on the first principles of government-第1节

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On　the　First　Principles　of　Government


by　David　Hume




　　　　Nothing　appears　more　surprising　to　those；　who　consider　human
affairs　with　a　philosophical　eve；　than　the　easiness　with　which
the　many　are　governed　by　the　few；　and　the　implicit　submission；
with　which　men　resign　their　own　sentiments　and　passions　to　those
of　their　rulers。　When　we　enquire　by　what　means　this　wonder　is
effected；　we　shall　find；　that；　as　FORCE　is　always　on　the　side　of
the　governed；　the　governors　have　nothing　to　support　them　but
opinion。　It　is　therefore；　on　opinion　only　that　government　is
founded；　and　this　maxim　extends　to　the　most　despotic　and　most
military　governments；　as　well　as　to　the　most　free　and　most
popular。　The　soldan　of　EGYPT；　or　the　emperor　of　ROME；　might　drive
his　harmless　subjects；　like　brute　beasts；　against　their
sentiments　and　inclination：　But　he　must；　at　least；　have　led　his
mamalukes；　or　praetorian　bands；　like　men；　by　their　opinion。
　　　　Opinion　is　of　two　kinds；　to　wit；　opinion　of　INTEREST；　and
opinion　of　RIGHT。　By　opinion　of　interest；　I　chiefly　understand
the　sense　of　the　general　advantage　which　is　reaped　from
government；　together　with　the　persuasion；　that　the　particular
government；　which　is　established；　is　equally　advantageous　with
any　other　that　could　easily　be　settled。　When　this　opinion
prevails　among　the　generality　of　a　state；　or　among　those　who　have
the　force　in　their　hands；　it　gives　great　security　to　any
government。
　　　　Right　is　of　two　kinds；　right　to　POWER　and　right　to　PROPERTY。
What　prevalence　opinion　of　the　first　kind　has　over　mankind；　may
easily　be　understood；　by　observing　the　attachment　which　all
nations　have　to　their　ancient　government；　and　even　to　those
names；　which　have　had　the　sanction　of　antiquity。　Antiquity　always
begets　the　opinion　of　right；　and　whatever　disadvantageous
sentiments　we　may　entertain　of　mankind；　they　are　always　found　to
be　prodigal　both　of　blood　and　treasure　in　the　maintenance　of
public　justice。　There　is；　indeed；　no　particular；　in　which；　at
first　sight；　there　may　appear　a　greater　contradiction　in　the
frame　of　the　human　mind　than　the　present。　When　men　act　in　a
faction；　they　are　apt；　without　shame　or　remorse；　to　neglect　all
the　ties　of　honour　and　morality；　in　order　to　serve　their　party；
and　yet；　when　a　faction　is　formed　upon　a　point　of　right　or
principle；　there　is　no　occasion；　where　men　discover　a　greater
obstinacy；　and　a　more　determined　sense　of　justice　and　equity。　The
same　social　disposition　of　mankind　is　the　cause　of　these
contradictory　appearances。
　　　　It　is　sufficiently　understood；　that　the　opinion　of　right　to
property　is　of　moment　in　all　matters　of　government。　A　noted
author　has　made　property　the　foundation　of　all　government；　and
most　of　our　political　writers　seem　inclined　to　follow　him　in　that
particular。　This　is　carrying　the　matter　too　far；　but　still　it
must　be　owned；　that　the　opinion　of　right　to　property　has　a　great
influence　in　this　subject。
　　　　Upon　these　three　opinions；　therefore；　of　public　interest；　of
right　to　power；　and　of　right　to　property；　are　all　governments
founded；　and　all　authority　of　the　few　over　the　many。　There　are
indeed　other　principles；　which　add　force　to　these；　and　determine；
limit；　or　alter　their　operation；　such　as　self…interest；　fear；　and
affection：　But　still　we　may　assert；　that　these　other　principles
can　have　no　influence　alone；　but　suppose　the　antecedent　influence
of　those　opinions　above…mentioned。　They　are；　therefore；　to　be
esteemed　the　secondary；　not　the　original　principles　of
government。
　　　　For；　first；　as　to　self…interest；　by　which　I　mean　the
expectation　of　particular　rewards；　distinct　from　the　general
protection　which　we　receive　from　government；　it　is　evident　that
the　magistrate's　authority　must　be　antecedently　established；　at
least　be　hoped　for；　in　order　to　produce　this　expectation。　The
prospect　of　reward　may　augment　his　authority　with　regard　to　some
particular　persons；　but　can　never　give　birth　to　it；　with　regard
to　the　public。　Men　naturally　look　for　the　greatest　favours　from
