fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals-第18节

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has　two　points　of　view　from　which　he　can　regard　himself；　and　recognise

laws　of　the　exercise　of　his　faculties；　and　consequently　of　all　his

actions：　first；　so　far　as　he　belongs　to　the　world　of　sense；　he　finds

himself　subject　to　laws　of　nature　（heteronomy）；　secondly；　as　belonging

to　the　intelligible　world；　under　laws　which　being　independent　of

nature　have　their　foundation　not　in　experience　but　in　reason　alone。

　　As　a　rational　being；　and　consequently　belonging　to　the

intelligible　world；　man　can　never　conceive　the　causality　of　his　own

will　otherwise　than　on　condition　of　the　idea　of　freedom；　for

independence　of　the　determinate　causes　of　the　sensible　world　（an

independence　which　reason　must　always　ascribe　to　itself）　is　freedom。

Now　the　idea　of　freedom　is　inseparably　connected　with　the　conception

of　autonomy；　and　this　again　with　the　universal　principle　of　morality

which　is　ideally　the　foundation　of　all　actions　of　rational　beings；

just　as　the　law　of　nature　is　of　all　phenomena。

　　Now　the　suspicion　is　removed　which　we　raised　above；　that　there　was　a

latent　circle　involved　in　our　reasoning　from　freedom　to　autonomy；

and　from　this　to　the　moral　law；　viz。：　that　we　laid　down　the　idea　of

freedom　because　of　the　moral　law　only　that　we　might　afterwards　in　turn

infer　the　latter　from　freedom；　and　that　consequently　we　could　assign

no　reason　at　all　for　this　law；　but　could　only　＇present＇　it　as　a

petitio　principii　which　well　disposed　minds　would　gladly　concede　to

us；　but　which　we　could　never　put　forward　as　a　provable　proposition。

For　now　we　see　that；　when　we　conceive　ourselves　as　free；　we　transfer

ourselves　into　the　world　of　understanding　as　members　of　it　and

recognise　the　autonomy　of　the　will　with　its　consequence；　morality；

whereas；　if　we　conceive　ourselves　as　under　obligation；　we　consider

ourselves　as　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense　and　at　the　same　time　to

