personal memoirs-1-第70节

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Anderson's　infantry　and　McCausland's　cavalry　to　Kerneysville。　　This

same　day　there　was　sharp　picket　firing　along　the　whole　front　of　my

infantry　line；　arising；　as　afterward　ascertained；　from　a　heavy

demonstration　by　Anderson。　　During　this　firing　I　sent　Torbert；　with

Merritt's　and　Wilson's　divisions；　to　Kerrteysville；　whence　he　was　to

proceed　toward　Leetown　and　learn　what　had　become　of　Fitz。　Lee。



About　a　mile　from　Leetown　Torbert　met　a　small　force　of　Confederate

cavalry；　and　soon　after　encountering　it；　stumbled　on　Breckenridge's

corps　of　infantry　on　the　march；　apparently　heading　for　Shepherdstown。

The　surprise　was　mutual；　for　Torbert　expected　to　meet　only　the

enemy's　cavalry；　while　the　Confederate　infantry　column　was

anticipating　an　unobstructed　march　to　the　Potomac。　　Torbert　attacked

with　such　vigor　as　at　first　to　double　up　the　head　of　Breckenridge's

corps　and　throw　it　into　confusion；　but　when　the　Confederates　realized

that　they　were　confronted　only　by　cavalry；　Early　brought　up　the　whole

of　the　four　infantry　divisions　engaged　in　his　manoeuvre；　and　in　a

sharp　attack　pushed　Torbert　rapidly　back。



All　the　advantages　which　Torbert　had　gained　by　surprising　the　enemy

were　nullified　by　this　counter…attack；　and　he　was　obliged　to　withdraw

Wilson's　division　toward　my　right；　to　the　neighborhood　of　Duffield's

Station；　Merritt　drawing　back　to　the　same　point　by　way　of　the

Shepherdstown　ford。　　Custer's　brigade　becoming　isolated　after　the

fight　while　assisting　the　rear　guard；　was　also　obliged　to　retire；

which　it　did　to　Shepherdstown　and　there　halted；　picketing　the　river

to　Antietam　ford。



When　Torbert　reported　to　me　the　nature　of　his　encounter；　and　that　a

part　of　Early's　infantry　was　marching　to　the　north；　while　Fitzhugh

Lee's　cavalry　had　gone　toward　Martinsburg；　I　thought　that　the

Confederate　general　meditated　crossing　his　cavalry　into　Maryland；　so

I　sent　Wilson　by　way　of　Harper's　Ferry　to　watch　his　movements　from

Boonesboro'；　and　at　the　same　time　directed　Averell；　who　had　reported

from　West　Virginia　some　days　before；　to　take　post　at　Williamsport　and

hold　the　crossing　there　until　he　was　driven　away。　　I　also　thought　it

possible　that　Early　might　cross　the　Potomac　with　his　whole　army；　but

the　doubts　of　a　movement　like　this　outweighed　the　probabilities

favoring　it。　　Nevertheless；　to　meet　such　a　contingency　I　arranged　to

throw　my　army　on　his　rear　should　the　occasion　arise；　and　deeming　my

position　at　Halltown　the　most　advantageous　in　which　to　await

developments；　my　infantry　was　retained　there。



If　General　Early　had　ever　intended　to　cross　the　Potomac；　Torbert's

discovery　of　his　manoeuvre　put　an　end　to　his　scheme　of　invasion；　for

he　well　knew　that　and　success　he　might　derive　from　such　a　course

would　depend　on　his　moving　with　celerity；　and　keeping　me　in　ignorance

of　his　march　till　it　should　be　well　under　way；　so　he　settled　all　the

present　uncertainties　by　retiring　with　all　his　troops　about

Kerneysville　to　his　old　position　at　Bunker　Hill　behind　the　Opequon；

and　on　the　night　of　the　26th　silently　withdrew　Anderson　and

McCausland　from　my　front　at　Halltown　to　Stephenson's　depot。



By　the　27th　all　of　Early's　infantry　was　in　position　at　Brucetown　and

Bunker　Hill；　his　cavalry　holding　the　outposts　of　Leetown　and

Smithfield；　and　on　that　day　Merritt's　division　attacked　the　enemy's

horse　at　Leetown；　and　pressed　it　back　through　Smithfield　to　the　west

side　of　the　Opequon。　　This　reconnoissance　determined　definitely　that

Early　had　abandoned　the　projected　movement　into　Maryland；　if　he　ever

seriously　contemplated　it；　and　I　marched　my　infantry　out　from

Halltown　to　the　front　of　Charlestown；　with　the　intention　of　occupying

a　line　between　Clifton　and　Berryville　the　moment　matters　should　so

shape　themselves　that　I　could　do　so　with　advantage。　　The　night　of　the

28th　Wilson　joined　me　near　Charlestown　from　his　points　of　observation

in　Maryland；　and　the　next　day　Averell　crossed　the　Potomac　at

Williamsport　and　advanced　to　Martinsburg。



Merritt's　possession　of　Smithfield　bridge　made　Early　somewhat　uneasy；

since　it　afforded　opportunity　for　interposing　a　column　between　his

right　and　left　flanks；　so　he　concluded　to　retake　the　crossing；　and；

to　this　end；　on　the　29th　advanced　two　divisions　of　infantry。　　A

severe　fight　followed；　and　Merritt　was　forced　to　retire；　being　driven

through　the　village　toward　Charlestown　with　considerable　loss。　　As

Merritt　was　nearing　my　infantry　line；　I　ordered。　　Ricketts's　division

