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of　obligation　to　the　public　obtains　in　modern　morality　is　derived　from



Greek　and　Roman　sources；　not　from　Christian；　as；　even　in　the



morality　of　private　life；　whatever　exists　of　magnanimity；



highmindedness；　personal　dignity；　even　the　sense　of　honour；　is　derived



from　the　purely　human；　not　the　religious　part　of　our　education；　and



never　could　have　grown　out　of　a　standard　of　ethics　in　which　the　only



worth；　professedly　recognised；　is　that　of　obedience。



　　I　am　as　far　as　any　one　from　pretending　that　these　defects　are



necessarily　inherent　in　the　Christian　ethics　in　every　manner　in



which　it　can　be　conceived；　or　that　the　many　requisites　of　a　complete



moral　doctrine　which　it　does　not　contain　do　not　admit　of　being



reconciled　with　it。　Far　less　would　I　insinuate　this　of　the　doctrines



and　precepts　of　Christ　himself。　I　believe　that　the　sayings　of　Christ



are　all　that　I　can　see　any　evidence　of　their　having　been　intended　to



be；　that　they　are　irreconcilable　with　nothing　which　a　comprehensive



morality　requires；　that　everything　which　is　excellent　in　ethics　may　be



brought　within　them；　with　no　greater　violence　to　their　language　than



has　been　done　to　it　by　all　who　have　attempted　to　deduce　from　them



any　practical　system　of　conduct　whatever。　But　it　is　quite　consistent



with　this　to　believe　that　they　contain；　and　were　meant　to　contain；



only　a　part　of　the　truth；　that　many　essential　elements　of　the



highest　morality　are　among　the　things　which　are　not　provided　for；



nor　intended　to　be　provided　for；　in　the　recorded　deliverances　of　the



Founder　of　Christianity；　and　which　have　been　entirely　thrown　aside



in　the　system　of　ethics　erected　on　the　basis　of　those　deliverances



by　the　Christian　Church。　And　this　being　so；　I　think　it　a　great　error



to　persist　in　attempting　to　find　in　the　Christian　doctrine　that



complete　rule　for　our　guidance　which　its　author　intended　it　to



sanction　and　enforce；　but　only　partially　to　provide。　I　believe；　too；



that　this　narrow　theory　is　becoming　a　grave　practical　evil；　detracting



greatly　from　the　moral　training　and　instruction　which　so　many



well…meaning　persons　are　now　at　length　exerting　themselves　to　promote。



I　much　fear　that　by　attempting　to　form　the　mind　and　feelings　on　an



exclusively　religious　type；　and　discarding　those　secular　standards　（as



for　want　of　a　better　name　they　may　be　called）　which　heretofore



coexisted　with　and　supplemented　the　Christian　ethics；　receiving　some



of　its　spirit；　and　infusing　into　it　some　of　theirs；　there　will　result；



and　is　even　now　resulting；　a　low；　abject；　servile　type　of　character；



which；　submit　itself　as　it　may　to　what　it　deems　the　Supreme　Will；　is



incapable　of　rising　to　or　sympathising　in　the　conception　of　Supreme



Goodness。　I　believe　that　other　ethics　than　any　which　can　be　evolved



from　exclusively　Christian　sources；　must　exist　side　by　side　with



Christian　ethics　to　produce　the　moral　regeneration　of　mankind；　and



that　the　Christian　system　is　no　exception　to　the　rule；　that　in　an



imperfect　state　of　the　human　mind　the　interests　of　truth　require　a



diversity　of　opinions。



　　It　is　not　necessary　that　in　ceasing　to　ignore　the　moral　truths　not



contained　in　Christianity　men　should　ignore　any　of　those　which　it　does



contain。　Such　prejudice；　or　oversight；　when　it　occurs；　is　altogether



an　evil；　but　it　is　one　from　which　we　cannot　hope　to　be　always



exempt；　and　must　be　regarded　as　the　price　paid　for　an　inestimable



good。　The　exclusive　pretension　made　by　a　part　of　the　truth　to　be　the



whole；　must　and　ought　to　be　protested　against；　and　if　a　reactionary



impulse　should　make　the　protestors　unjust　in　their　turn；　this



one…sidedness；　like　the　other；　may　be　lamented；　but　must　be　tolerated。



If　Christians　would　teach　infidels　to　be　just　to　Christianity；　they



should　themselves　be　just　to　infidelity。　It　can　do　truth　no　service　to



blink　the　fact；　known　to　all　who　have　the　most　ordinary　acquaintance



with　literary　history；　that　a　large　portion　of　the　noblest　and　most



valuable　moral　teaching　has　been　the　work；　not　only　of　men　who　did　not



know；　but　of　men　who　knew　and　rejected；　the　Christian　faith。



　　I　do　not　pretend　that　the　most　unlimited　use　of　the　freedom　of



enunciating　all　possible　opinions　would　put　an　end　to　the　evils　of



religious　or　philosophical　sectarianism。　Every　truth　which　men　of



narrow　capacity　are　in　earnest　about；　is　sure　to　be　asserted；



