history of philosophy-第93节

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posited　through　an　original；　necessary　activity　of　the　ego；　in　which　it　does　not　know　itself　as　free。　It
is　a　sensuous　perception；　a　drawing　of　lines；　the　sphere　of　activity　thereby　becomes　something
extended　in　space。　As　quiescent；　continuous；　and　yet　unceasingly　changing；　this　sphere　is　matter；
which；　as　body；　has　a　number　of　parts　which　in　relation　to　one　another　are　called　limbs。　The
person　can　ascribe　to　himself　no　body　without　positing　it　as　being　under　the　influence　of　another
person。　But　it　is　likewise　essential　that　I　should　be　able　to　check　this　same　influence；　and　external
matter　is　also　posited　as　resisting　my　influences　on　it；　i。e。　as　a　tough；　compact　matter。”　（29）　These
tough　matters　must　further　be　separated　from　one　another　—　the　different　persons　cannot　hold
together　like　one　mass　of　dough。　For　“my　body　is　my　body　and　not　that　of　another；　it　must　further
operate　and　be　active　without　my　working　through　it。　It　is　only　through　the　operation　of　another
that　I　can　myself　be　active　and　represent　myself　as　a　rational　being　who　can　be　respected　by　him。
But　the　other　being　should　treat　me　immediately　as　a　rational　being；　I　should　be　for　him　a　rational
being　even　before　my　activity　begins。　Or　my　form　must　produce　an　effect　through　its　mere
existence　in　space；　without　my　activity；　i。e。　it　must　be　visible。　The　reciprocal　operation　of　rational
beings　must　take　place　without　activity；　thus　a　subtle　matter　must　be　assumed　in　order　that　it　way
be　modified　by　means　of　the　merely　quiescent　form。　In　this　way　are　deduced　first　Light　and　then
Air。”　（30）　This　constitutes　a　very　external　manner　of　passing　from　one　step　to　another；　resembling
the　method　of　the　ordinary　teleology；　which　makes　out；　for　instance；　that　plants　and　animals　are
given　for　the　nourishment　of　mankind。　This　is　how　it　is　put：　Man　must　eat；　and　thus　there　must　be
something　edible　—　consequently　plants　and　animals　are　at　once　deduced；　plants　must　have　their
root　in　something；　and　consequently　the　earth　is　forthwith　deduced。　What　is　altogether　lacking　is
any　consideration　of　the　object　as　what　it　is　in　itself；　it　is　plainly　considered　only　in　relation　to
another。　In　this　way　the　animal　organism　appears　as　a　tough；　tenacious　matter　which　is
“articulated”　and　can　be　modified；　light　is　a　subtle　matter　which　is　the　medium　of　communication
of　mere　existence；　&c。　—　just　as　in　the　other　case　plants　and　animals　are　merely　edible。　As　regards
a　philosophic　consideration　of　the　content　there　is　nothing　at　all　to　be　found。

Fichte　likewise　wrote　both　a　Science　of　Morals　and　of　Natural　Rights；　but　he　treats　them　as
sciences　pertaining　to　the　understanding　only；　and　his　method　of　procedure　is　destitute　of　ideas
and　carried　on　by　means　of　a　limited　understanding。　The　Fichtian　deduction　of　the　conceptions　of
justice　and　morality　thus　remains　within　the　limitations　and　rigidity　of　self…consciousness；　as　against
which　Fichte's　popular　presentations　of　religion　and　morality　present　inconsistencies。　The　treatise
on　Natural　Rights　is　a　special　failure；　e。g。　where　he；　as　we　have　just　seen　（p。　502）；　deduces　even
nature　just　as　far　as　he　requires　it。　The　organization　of　the　state　which　is　described　in　Fichte's
Science　of　Rights　is　furthermore　as　unspiritual　as　was　the　deduction　of　natural　objects　just
mentioned；　and　as　were　many　of　the　French　constitutions　which　have　appeared　in　modern　times
—　a　formal；　external　uniting　and　connecting；　in　which　the　individuals　as　such　are　held　to　be
absolute；　or　in　which　Right　is　the　highest　principle。　Kant　began　to　ground　Right　upon　Freedom；
and　Fichte　likewise　makes　freedom　the　principle　in　the　Rights　of　Nature；　but；　its　was　the　case　with
Rousseau；　it　is　freedom　in　the　form　of　the　isolated　individual。　This　is　a　great　commencement；　but　in
order　to　arrive　at　the　particular；　they　have　to　accept　certain　hypotheses。　The　universal　is　not　the
spirit；　the　substance　of　the　whole；　but　an　external；　negative　power　of　the　finite　understanding
directed　against　individuals。　The　state　is　not　apprehended　in　its　essence；　but　only　as　representing　a
condition　of　justice　and　law；　i。e。　as　an　external　relation　of　finite　to　finite。　There　are　various
individuals；　the　whole　constitution　of　the　state　is　thus　in　the　main　characterized　by　the　fact　that　the
freedom　of　individuals　must　be　limited　by　means　of　the　freedom　of　the　whole。（31）　The　individuals
always　maintain　a　cold　attitude　of　negativity　as　regards　one　another；　the　confinement　becomes
closer　and　the　bonds　more　stringent　as　time　goes　on；　instead　of　the　state　being　regarded　as
representing　the　realization　of　freedom。