the　world　of　understanding。



　　　　　　　　　　　How　is　a　Categorical　Imperative　Possible？



　　Every　rational　being　reckons　himself　qua　intelligence　as　belonging

to　the　world　of　understanding；　and　it　is　simply　as　an　efficient

cause　belonging　to　that　world　that　he　calls　his　causality　a　will。　On

the　other　side　he　is　also　conscious　of　himself　as　a　part　of　the

world　of　sense　in　which　his　actions；　which　are　mere　appearances

＇phenomena＇　of　that　causality；　are　displayed；　we　cannot；　however；

discern　how　they　are　possible　from　this　causality　which　we　do　not

know；　but　instead　of　that；　these　actions　as　belonging　to　the

sensible　world　must　be　viewed　as　determined　by　other　phenomena；

namely；　desires　and　inclinations。　If　therefore　I　were　only　a　member　of

the　world　of　understanding；　then　all　my　actions　would　perfectly

conform　to　the　principle　of　autonomy　of　the　pure　will；　if　I　were

only　a　part　of　the　world　of　sense；　they　would　necessarily　be　assumed

to　conform　wholly　to　the　natural　law　of　desires　and　inclinations；　in

other　words；　to　the　heteronomy　of　nature。　（The　former　would　rest　on

morality　as　the　supreme　principle；　the　latter　on　happiness。）　Since；

however；　the　world　of　understanding　contains　the　foundation　of　the

world　of　sense；　and　consequently　of　its　laws　also；　and　accordingly

gives　the　law　to　my　will　（which　belongs　wholly　to　the　world　of

understanding）　directly；　and　must　be　conceived　as　doing　so；　it　follows

that；　although　on　the　one　side　I　must　regard　myself　as　a　being

belonging　to　the　world　of　sense；　yet　on　the　other　side　I　must

recognize　myself　as　subject　as　an　intelligence　to　the　law　of　the　world

of　understanding；　i。e。；　to　reason；　which　contains　this　law　in　the　idea

of　freedom；　and　therefore　as　subject　to　the　autonomy　of　the　will：

consequently　I　must　regard　the　laws　of　the　world　of　understanding　as

imperatives　for　me　and　the　actions　which　conform　to　them　as　duties。

　　And　thus　what　makes　categorical　imperatives　possible　is　this；　that

the　idea　of　freedom　makes　me　a　member　of　an　intelligible　world；　in

consequence　of　which；　if　I　were　nothing　else；　all　my　actions　would

always　conform　to　the　autonomy　of　the　will；　but　as　I　at　the　same

time　intuite　myself　as　a　member　of　the　world　of　sense；　they　ought　so

to　conform；　and　this　categorical　〃ought〃　implies　a　synthetic　a

priori　proposition；　inasmuch　as　besides　my　will　as　affected　by

sensible　desires　there　is　added　further　the　idea　of　the　same　will

but　as　belonging　to　the　world　of　the　understanding；　pure　and　practical

of　itself；　which　contains　the　supreme　condition　according　to　reason　of

the　former　will；　precisely　as　to　the　intuitions　of　sense　there　are

added　concepts　of　the　understanding　which　of　themselves　signify

nothing　but　regular　form　in　general　and　in　this　way　synthetic　a　priori

propositions　become　possible；　on　which　all　knowledge　of　physical

nature　rests。

　　The　practical　use　of　common　human　reason　confirms　this　reasoning。

There　is　no　one；　not　even　the　most　consummate　villain；　provided　only

that　be　is　otherwise　accustomed　to　the　use　of　reason；　who；　when　we　set

before　him　examples　of　honesty　of　purpose；　of　steadfastness　in

following　good　maxims；　of　sympathy　and　general　benevolence　（even

combined　with　great　sacrifices　of　advantages　and　comfort）；　does　not

wish　that　he　might　also　possess　these　qualities。　Only　on　account　of

his　inclinations　and　impulses　he　cannot　attain　this　in　himself；　but　at

the　same　time　he　wishes　to　be　free　from　such　inclinations　which　are

burdensome　to　himself。　He　proves　by　this　that　he　transfers　himself

in　thought　with　a　will　free　from　the　impulses　of　the　sensibility

into　an　order　of　things　wholly　different　from　that　of　his　desires　in

the　field　of　the　sensibility；　since　he　cannot　expect　to　obtain　by　that

wish　any　gratification　of　his　desires；　nor　any　position　which　would

satisfy　any　of　his　actual　or　supposable　inclinations　（for　this　would

destroy　the　pre…eminence　of　the　very　idea　which　wrests　that　wish

from　him）：　he　can　only　expect　a　greater　intrinsic　worth　of　his　own

person。　This　better　person；　however；　he　imagines　himself　to　be　when　be

transfers　himself　to　the　point　of　view　of　a　member　of　the　world　of　the

understanding；　to　which　he　is　involuntarily　forced　by　the　idea　of

freedom；　i。e。；　of　independence　on　determining　causes　of　the　world　of

sense；　and　from　this　point　of　view　he　is　conscious　of　a　good　will；

which　by　his　own　confession　constitutes　the　law　for　the　bad　will

that　he　possesses　as　a　member　of　the　world　of　sense…　a　law　whose

authority　he　recognizes　while　transgressing　it。　What　he　morally

〃ought〃　is　then　what　he　necessarily　〃would；〃　as　a　member　of　the

world　of　the　understanding；　and　is　conceived　by　him　as　an　〃ought〃　only

inasmuch　as　he　likewise　considers　himself　as　a　member　of　the　world

of　sense。



　　　　　　　Of　the　Extreme　Limits　of　all　Practical　Philosophy。



　　All　men　attribute　to　themselves　freedom　of　will。　Hence　come　all

judgements　upon　actions　as　being　such　as　ought　to　have　been　done；

although　they　have　not　been　done。　However；　this　freedom　is　not　a

conception　of　experience；　nor　can　it　be　so；　since　it　still　remains；

even　though　experience　shows　the　contrary　of　what　on　supposition　of

freedom　are　conceived　as　its　necessary　consequences。　On　the　other　side

it　is　equally　necessary　that　everything　that　takes　place　should　be

fixedly　determined　according　to　laws　of　nature。　This　necessity　of

nature　is　likewise　not　an　empirical　conception；　just　for　this

reason；　that　it　involves　the　motion　of　necessity　and　consequently　of　a

priori　cognition。　But　this　conception　of　a　system　of　nature　is

confirmed　by　experience；　and　it　must　even　be　inevitably　presupposed　if

experience　itself　is　to　be　possible；　that　is；　a　connected　knowledge　of

the　objects　of　sense　resting　on　general　laws。　Therefore　freedom　is

only　an　idea　of　reason；　and　its　objective　reality　in　itself　is

doubtful；　while　nature　is　a　concept　of　the　understanding　which　proves；

and　must　necessarily　prove；　its　reality　in　examples　of　experience。

　　There　arises　from　this　a　dialectic　of　reason；　since　the　freedom

attributed　to　the　will　appears　to　contradict　the　necessity　of

nature；　and　placed　between　these　two　ways　reason　for　speculative

purposes　finds　the　road　of　physical　necessity　much　more　beaten　and

more　appropriate　than　that　of　freedom；　yet　for　practical　purposes

the　narrow　footpath　of　freedom　is　the　only　one　on　which　it　is　possible

to　make　use　of　reason　in　our　conduct；　hence　it　is　just　as　impossible

for　the　subtlest　philosophy　as　for　the　commonest　reason　of　men　to

argue　away　freedom。　Philosophy　must　then　assume　that　no　real

contradiction　will　be　found　between　freedom　and　physical　necessity

of　the　same　human　actions；　for　it　cannot　give　up　the　conception　of

nature　any　more　than　that　of　freedom。

　　Nevertheless；　even　though　we　should　never　be　able　to　comprehend

how　freedom　is　possible；　we　must　at　least　remove　this　apparent

contradiction　in　a　convincing　manner。　For　if　the　thought　of　freedom

contradicts　either　itself　or　nature；　which　is　equally　necessary；　it

must　in　competition　with　physical　necessity　be　entirely　given　up。