nevertheless　spared　as　a　Subjects　Freehold　in　favour　of　him　that　bought　it。　　　　　Of　these　Offices　are　many　in　this　Nation；　and　such　as　might　be　a　Revenue　to　the　King；　either　by　their　Annual　profits；　or　the　Sale　of　them　for　many　years　together。　And　these　are　the　Offices　that　are　properly　saleable；　viz。　where　the　Fees　are　large；　as　appointed　when　the　number　of　them　was　few；　and　also　numerous；　as　multiplying　upon　the　increase　of　business；　and　where　the　business　is　onley　the　labour　of　the　meanest　men：　length　of　time　having　made　all　the　work　so　easie；　and　found　out　security　against　all　the　frauds；　breaches　of　trust；　and　male…administrations；　whereunto　the　infancies　of　those　place　were　obnoxious。　　　　　The　Offices　are　therefore　Taxes　upon　such　as　can　or　will　not　avoid　the　passing　through　them；　and　are　born　as　men　endure　and　run　themselves　into　the　mischiefs　of　Duelling；　the　which　are　very　great；　which　side　soever　prevails；　for　certainly　men　do　not　alwayes　go　to　Law　to　obtain　right；　or　prevent　wrong；　which　judicious　neighbours　might　perform　as　well