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minds；　because；　without　the　unpleasant　process　of　fining　or



imprisoning　anybody；　it　maintains　all　prevailing　opinions　outwardly



undisturbed；　while　it　does　not　absolutely　interdict　the　exercise　of



reason　by　dissentients　afflicted　with　the　malady　of　thought。　A



convenient　plan　for　having　peace　in　the　intellectual　world；　and



keeping　all　things　going　on　therein　very　much　as　they　do　already。



But　the　price　paid　for　this　sort　of　intellectual　pacification　is　the



sacrifice　of　the　entire　moral　courage　of　the　human　mind。　A　state　of



things　in　which　a　large　portion　of　the　most　active　and　inquiring



intellects　find　it　advisable　to　keep　the　general　principles　and



grounds　of　their　convictions　within　their　own　breasts；　and　attempt；　in



what　they　address　to　the　public；　to　fit　as　much　as　they　can　of　their



own　conclusions　to　premises　which　they　have　internally　renounced；



cannot　send　forth　the　open；　fearless　characters；　and　logical；



consistent　intellects　who　once　adorned　the　thinking　world。　The　sort　of



men　who　can　be　looked　for　under　it；　are　either　mere　conformers　to



commonplace；　or　time…servers　for　truth；　whose　arguments　on　all　great



subjects　are　meant　for　their　hearers；　and　are　not　those　which　have



convinced　themselves。　Those　who　avoid　this　alternative；　do　so　by



narrowing　their　thoughts　and　interests　to　things　which　can　be　spoken



of　without　venturing　within　the　region　of　principles；　that　is；　to



small　practical　matters；　which　would　come　right　of　themselves；　if



but　the　minds　of　mankind　were　strengthened　and　enlarged；　and　which



will　never　be　made　effectually　right　until　then：　while　that　which



would　strengthen　and　enlarge　men's　minds；　free　and　daring



speculation　on　the　highest　subjects；　is　abandoned。



　　Those　in　whose　eyes　this　reticence　on　the　part　of　heretics　is　no



evil　should　consider；　in　the　first　place；　that　in　consequence　of　it



there　is　never　any　fair　and　thorough　discussion　of　heretical　opinions；



and　that　such　of　them　as　could　not　stand　such　a　discussion；　though



they　may　be　prevented　from　spreading；　do　not　disappear。　But　it　is



not　the　minds　of　heretics　that　are　deteriorated　most　by　the　ban　placed



on　all　inquiry　which　does　not　end　in　the　orthodox　conclusions。　The



greatest　harm　done　is　to　those　who　are　not　heretics；　and　whose　whole



mental　development　is　cramped；　and　their　reason　cowed；　by　the　fear



of　heresy。　Who　can　compute　what　the　world　loses　in　the　multitude　of



promising　intellects　combined　with　timid　characters；　who　dare　not



follow　out　any　bold；　vigorous；　independent　train　of　thought；　lest　it



should　land　them　in　something　which　would　admit　of　being　considered



irreligious　or　immoral？　Among　them　we　may　occasionally　see　some　man　of



deep　conscientiousness；　and　subtle　and　refined　understanding；　who



spends　a　life　in　sophisticating　with　an　intellect　which　he　cannot



silence；　and　exhausts　the　resources　of　ingenuity　in　attempting　to



reconcile　the　promptings　of　his　conscience　and　reason　with



orthodoxy；　which　yet　he　does　not；　perhaps；　to　the　end　succeed　in



doing。



　　No　one　can　be　a　great　thinker　who　does　not　recognise；　that　as　a



thinker　it　is　his　first　duty　to　follow　his　intellect　to　whatever



conclusions　it　may　lead。　Truth　gains　more　even　by　the　errors　of　one



who；　with　due　study　and　preparation；　thinks　for　himself；　than　by　the



true　opinions　of　those　who　only　hold　them　because　they　do　not　suffer



themselves　to　think。　Not　that　it　is　solely；　or　chiefly；　to　form



great　thinkers；　that　freedom　of　thinking　is　required。　On　the　contrary；



it　is　as　much　and　even　more　indispensable　to　enable　average　human



beings　to　attain　the　mental　stature　which　they　are　capable　of。　There



have　been；　and　may　again　be；　great　individual　thinkers　in　a　general



atmosphere　of　mental　slavery。　But　there　never　has　been；　nor　ever



will　be；　in　that　atmosphere　an　intellectually　active　people。　Where　any



people　has　made　a　temporary　approach　to　such　a　character；　it　has



been　because　the　dread　of　heterodox　speculation　was　for　a　time



suspended。　Where　there　is　a　tacit　convention　that　principles　are　not



to　be　disputed；　where　the　discussion　of　the　greatest　questions　which



can　occupy　humanity　is　considered　to　be　closed；　we　cannot　hope　to　find



that　generally　high　scale　of　mental　activity　which　has　made　some



periods　of　history　so　remarkable。　Never　when　controversy　avoided　the



subjects　which　are　large　and　important　enough　to　kindle　enthusiasm；



