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of the disposition to act from pure duty。 Although many things are

done in conformity with what duty prescribes; it is nevertheless

always doubtful whether they are done strictly from duty; so as to

have a moral worth。 Hence there have at all times been philosophers

who have altogether denied that this disposition actually exists at

all in human actions; and have ascribed everything to a more or less

refined self…love。 Not that they have on that account questioned the

soundness of the conception of morality; on the contrary; they spoke

with sincere regret of the frailty and corruption of human nature;

which; though noble enough to take its rule an idea so worthy of

respect; is yet weak to follow it and employs reason which ought to

give it the law only for the purpose of providing for the interest

of the inclinations; whether singly or at the best in the greatest

possible harmony with one another。

  In fact; it is absolutely impossible to make out by experience

with complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action;

however right in itself; rested simply on moral grounds and on the

conception of duty。 Sometimes it happens that with the sharpest

self…examination we can find nothing beside the moral principle of

duty which could have been powerful enough to move us to this or

that action and to so great a sacrifice; yet we cannot from this infer

with certainty that it was not really some secret impulse of

self…love; under the false appearance of duty; that was the actual

determining cause of the will。 We like them to flatter ourselves by

falsely taking credit for a more noble motive; whereas in fact we

can never; even by the strictest examination; get completely behind

the secret springs of action; since; when the question is of moral

worth; it is not with the actions which we see that we are

concerned; but with those inward principles of them which we do not

see。

  Moreover; we cannot better serve the wishes of those who ridicule

all morality as a mere chimera of human imagination over stepping

itself from vanity; than by conceding to them that notions of duty

must be drawn only from experience (as from indolence; people are

ready to think is also the case with all other notions); for or is

to prepare for them a certain triumph。 I am willing to admit out of

love of humanity that even most of our actions are correct; but if

we look closer at them we everywhere come upon the dear self which

is always prominent; and it is this they have in view and not the

strict command of duty which would often require self…denial。

Without being an enemy of virtue; a cool observer; one that does not

mistake the wish for good; however lively; for its reality; may

sometimes doubt whether true virtue is actually found anywhere in

the world; and this especially as years increase and the judgement

is partly made wiser by experience and partly; also; more acute in

observation。 This being so; nothing can secure us from falling away

altogether from our ideas of duty; or maintain in the soul a

well…grounded respect for its law; but the clear conviction that

although there should never have been actions which really sprang from

such pure sources; yet whether this or that takes place is not at

all the question; but that reason of itself; independent on all

experience; ordains what ought to take place; that accordingly actions

of which perhaps the world has hitherto never given an example; the

feasibility even of which might be very much doubted by one who founds

everything on experience; are nevertheless inflexibly commanded by

reason; that; e。g。; even though there might never yet have been a

sincere friend; yet not a whit the less is pure sincerity in

friendship required of every man; because; prior to all experience;

this duty is involved as duty in the idea of a reason determining

the will by a priori principles。

  When we add further that; unless we deny that the notion of morality

has any truth or reference to any possible object; we must admit

that its law must be valid; not merely for men but for all rational

creatures generally; not merely under certain contingent conditions or

with exceptions but with absolute necessity; then it is clear that

no experience could enable us to infer even the possibility of such

apodeictic laws。 For with what right could we bring into unbounded

respect as a universal precept for every rational nature that which

perhaps holds only under the contingent conditions of humanity? Or how

could laws of the determination of our will be regarded as laws of the

determination of the will of rational beings generally; and for us

only as such; if they were merely empirical and did not take their

origin wholly a priori from pure but practical reason?

  Nor could anything be more fatal to morality than that we should

wish to derive it from examples。 For every example of it that is set

before me must be first itself tested by principles of morality;

whether it is worthy to serve as an original example; i。e。; as a

pattern; but by no means can it authoritatively furnish the conception

of morality。 Even the Holy One of the Gospels must first be compared

with our ideal of moral perfection before we can recognise Him as

such; and so He says of Himself; 〃Why call ye Me (whom you see)

good; none is good (the model of good) but God only (whom ye do not

see)?〃 But whence have we the conception of God as the supreme good?

Simply from the idea of moral perfection; which reason frames a priori

and connects inseparably with the notion of a free will。 Imitation

finds no place at all in morality; and examples serve only for

encouragement; i。e。; they put beyond doubt the feasibility of what the

law commands; they make visible that which the practical rule

expresses more generally; but they can never authorize us to set aside

the true original which lies in reason and to guide ourselves by

examples。

  If then there is no genuine supreme principle of morality but what

must rest simply on pure reason; independent of all experience; I

think it is not necessary even to put the question whether it is

good to exhibit these concepts in their generality (in abstracto) as

they are established a priori along with the principles belonging to

them; if our knowledge is to be distinguished from the vulgar and to

be called philosophical。

  In our times indeed this might perhaps be necessary; for if we

collected votes whether pure rational knowledge separated from

everything empirical; that is to say; metaphysic of morals; or whether

popular practical philosophy is to be preferred; it is easy to guess

which side would preponderate。

  This descending to popular notions is certainly very commendable; if

the ascent to the principles of pure reason has first taken place

and been satisfactorily accomplished。 This implies that we first found

ethics on metaphysics; and then; when it is firmly established;

procure a hearing for it by giving it a popular character。 But it is

quite absurd to try to be popular in the first inquiry; on which the

soundness of the principles depends。 It is not only that this

proceeding can never lay claim to the very rare merit of a true

philosophical popularity; since there is no art in being

intelligible if one renounces all thoroughness of insight; but also it

produces a disgusting medley of compiled observations and

half…reasoned principles。 Shallow pates enjoy this because it can be

used for every…day chat; but the sagacious find in it only

confusion; and being unsatisfied and unable to help themselves; they

turn away their eyes; while philosophers; who see quite well through

this delusion; are little listened to when they call men off for a

time from this pretended popularity; in order that they might be

rightfully popular after they have attained a definite insight。

  We need only look at the attempts of moralists in that favourite

fashion; and we shall find at one time the special constitution of

human nature (including; however; the idea of a rational nature

generally); at one time perfection; at another happiness; here moral

sense; there fear of God。 a little of this; and a little of that; in

marvellous mixture; without its occurring to them to ask whether the

principles of morality are to be sought in the knowledge of human

nature at all (which we can have only from experience); or; if this is

not so; if these principles are to be found altogether a priori;

free from everything empirical; in pure rational concepts only and

nowhere else; not even in the smallest degree; then rather to adopt

the method of making this a separate inquiry; as pure practical

philosophy; or (if one may use a name so decried) as metaphysic of

morals;* to bring it by itself to completeness; and to require the

public; which wishes for popular treatment; to await the issue of this

undertaking。



  *Just as pure mathematics are distinguished from applied

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