inculcated；　and　in　many　ways　even　acted　on；　as　if　no　other　truth



existed　in　the　world；　or　at　all　events　none　that　could　limit　or



qualify　the　first。　I　acknowledge　that　the　tendency　of　all　opinions



to　become　sectarian　is　not　cured　by　the　freest　discussion；　but　is



often　heightened　and　exacerbated　thereby；　the　truth　which　ought　to



have　been；　but　was　not；　seen；　being　rejected　all　the　more　violently



because　proclaimed　by　persons　regarded　as　opponents。　But　it　is　not



on　the　impassioned　partisan；　it　is　on　the　calmer　and　more



disinterested　bystander；　that　this　collision　of　opinions　works　its



salutary　effect。　Not　the　violent　conflict　between　parts　of　the



truth；　but　the　quiet　suppression　of　half　of　it；　is　the　formidable



evil；　there　is　always　hope　when　people　are　forced　to　listen　to　both



sides；　it　is　when　they　attend　only　to　one　that　errors　harden　into



prejudices；　and　truth　itself　ceases　to　have　the　effect　of　truth；　by



being　exaggerated　into　falsehood。　And　since　there　are　few　mental



attributes　more　rare　than　that　judicial　faculty　which　can　sit　in



intelligent　judgment　between　two　sides　of　a　question；　of　which　only



one　is　represented　by　an　advocate　before　it；　truth　has　no　chance　but



in　proportion　as　every　side　of　it；　every　opinion　which　embodies　any



fraction　of　the　truth；　not　only　finds　advocates；　but　is　so　advocated



as　to　be　listened　to。







　　We　have　now　recognised　the　necessity　to　the　mental　well…being　of



mankind　（on　which　all　their　other　well…being　depends）　of　freedom　of



opinion；　and　freedom　of　the　expression　of　opinion；　on　four　distinct



grounds；　which　we　will　now　briefly　recapitulate。



　　First；　if　any　opinion　is　compelled　to　silence；　that　opinion　may；　for



aught　we　can　certainly　know；　be　true。　To　deny　this　is　to　assume　our



own　infallibility。



　　Secondly；　though　the　silenced　opinion　be　an　error；　it　may；　and



very　commonly　does；　contain　a　portion　of　truth；　and　since　the



general　or　prevailing　opinion　on　any　subject　is　rarely　or　never　the



whole　truth；　it　is　only　by　the　collision　of　adverse　opinions　that



the　remainder　of　the　truth　has　any　chance　of　being　supplied。



　　Thirdly；　even　if　the　received　opinion　be　not　only　true；　but　the



whole　truth；　unless　it　is　suffered　to　be；　and　actually　is；



vigorously　and　earnestly　contested；　it　will；　by　most　of　those　who



receive　it；　be　held　in　the　manner　of　a　prejudice；　with　little



comprehension　or　feeling　of　its　rational　grounds。　And　not　only　this；



but；　fourthly；　the　meaning　of　the　doctrine　itself　will　be　in　danger　of



being　lost；　or　enfeebled；　and　deprived　of　its　vital　effect　on　the



character　and　conduct：　the　dogma　becoming　a　mere　formal　profession；



inefficacious　for　good；　but　cumbering　the　ground；　and　preventing　the



growth　of　any　real　and　heartfelt　conviction；　from　reason　or　personal



experience。



　　Before　quitting　the　subject　of　freedom　of　opinion；　it　is　fit　to　take



some　notice　of　those　who　say　that　the　free　expression　of　all



opinions　should　be　permitted；　on　condition　that　the　manner　be



temperate；　and　do　not　pass　the　bounds　of　fair　discussion。　Much　might



be　said　on　the　impossibility　of　fixing　where　these　supposed　bounds　are



to　be　placed；　for　if　the　test　be　offence　to　those　whose　opinions　are



attacked；　I　think　experience　testifies　that　this　offence　is　given



whenever　the　attack　is　telling　and　powerful；　and　that　every　opponent



who　pushes　them　hard；　and　whom　they　find　it　difficult　to　answer；



appears　to　them；　if　he　shows　any　strong　feeling　on　the　subject；　an



intemperate　opponent。



　　But　this；　though　an　important　consideration　in　a　practical　point



of　view；　merges　in　a　more　fundamental　objection。　Undoubtedly　the



manner　of　asserting　an　opinion；　even　though　it　be　a　true　one；　may　be



very　objectionable；　and　may　justly　incur　severe　censure。　But　the



principal　offences　of　the　kind　are　such　as　it　is　mostly　impossible；



unless　by　accidental　self…betrayal；　to　bring　home　to　conviction。　The



gravest　of　them　is；　to　argue　sophistically；　to　suppress　facts　or



arguments；　to　misstate　the　elements　of　the　case；　or　misrepresent　the



opposite　opinion。　But　all　this；　even　to　the　most　aggravated　degree；　is



so　continually　done　in　perfect　good　faith；　by　persons　who　are　not



considered；　and　in　many　other　respects　may　not　deserve　to　be



considered；　ignorant　or　incompetent；　that　it　is　rarely　possible；　on



adequate　grounds；　conscientiously　to　stamp　the　misrepresentation　as



morally　culpable；