was　the　mind　of　a　people　stirred　up　from　its　foundations；　and　the



impulse　given　which　raised　even　persons　of　the　most　ordinary　intellect



to　something　of　the　dignity　of　thinking　beings。　Of　such　we　have　had　an



example　in　the　condition　of　Europe　during　the　times　immediately



following　the　Reformation；　another；　though　limited　to　the　Continent



and　to　a　more　cultivated　class；　in　the　speculative　movement　of　the



latter　half　of　the　eighteenth　century；　and　a　third；　of　still　briefer



duration；　in　the　intellectual　fermentation　of　Germany　during　the



Goethian　and　Fichtean　period。　These　periods　differed　widely　in　the



particular　opinions　which　they　developed；　but　were　alike　in　this；　that



during　all　three　the　yoke　of　authority　was　broken。　In　each；　an　old



mental　despotism　had　been　thrown　off；　and　no　new　one　had　yet　taken　its



place。　The　impulse　given　at　these　three　periods　has　made　Europe　what



it　now　is。　Every　single　improvement　which　has　taken　place　either　in



the　human　mind　or　in　institutions；　may　be　traced　distinctly　to　one



or　other　of　them。　Appearances　have　for　some　time　indicated　that　all



three　impulses　are　well　nigh　spent；　and　we　can　expect　no　fresh　start



until　we　again　assert　our　mental　freedom。



　　Let　us　now　pass　to　the　second　division　of　the　argument；　and



dismissing　the　supposition　that　any　of　the　received　opinions　may　be



false；　let　us　assume　them　to　be　true；　and　examine　into　the　worth　of



the　manner　in　which　they　are　likely　to　be　held；　when　their　truth　is



not　freely　and　openly　canvassed。　However　unwillingly　a　person　who



has　a　strong　opinion　may　admit　the　possibility　that　his　opinion　may　be



false；　he　ought　to　be　moved　by　the　consideration　that；　however　true　it



may　be；　if　it　is　not　fully；　frequently；　and　fearlessly　discussed；　it



will　be　held　as　a　dead　dogma；　not　a　living　truth。



　　There　is　a　class　of　persons　（happily　not　quite　so　numerous　as



formerly）　who　think　it　enough　if　a　person　assents　undoubtingly　to　what



they　think　true；　though　he　has　no　knowledge　whatever　of　the　grounds　of



the　opinion；　and　could　not　make　a　tenable　defence　of　it　against　the



most　superficial　objections。　Such　persons；　if　they　can　once　get



their　creed　taught　from　authority；　naturally　think　that　no　good；　and



some　harm；　comes　of　its　being　allowed　to　be　questioned。　Where　their



influence　prevails；　they　make　it　nearly　impossible　for　the　received



opinion　to　be　rejected　wisely　and　considerately；　though　it　may　still



be　rejected　rashly　and　ignorantly；　for　to　shut　out　discussion　entirely



is　seldom　possible；　and　when　it　once　gets　in；　beliefs　not　grounded



on　conviction　are　apt　to　give　way　before　the　slightest　semblance　of　an



argument。　Waiving；　however；　this　possibility…　assuming　that　the　true



opinion　abides　in　the　mind；　but　abides　as　a　prejudice；　a　belief



independent　of；　and　proof　against；　argument…　this　is　not　the　way　in



which　truth　ought　to　be　held　by　a　rational　being。　This　is　not



knowing　the　truth。　Truth；　thus　held；　is　but　one　superstition　the　more；



accidentally　clinging　to　the　words　which　enunciate　a　truth。



　　If　the　intellect　and　judgment　of　mankind　ought　to　be　cultivated；　a



thing　which　Protestants　at　least　do　not　deny；　on　what　can　these



faculties　be　more　appropriately　exercised　by　any　one；　than　on　the



things　which　concern　him　so　much　that　it　is　considered　necessary　for



him　to　hold　opinions　on　them？　If　the　cultivation　of　the



understanding　consists　in　one　thing　more　than　in　another；　it　is　surely



in　learning　the　grounds　of　one's　own　opinions。　Whatever　people



believe；　on　subjects　on　which　it　is　of　the　first　importance　to　believe



rightly；　they　ought　to　be　able　to　defend　against　at　least　the　common



objections。　But；　some　one　may　say；　〃Let　them　be　taught　the　grounds



of　their　opinions。　It　does　not　follow　that　opinions　must　be　merely



parroted　because　they　are　never　heard　controverted。　Persons　who



learn　geometry　do　not　simply　commit　the　theorems　to　memory；　but



understand　and　learn　likewise　the　demonstrations；　and　it　would　be



absurd　to　say　that　they　remain　ignorant　of　the　grounds　of



geometrical　truths；　because　they　never　hear　any　one　deny；　and



attempt　to　disprove　them。〃　Undoubtedly：　and　such　teaching　suffices



on　a　subject　like　mathematics；　where　there　is　nothing　at　all　to　be



said　on　the　wrong　side　of　the　question。　The　peculiarity　of　the



evidence　of　mathematical　truths　is　that　all　the　argument　is　on　one



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