This　philosophy　contains　nothing　speculative；　but　it　demands　the　presence　of　the　speculative
element。　As　the　philosophy　of　Kant　seeks　in　unity　its　Idea　of　the　Supreme　Good；　wherein　the
opposites　have　to　be　united；　so　the　Fichtian　philosophy　demands　union　in　the　ego　and　in　the
implicitude　of　faith；　in　this　self…consciousness　in　all　its　actions　makes　its　starting…point　conviction；　so
that　in　themselves　its　actions　may　bring　forth　the　highest　end　and　realize　the　good。　In　the　Fichtian
philosophy　nothing　can　be　seen　beyond　the　moment　of　self…consciousness；　of　self…conscious
Being…within…self；　as　in　the　philosophy　of　England　we　find　expressed　—　in　just　as　one…sided　a　way
—　the　moment　of　Being…for…another；　or　of　consciousness；　and　that　not　as　a　moment　simply；　but　as
the　principle　of　the　truth；　in　neither　of　the　two　is　there　the　unity　of　both　—　or　spirit。

Fichte's　philosophy　constitutes　a　significant　epoch　in　Philosophy　regarded　in　its　outward　form。　It　is
from　him　and　from　his　methods　that　abstract　thought　proceeds；　deduction　and　construction。　Hence
with　the　Fichtian　philosophy　a　revolution　took　place　in　Germany。　The　public　had　penetrated　as　far
as　the　philosophy　of　Kant；　and　until　the　Kantian　philosophy　was　reached　the　interest　awakened　by
Philosophy　was　general；　it　was　accessible；　and　men　were　curious　to　know　about　it；　it　pertained　to
the　ordinary　knowledge　of　a　man　of　culture　（supra；　p。　218）。　Formerly　men　of　business；　statesmen；
occupied　themselves　with　Philosophy；　now；　however；　with　the　intricate　idealism　of　the　philosophy
of　Kant；　their　wings　droop　helpless　to　the　ground。　Hence　it　is　with　Kant　that　we　first　begin　to　find
a　line　of　separation　which　parts　us　from　the　common　modes　of　consciousness；　but　the　result；　that
the　Absolute　cannot　be　known；　has　become　one　generally　acknowledged。　With　Fichte　the
common　consciousness　has　still　further　separated　itself　from　Philosophy；　and　it　has　utterly
departed　from　the　speculative　element　therein　present。　For　Fichte's　ego　is　not　merely　the　ego　of
the　empiric　consciousness；　since　general　determinations　of　thought　such　as　do　not　fall　within　the
ordinary　consciousness　have　likewise　to　be　known　and　brought　to　consciousness；　in　this　way　since
Fichte's　time　few　men　have　occupied　themselves　with　speculation。　Fichte；　it　is　true；　in　his　later
works　especially；　wrote　with　a　view　to　meeting　the　popular　ear　as　we　may　see　in　the　“Attempt　to
force　the　reader　into　comprehension；”　but　this　end　was　not　accomplished。　The　public　was
through　the　philosophy　of　Kant　and　Jacobi　strengthened　in　its　opinion　—　one　which　it　accepted
utiliter　…　that　the　knowledge　of　God　is　immediate；　and　that　we　know　it　from　the　beginning　and
without　requiring　to　study；　and　hence　that　Philosophy　is　quite　superfluous。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　2。　Fichte's　System　in　a　Reconstituted　Form。

The　times　called　for　life；　for　spirit。　Now　since　mind　has　thus　retreated　within　self…consciousness；
but　within　self…consciousness　as　a　barren　ego；　which　merely　gives　itself　a　content　or　a　realization
through　finitenesses　and　individualities　which　in　and　for　themselves　are　nothing；　the　next　stage　is
found　in　knowing　this　realization　of　self…consciousness　in　itself；　in　knowing　the　content　in　itself　as　a
content　which；　penetrated　throughout　by　spirit；　is　self…conscious　and　spiritual；　or　a　spirit　full　of
content。　In　his　later　popular　works　Fichte　thus　set　forth　faith；　love；　hope；　religion；　treating　them
without　philosophic　interest；　and　as　for　a　general　public：　it　was　a　philosophy　calculated　to　suit
enlightened　Jews　and　Jewesses；　councillors　and　Kotzebues。　He　places　the　matter　in　a　popular
form：　“It　is　not　the　finite　ego　that　is；　but　the　divine　Idea　is　the　foundation　of　all　Philosophy；
everything　that　man　does　of　himself　is　null　and　void。　All　existence　is　living　and　active　in　itself；　and
there　is　no　other　life　than　Being；　and　no　other　Being　than　God；　God　is　thus　absolute　Being　and
Life。　The　divine　essence　likewise　comes　forth；　revealing　and　manifesting　itself…the　world。”　（32）
This　immediate　unity　of　the　self…conscious　ego　and　its　content；　or　spirit；　which　merely　has　an
intuition　of　its　self…conscious　life　and　knows　it　as　the　truth　immediately；　manifested　itself
subsequently　in　poetic　and　prophetic　tendencies；　in　vehement　aspirations；　in　excrescences　which
grew　out　of　the　Fichtian　philosophy。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　3。　The　More　Important　of　the　Followers　of　Fichte。

On　the　one　hand；　in　respect　of　the　content　which　the　ego　reaches　in　the　philosophy　of　Fichte；　the
complete　absence　of　spirituality；　the　woodenness；　and；　to　put　it　plainly；　the　utter　foo