fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals-第15节

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the　proper　object　of　respect；　and　the　dignity　of　humanity　consists

just　in　this　capacity　of　being　universally　legislative；　though　with

the　condition　that　it　is　itself　subject　to　this　same　legislation。



　　The　Autonomy　of　the　Will　as　the　Supreme　Principle　of　Morality



　　Autonomy　of　the　will　is　that　property　of　it　by　which　it　is　a　law

to　itself　（independently　of　any　property　of　the　objects　of

volition）。　The　principle　of　autonomy　then　is：　〃Always　so　to　choose

that　the　same　volition　shall　comprehend　the　maxims　of　our　choice　as

a　universal　law。〃　We　cannot　prove　that　this　practical　rule　is　an

imperative；　i。e。；　that　the　will　of　every　rational　being　is　necessarily

bound　to　it　as　a　condition；　by　a　mere　analysis　of　the　conceptions

which　occur　in　it；　since　it　is　a　synthetical　proposition；　we　must

advance　beyond　the　cognition　of　the　objects　to　a　critical

examination　of　the　subject；　that　is；　of　the　pure　practical　reason；　for

this　synthetic　proposition　which　commands　apodeictically　must　be

capable　of　being　cognized　wholly　a　priori。　This　matter；　however；

does　not　belong　to　the　present　section。　But　that　the　principle　of

autonomy　in　question　is　the　sole　principle　of　morals　can　be　readily

shown　by　mere　analysis　of　the　conceptions　of　morality。　For　by　this

analysis　we　find　that　its　principle　must　be　a　categorical　imperative

and　that　what　this　commands　is　neither　more　nor　less　than　this　very

autonomy。



　　Heteronomy　of　the　Will　as　the　Source　of　all　spurious　Principles

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　Morality



　　If　the　will　seeks　the　law　which　is　to　determine　it　anywhere　else

than　in　the　fitness　of　its　maxims　to　be　universal　laws　of　its　own

dictation；　consequently　if　it　goes　out　of　itself　and　seeks　this　law　in

the　character　of　any　of　its　objects；　there　always　results

heteronomy。　The　will　in　that　case　does　not　give　itself　the　law；　but　it

is　given　by　the　object　through　its　relation　to　the　will。　This

relation；　whether　it　rests　on　inclination　or　on　conceptions　of　reason；

only　admits　of　hypothetical　imperatives：　〃I　ought　to　do　something

because　I　wish　for　something　else。〃　On　the　contrary；　the　moral；　and

therefore　categorical；　imperative　says：　〃I　ought　to　do　so　and　so；　even

though　I　should　not　wish　for　anything　else。〃　E。g。；　the　former　says：　〃I

ought　not　to　lie；　if　I　would　retain　my　reputation〃；　the　latter　says：

〃I　ought　not　to　lie；　although　it　should　not　bring　me　the　least

discredit。〃　The　latter　therefore　must　so　far　abstract　from　all　objects

that　they　shall　have　no　influence　on　the　will；　in　order　that　practical

reason　（will）　may　not　be　restricted　to　administering　an　interest　not

belonging　to　it；　but　may　simply　show　its　own　commanding　authority　as

the　supreme　legislation。　Thus；　e。g。；　I　ought　to　endeavour　to　promote

the　happiness　of　others；　not　as　if　its　realization　involved　any

concern　of　mine　（whether　by　immediate　inclination　or　by　any

satisfaction　indirectly　gained　through　reason）；　but　simply　because　a

maxim　which　excludes　it　cannot　be　comprehended　as　a　universal　law　in

one　and　the　same　volition。



　　　　Classification　of　all　Principles　of　Morality　which　can　be

　　　　　　　　　　　founded　on　the　Conception　of　Heteronomy



　　Here　as　elsewhere　human　reason　in　its　pure　use；　so　long　as　it　was

not　critically　examined；　has　first　tried　all　possible　wrong　ways

before　it　succeeded　in　finding　the　one　true　way。

　　All　principles　which　can　be　taken　from　this　point　of　view　are　either

empirical　or　rational。　The　former；　drawn　from　the　principle　of

happiness；　are　built　on　physical　or　moral　feelings；　the　latter；

drawn　from　the　principle　of　perfection；　are　built　either　on　the

rational　conception　of　perfection　as　a　possible　effect；　or　on　that

of　an　independent　perfection　（the　will　of　God）　as　the　determining

cause　of　our　will。

　　Empirical　principles　are　wholly　incapable　of　serving　as　a　foundation

for　moral　laws。　For　the　universality　with　which　these　should　hold

for　all　rational　beings　without　distinction；　the　unconditional

practical　necessity　which　is　thereby　imposed　on　them；　is　lost　when

their　foundation　is　taken　from　the　particular　constitution　of　human

nature；　or　the　accidental　circumstances　in　which　it　is　placed。　The

principle　of　private　happiness；　however；　is　the　most　objectionable；

not　merely　because　it　is　false；　and　experience　contradicts　the

supposition　that　prosperity　is　always　proportioned　to　good　conduct；