their　friends　and　acquaintance；　and　therefore；　the　hopes　of　any
considerable　number　of　the　state　would　never　center　in　any
particular　set　of　men；　if　these　men　had　no　other　title　to
magistracy；　and　had　no　separate　influence　over　the　opinions　of
mankind。　The　same　observation　may　be　extended　to　the　other　two
principles　of　fear　and　affection。　No　man　would　have　any　reason　to
fear　the　fury　of　a　tyrant；　if　he　had　no　authority　over　any　but
from　fear；　since；　as　a　single　man；　his　bodily　force　can　reach　but
a　small　way；　and　all　the　farther　power　he　possesses　must　be
founded　either　on　our　own　opinion；　or　on　the　presumed　opinion　of
others。　And　though　affection　to　wisdom　and　virtue　in　a　sovereign
extends　very　far；　and　has　great　influence；　yet　he　must
antecedently　be　supposed　invested　with　a　public　character；
otherwise　the　public　esteem　will　serve　him　in　no　stead；　nor　will
his　virtue　have　any　influence　beyond　a　narrow　sphere。
　　　　A　Government　may　endure　for　several　ages；　though　the　balance
of　power；　and　the　balance　of　property　do　not　coincide。　This
chiefly　happens；　where　any　rank　or　order　of　the　state　has
acquired　a　large　share　in　the　property；　but　from　the　original
constitution　of　the　government；　has　no　share　in　the　power。　Under
what　pretence　would　any　individual　of　that　order　assume　authority
in　public　affairs？　As　men　are　commonly　much　attached　to　their
ancient　government；　it　is　not　to　be　expected；　that　the　public
would　ever　favour　such　usurpations。　But　where　the　original
constitution　allows　any　share　of　power；　though　small；　to　an　order
of　men；　who　possess　a　large　share　of　the　property；　it　is　easy　for
them　gradually　to　stretch　their　authority；　and　bring　the　balance
of　power　to　coincide　with　that　of　property。　This　has　been　the
case　with　the　house　of　commons　in　ENGLAND。
　　　　Most　writers；　that　have　treated　of　the　BRITISH　government；
have　supposed；　that；　as　the　lower　house　represents　all　the
commons　of　GREAT　BRITAIN；　its　weight　in　the　scale　is　proportioned
to　the　property　and　power　of　all　whom　it　represents。　But　this
principle　must　not　be　received　as　absolutely　true。　For　though　the
people　are　apt　to　attach　themselves　more　to　the　house　of　commons；
than　to　any　other　member　of　the　constitution；　that　house　being
chosen　by　them　as　their　representatives；　and　as　the　public
guardians　of　their　liberty；　yet　are　there　instances　where　the
house；　even　when　in　opposition　to　the　crown；　has　not　been
followed　by　the　people；　as　we　may　particularly　observe　of　the
tory　house　of　commons　in　the　reign　of　king　WILLIAM。　Were　the
members　obliged　to　receive　instructions　from　their　constituents；
like　the　DUTCH　deputies；　this　would　entirely　alter　the　case；　and
if　such　immense　power　and　riches；　as　those　of　all　the　commons　of
GREAT　BRITAIN；　were　brought　into　the　scale；　it　is　not　easy　to
conceive；　that　the　crown　could　either　influence　that　multitude　of
people；　or　withstand　that　overbalance　of　property。　It　is　true；
the　crown　has　great　influence　over　the　collective　body　in　the
elections　of　members；　but　were　this　influence；　which　at　present
is　only　exerted　once　in　seven　years；　to　be　employed　in　bringing
over　the　people　to　every　vote；　it　would　soon　be　wasted；　and　no
skill；　popularity；　or　revenue；　could　support　it。　I　must；
therefore；　be　of　opinion；　that　an　alteration　in　this　particular
would　introduce　a　total　alteration　in　our　government；　and　would
soon　reduce　it　to　a　pure　republic；　and；　perhaps；　to　a　republic　of
no　inconvenient　form。　For　though　the　people；　collected　in　a　body
like　the　ROMAN　tribes；　be　quite　unfit　for　government；　yet　when
dispersed　in　small　bodies；　they　are　more　susceptible　both　of
reason　and　order；　the　force　of　popular　currents　and　tides　is；　in
a　great　measure；　broken；　and　the　public　interest　may　be　pursued
with　some　method　and　constancy。　But　it　is　needless　to　reason　any
farther　concerning　a　form　of　government；　which　is　never　likely　to
have　place　in　GREAT　BRITAIN；　and　which　seems　not　to　be　the　aim　of
any　party　amongst　us。　Let　us　cherish　and　improve　our　ancient
government　as　much　as　possible；　without　encouraging　a　passion　for
such　dangerous　novelties。





The　End