of　the　Sixth　Corps　to　his　relief；　and　this　in　a　few　minutes　turned

the　tide；　the　Smithfield　crossing　of　the　Opequon　being　regained；　and

afterward　held　by　Lowell's　brigade；　supported　by　Ricketts。　　The　next

morning　I　moved　Torbert；　with　Wilson　and　Merritt；　to　Berryville；　and

succeeding　their　occupation　of　that　point　there　occurred　along　my

whole　line　a　lull；　which　lasted　until　the　3d　of　September；　being

undisturbed　except　by　a　combat　near　Bunker　Hill　between　Averell's

cavalry　and　a　part　of　McCausland's；　supported　by　Rodes's　division　of

infantry；　in　which　affair　the　Confederates　were　defeated　with　the

loss　of　about　fifty　prisoners　and　considerable　property　in　the　shape

of　wagons　and　beef…cattle。



Meanwhile　Torbert's　movement　to　Berryville　had　alarmed　Early；　and　as

a　counter　move　on　the　2d　of　September　he　marched　with　the　bulk　of　his

army　to　Summit　Point；　but　while　reconnoitring　in　that　region　on　the

3d　he　learned　of　the　havoc　that　Averell　was　creating　in　his　rear；　and

this　compelled　him　to　recross　to　the　west　side　of　the　Opequon　and

mass　his　troops　in　the　vicinity　of　Stephenson's　depot；　whence　he

could　extend　down　to　Bunker　Hill；　continue　to　threaten　the　Baltimore

and　Ohio　railroad；　and　at　the　same　time　cover　Winchester。



The　same　day　I　was　moving　my　infantry　to　take　up　the　Clifton…

Berryville　line；　and　that　afternoon　Wright　went　into　position　at

Clifton；　Crook　occupied　Berryville；　and　Emory's　corps　came　in　between

them；　forming　almost　a　continuous　line。　　Torbert　had　moved　to　White

Post　meanwhile；　with　directions　to　reconnoitre　as　far　south　as　the

Front　Royal　Pike。



My　infantry　had　just　got　fairly　into　this　position　about　an　hour

before　sunset；　when　along　Crook's　front　a　combat　took　place　that　at

the　time　caused　me　to　believe　it　was　Early's　purpose　to　throw　a

column　between　Crook　and　Torbert；　with　the　intention　of　isolating　the

latter；　but　the　fight　really　arose　from　the　attempt　of　General

Anderson　to　return　to　Petersburg　with　Kershaw's　division　in　response

to　loud　calls　from　General　Lee。　　Anderson　started　south　on　the　3d　of

September；　and　possibly　this　explains　Early's　reconnoissance　that　day

to　Summit　Point　as　a　covering　movement；　but　his　rapid　withdrawal　left

him　in　ignorance　of　my　advance；　and　Anderson　marched　on　heedlessly

toward　Berryville；　expecting　to　cross　the　Blue　Ridge　through　Ashby's

Gap。　　At　Berryville　however；　he　blundered　into　Crook's　lines　about

sunset；　and　a　bitter　little　fight　ensued；　in　which　the　Confederates

got　so　much　the　worst　of　it　that　they　withdrew　toward　Winchester。

When　General　Early　received　word　of　this　encounter　he　hurried　to

Anderson's　assistance　with　three　divisions；　but　soon　perceiving　what

was　hitherto　unknown　to　him；　that　my　whole　army　was　on　a　new　line；　he

decided；　after　some　slight　skirmishing；　that　Anderson　must　remain　at

Winchester　until　a　favorable　opportunity　offered　for　him　to　rejoin

Lee　by　another　route。



Succeeding　the　discomfiture　of　Anderson；　some　minor　operations　took

place　on　the　part　of；　Averell　on　the　right　and　McIntosh's　brigade　of

Wilson's　division　on　the　left；　but　from　that　time　until　the　19th　of

September　no　engagement　of　much　importance　occurred。　　The　line　from

Clifton　to　Berryville　was　occupied　by　the　Sixth　Corps　and　Grower's

and　Dwight's　divisions　of　the　Nineteenth；　Crook　being　transferred　to

Summit　Point；　whence　I　could　use　him　to　protect　my　right　flank　and　my

communication　with　Harper's　Ferry；　while　the　cavalry　threatened　the

enemy's　right　flank　and　line　of　retreat　up　the　valley。



The　difference　of　strength　between　the　two　armies　at　this　date　was

considerably　in　my　favor；　but　the　conditions　attending　my　situation

in　a　hostile　region　necessitated　so　much　detached　service　to　protect

trains；　and　to　secure　Maryland　and　Pennsylvania　from　raids；　that　my

excess　in　numbers　was　almost　canceled　by　these　incidental　demands

that　could　not　be　avoided；　and　although　I　knew　that　I　was　strong；

yet；　in　consequence　of　the　injunctions　of　General　Grant；　I　deemed　it

necessary　to　be　very　cautious；　and　the　fact　that　the　Presidential

election　was　impending　made　me　doubly　so；　the　authorities　at

Washington　having　impressed　upon　me　that　the　defeat　of　my　army　might

be　followed　by　the　overthrow　of　the　party　in　power；　which　event；　it

was　believed；　would　at　least　retard　the　progress　of　the　war；　if；

indeed；　it　did　not　lead　to　the　complete　abandonment　of　all　coercive

measures。　　Under　circumstances　such　as　these　I　could　not　afford　to

ris