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!!!!隆堋響頼紗秘慕禰厮宴和肝写偬堋響





pain to any one。



  I have reserved for the last place a large class of questions



respecting the limits of government interference察which察though



closely connected with the subject of this Essay察do not察in



strictness察belong to it。 These are cases in which the reasons against



interference do not turn upon the principle of liberty此the question



is not about restraining the actions of individuals察but about helping



them察it is asked whether the government should do察or cause to be



done察something for their benefit察instead of leaving it to be done by



themselves察individually or in voluntary combination。



  The objections to government interference察when it is not such as to



involve infringement of liberty察may be of three kinds。



  The first is察when the thing to be done is likely to be better



done by individuals than by the government。 Speaking generally



there is no one so fit to conduct any business察or to determine how or



by whom it shall be conducted察as those who are personally



interested in it。 This principle condemns the interferences察once so



common察of the legislature察or the officers of government察with the



ordinary processes of industry。 But this part of the subject has



been sufficiently enlarged upon by political economists察and is not



particularly related to the principles of this Essay。



  The second objection is more nearly allied to our subject。 In many



cases察though individuals may not do the particular thing so well



on the average察as the officers of government察it is nevertheless



desirable that it should be done by them察rather than by the



government察as a means to their own mental education´ a mode of



strengthening their active faculties察exercising their judgment察and



giving them a familiar knowledge of the subjects with which they are



thus left to deal。 This is a principal察though not the sole



recommendation of jury trial in cases not political察of free and



popular local and municipal institutions察of the conduct of industrial



and philanthropic enterprises by voluntary associations。 These are not



questions of liberty察and are connected with that subject only by



remote tendencies察but they are questions of development。 It belongs



to a different occasion from the present to dwell on these things as



parts of national education察as being察in truth察the peculiar training



of a citizen察the practical part of the political education of a



free people察taking them out of the narrow circle of personal and



family selfishness察and accustoming them to the comprehension of joint



interests察the management of joint concerns´ habituating them to act



from public or semi´public motives察and guide their conduct by aims



which unite instead of isolating them from one another。 Without



these habits and powers察a free constitution can neither be worked nor



preserved察as is exemplified by the too´often transitory nature of



political freedom in countries where it does not rest upon a



sufficient basis of local liberties。 The management of purely local



business by the localities察and of the great enterprises of industry



by the union of those who voluntarily supply the pecuniary means察is



further recommended by all the advantages which have been set forth in



this Essay as belonging to individuality of development察and diversity



of modes of action。 Government operations tend to be everywhere alike。



With individuals and voluntary associations察on the contrary察there



are varied experiments察and endless diversity of experience。 What



the State can usefully do is to make itself a central depository



and active circulator and diffuser察of the experience resulting from



many trials。 Its business is to enable each experimentalist to benefit



by the experiments of others察instead of tolerating no experiments but



its own。



  The third and most cogent reason for restricting the interference of



government is the great evil of adding unnecessarily to its power。



Every function superadded to those already exercised by the government



causes its influence over hopes and fears to be more widely



diffused察and converts察more and more察the active and ambitious part



of the public into hangers´on of the government察or of some party



which aims at becoming the government。 If the roads察the railways察the



banks察the insurance offices察the great joint´stock companies察the



universities察and the public charities察were all of them branches of



the government察if察in addition察the municipal corporations and



local boards察with all that now devolves on them察became departments



of the central administration察if the employes of all these



different enterprises were appointed and paid by the government察and



looked to the government for every rise in life察not all the freedom



of the press and popular constitution of the legislature would make



this or any other country free otherwise than in name。 And the evil



would be greater察the more efficiently and scientifically the



administrative machinery was constructed´ the more skilful the



arrangements for obtaining the best qualified hands and heads with



which to work it。 In England it has of late been proposed that all the



members of the civil service of government should be selected by



competitive examination察to obtain for these employments the most



intelligent and instructed persons procurable察and much has been



said and written for and against this proposal。 One of the arguments



most insisted on by its opponents is that the occupation of a



permanent official servant of the State does not hold out sufficient



prospects of emolument and importance to attract the highest



talents察which will always be able to find a more inviting career in



the professions察or in the service of companies and other public



bodies。 One would not have been surprised if this argument had been



used by the friends of the proposition察as an answer to its



principal difficulty。 Coming from the opponents it is strange



enough。 What is urged as an objection is the safety´valve of the



proposed system。 If indeed all the high talent of the country could be



drawn into the service of the government察a proposal tending to



bring about that result might well inspire uneasiness。 If every part



of the business of society which required organised concert察or



large and comprehensive views察were in the hands of the government



and if government offices were universally filled by the ablest men



all the enlarged culture and practised intelligence in the country



except the purely speculative察would be concentrated in a numerous



bureaucracy察to whom alone the rest of the community would look for



all things此the multitude for direction and dictation in all they



had to do察the able and aspiring for personal advancement。 To be



admitted into the ranks of this bureaucracy察and when admitted察to



rise therein察would be the sole objects of ambition。 Under this



regime察not only is the outside public ill´qualified察for want of



practical experience察to criticise or check the mode of operation of



the bureaucracy察but even if the accidents of despotic or the



natural working of popular institutions occasionally raise to the



summit a ruler or rulers of reforming inclinations察no reform can be



effected which is contrary to the interest of the bureaucracy。



  Such is the melancholy condition of the Russian empire察as shown



in the accounts of those who have had sufficient opportunity of



observation。 The Czar himself is powerless against the bureaucratic



body察he can send any one of them to Siberia察but he cannot govern



without them察or against their will。 On every decree of his they



have a tacit veto察by merely refraining from carrying it into



effect。 In countries of more advanced civilisation and of a more



insurrectionary spirit察the public察accustomed to expect everything to



be done for them by the State察or at least to do nothing for



themselves without asking from the State not only leave to do it



but even how it is to be done察naturally hold the State responsible



for all evil which befalls them察and when the evil exceeds their



amount of patience察they rise against the government察and make what is



called a revolution察whereupon somebody else察with or without



legitimate authority from the nation察vaults into the seat察issues his



orders to the bureaucracy察and everything goes on much as it did



before察the bureaucracy being unchanged察and nobody else being capable



of taking their place。



  A very different spectacle is exhibited among a people accustomed to



transact their own business。 In France察a large part of the people



having been engaged in military service察many of whom have held at



least the rank of non commissioned officers察there are in every



popular i

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