history of philosophy-第84节

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God。　“Or”　we　know　the　thing　if　we　“perceive　its　immediate　conditions　as　they　come　in　due
succession。　Thus；　for　instance；　we　comprehend　a　circle　when　we　can　clearly　represent　to
ourselves　the　mechanism　of　its　origination　or　its　physical　conditions；　we　know　the　syllogistic
formul？　when　we　have　actually　come　to　know　the　laws　to　which　the　human　understanding　is
subject　in　judgment　and　conclusion；　its　physical　nature　and　its　mechanism。　For　this　reason　we　have
no　conceptions　of　qualities　as　such；　but　only　intuitions。　Even　of　our　present　existence　we　have　a
feeling　only；　but　no　conceptions。　Genuine　conceptions　we　have　merely　of　figure；　number；　position；
movement　and　the　forms　of　thought；　qualities　are　known　and　understood；　if　they　are　traced　back
to　these　and　objectively　annulled。”　This　is　undoubtedly　really　finite　knowledge；　which　is　to　give
the　determinate　conditions　of　anything　determinate；　to　demonstrate　it　as　resulting　from　another
cause；　in　such　a　way　that　each　condition　is　again　conditioned　and　finite。　Jacobi　continues：　“The
business　of　reason　is　really　progressive　union　and　connection；　and　its　speculative　business　is　union
and　connection　in　accordance　with　the　known　laws　of　necessity；　i。e。　of　identity。　Everything　that
reason　can　bring　forth　by　means　of　analysis；　combination；　judgment；　conclusion；　and
re…conception；　consists　in　nothing　but　things　of　nature”　（i。e。　finite　things）；　“and　reason　itself；　as　a
limited　existence；　belongs　to　these　things。　But　the　whole　of　nature；　the　sum　of　all　conditioned
existence；　cannot　reveal　more　to　the　investigating　understanding　than　what　is　contained　in　it；
namely；　manifold　existence；　changes；　a　succession　of　forms”　（the　conditioned）；　“and　not　an　actual
beginning”　（of　the　world）；　“nor　a　real　principle　of　any　objective　existence。〃（7）

But　Jacobi　in　the　second　place　here　accepts　reason　in　a　wider　sense　and　says：　“If　we　understand
by　reason　the　principle　of　knowledge　generally；　it　is　the　mind　from　which　the　whole　living　nature　of
man　is　constituted；　through　it　man　arises；　he　is　a　form　which　it　has　adopted。”　With　this　Jacobi's
view　of　the　attempt　to　know　the　unconditioned　is　connected。　“I　take　the　whole　human　being　and
find　that　his　consciousness　is　composed　of　two　original　conceptions；　the　conceptions　of　the
conditioned　and　the　unconditioned。　Both　are　inseparably　bound　up　with　one　another；　and　yet　in
such　a　way　that　the　conception　of　the　conditioned　presupposes　the　conception　of　the
unconditioned；　and　can　be　given　in　this　alone。　We　are　just　as　certain　of　its　existence　as　we　are　of
our　own　conditioned　existence；　or　even　more　so。　Since　our　conditioned　existence　rests　on　an
infinitude　of　mediations；　there　is　opened　up　to　our　investigation　a　vast　field　which；　for　the　sake　of
our　preservation　even；　we　are　forced　to　work　upon。”　It　would；　however；　be　quite　another　thing
to　wish　to　know　the　unconditioned　apart　from　this　practical　end。　However　Jacobi　here　remarks；
“To　try　to　discover　the　conditions　of　the　unconditioned；　to　find　a　possibility　for　absolute　necessity；
and　to　construct　this　last　in　order　to　be　able　to　comprehend　it；　is　what　we　undertake　when　we
endeavour　to　make　nature　an　existence　comprehensible　to　us；　i。e。　a　merely　natural　existence；　and
to　bring　the　mechanism　of　the　principle　of　mechanism　into　the　light　of　day。　For　if　everything　which
can　be　said　to　arise　and　be　present　in　a　way　comprehensible　to　us；　must　arise　and　be　present　in　a
conditioned　way；　we　remain；　so　long　as　we　continue　to　comprehend；　in　a　chain　of　conditioned
conditions。　Where　this　chain　breaks　off；　we　cease　to　comprehend；　and　there　the　connection　which
we　call　nature　likewise　ceases。　The　conception　of　the　possibility　of　the　outward　existence　of　nature
would　thus　be　the　conception　of　an　absolute　beginning　or　origin　of　nature；　it　would　be　the
conception　of　the　unconditioned　itself　in　so　far　as　it　is　a　conditioning　of　nature　not　naturally
connected；　i。e。　a　conditioning　of　nature　unconnected　and　unconditioned　for　us。　Now　should　a
conception　of　what　is　thus　unconditioned　and　unconnected；　and　consequently　supernatural；　be
possible；　the　unconditioned　must　cease　to　be　unconditioned；　it　must　itself　receive　conditions；　and
absolute　necessity　must　commence　to　be　possibility　in　order　that　it　may　allow　itself　to　be
constructed。〃（8）　This　is　contradictory。