nor　yet　merely　because　it　contributes　nothing　to　the　establishment

of　morality…　since　it　is　quite　a　different　thing　to　make　a

prosperous　man　and　a　good　man；　or　to　make　one　prudent　and

sharp…sighted　for　his　own　interests　and　to　make　him　virtuous…　but

because　the　springs　it　provides　for　morality　are　such　as　rather

undermine　it　and　destroy　its　sublimity；　since　they　put　the　motives

to　virtue　and　to　vice　in　the　same　class　and　only　teach　us　to　make　a

better　calculation；　the　specific　difference　between　virtue　and　vice

being　entirely　extinguished。　On　the　other　hand；　as　to　moral　feeling；

this　supposed　special　sense；*　the　appeal　to　it　is　indeed　superficial

when　those　who　cannot　think　believe　that　feeling　will　help　them　out；

even　in　what　concerns　general　laws：　and　besides；　feelings；　which

naturally　differ　infinitely　in　degree；　cannot　furnish　a　uniform

standard　of　good　and　evil；　nor　has　anyone　a　right　to　form　judgements

for　others　by　his　own　feelings：　nevertheless　this　moral　feeling　is

nearer　to　morality　and　its　dignity　in　this　respect；　that　it　pays

virtue　the　honour　of　ascribing　to　her　immediately　the　satisfaction　and

esteem　we　have　for　her　and　does　not；　as　it　were；　tell　her　to　her

face　that　we　are　not　attached　to　her　by　her　beauty　but　by　profit。



　　*I　class　the　principle　of　moral　feeling　under　that　of　happiness；

because　every　empirical　interest　promises　to　contribute　to　our

well…being　by　the　agreeableness　that　a　thing　affords；　whether　it　be

immediately　and　without　a　view　to　profit；　or　whether　profit　be

regarded。　We　must　likewise；　with　Hutcheson；　class　the　principle　of

sympathy　with　the　happiness　of　others　under　his　assumed　moral　sense。



　　Amongst　the　rational　principles　of　morality；　the　ontological

conception　of　perfection；　notwithstanding　its　defects；　is　better

than　the　theological　conception　which　derives　morality　from　a　Divine

absolutely　perfect　will。　The　former　is；　no　doubt；　empty　and　indefinite

and　consequently　useless　for　finding　in　the　boundless　field　of

possible　reality　the　greatest　amount　suitable　for　us；　moreover；　in

attempting　to　distinguish　specifically　the　reality　of　which　we　are　now

speaking　from　every　other；　it　inevitably　tends　to　turn　in　a　circle　and

cannot　avoid　tacitly　presupposing　the　morality　which　it　is　to　explain；

it　is　nevertheless　preferable　to　the　theological　view；　first；

because　we　have　no　intuition　of　the　divine　perfection　and　can　only

deduce　it　from　our　own　conceptions；　the　most　important　of　which　is

that　of　morality；　and　our　explanation　would　thus　be　involved　in　a

gross　circle；　and；　in　the　next　place；　if　we　avoid　this；　the　only

notion　of　the　Divine　will　remaining　to　us　is　a　conception　made　up　of

the　attributes　of　desire　of　glory　and　dominion；　combined　with　the

awful　conceptions　of　might　and　vengeance；　and　any　system　of　morals

erected　on　this　foundation　would　be　directly　opposed　to　morality。

　　However；　if　I　had　to　choose　between　the　notion　of　the　moral　sense

and　that　of　perfection　in　general　（two　systems　which　at　least　do　not

weaken　morality；　although　they　are　totally　incapable　of　serving　as　its

foundation）；　then　I　should　decide　for　the　latter；　because　it　at

least　withdraws　the　decision　of　the　question　from　the　sensibility

and　brings　it　to　the　court　of　pure　reason；　and　although　even　here　it

decides　nothing；　it　at　all　events　preserves　the　indefinite　idea　（of

a　will　good　in　itself　free　from　corruption；　until　it　shall　be　more

precisely　defined。

　　For　the　rest　I　think　I　may　be　excused　here　from　a　detailed

refutation　of　all　these　doctrines；　that　would　only　be　superfluous

labour；　since　it　is　so　easy；　and　is　probably　so　well　seen　even　by

those　whose　office　requires　them　to　decide　for　one　of　these　theories

（because　their　hearers　would　not　tolerate　suspension　of　judgement）。

But　what　interests　us　more　here　is　to　know　that　the　prime　foundation

of　morality　laid　down　by　all　these　principles　is　nothing　but

heteronomy　of　the　will；　and　for　this　reason　they　must　necessarily　miss

their　aim。

　　In　every　case　where　an　object　of　the　will　has　to　be　supposed；　in

order　that　the　rule　may　be　prescribed　which　is　to　determine　the

will；　there　the　rule　is　simply　heteronomy；　the　imperative　is

conditional；　namely；　if　or　because　one　wishes　for　this　object；　one

should　act　so　and　so：　hence　it　can　never　command　morally；　that　is；

categorically。　Whether　the　object　determines　the　will　by　means　of

inclination；　as　in　the　principle　of　private　happiness；　or　by　means

of　reason　directed　to　objects　of　our　possible　volition　generally；　as

in　the　principle　of　perfection；　in　either　case　the　wil