Jacobi　then　passes　on　from　this　point　to　the　second　of　his　main　propositions；　“The　unconditioned
is　called　the　supernatural。　Now　since　everything　which　lies　outside　the　connection　of　what　is
conditioned；　of　what　is　naturally　mediated；　also　lies　outside　the　sphere　of　our　clear　and　certain
knowledge；　and　cannot　be　understood　through　conceptions；　the　supernatural　cannot　be　accepted
in　any　other　way　by　us　than　that　in　which　it　is　given　to　us　—　namely　as　a　fact。　It　is！　This
supernatural；　this　essence　of　all　essence；　all　tongues　join　in　proclaiming　to　be　God。〃（9）　God　as　the
universal；　the　true；　is　here　taken　in　the　sense　of　a　spiritual　generally；　in　the　sense　of　power；
wisdom；　&c。　That　God　is；　however；　is　to　Jacobi　not　absolutely　true；　for　to　knowledge　pertains　His
objective　absolute　existence；　but　He　cannot　be　said　to　be　known。　It　is　thus　merely　a　fact　of　my
consciousness　that　God　exists　independently　apart　from　my　consciousness；　this；　however；　is　itself
maintained　through　my　consciousness；　the　subjective　attitude　of　thought　is　thus　to　Jacobi　the
element　of　most　importance。　The　consciousness　of　God；　which　is　in　our　consciousness；　is；
however；　of　such　a　nature　that　along　with　the　thought　of　God　we　have　immediately　associated　the
fact　that　He　is。　The　existence　of　the　supernatural　and　super…sensuous；　to　which　the　thought　of　man
regarding　the　natural　and　finite　passes　on；　is　just　as　certain　to　Jacobi　as　he　is　himself。　This　certainty
is　identical　with　his　self…consciousness；　as　certainly　as　I　am；　so　certainly　is　God　（Jacobi's　Werke；
Vol。　III。　p。　35）。　Since　he　thus　passes　back　into　self…consciousness；　the　unconditioned　is　only　for　us
in　an　immediate　way；　this　immediate　knowledge　Jacobi　calls　Faith；　inward　revelation　（Werke；　Vol。
II。　pp。　3；　4）；　to　this　appeal　can　be　made　in　man。　God；　the　absolute；　the　unconditioned；　cannot；
according；　to　Jacobi；　be　proved。　For　proof；　comprehension；　means　to　discover　conditions　for
something；　to　derive　it　from　conditions；　but　a　derived　absolute；　God；　&c。；　would　thus　not　be
absolute　at　all；　would　not　be　unconditioned；　would　not　be　God　（Jacobi's　Werke；　Vol。　III。　p。　7）。
This　immediate　knowledge　of　God　is　then　the　point　which　is　maintained　in　the　philosophy　of
Jacobi。　The　faith　of　Kant　and　of　Jacobi　are；　however；　different。　To　Kant　it　is　a　postulate　of　reason；
it　is　the　demand　for　the　solution　of　the　contradiction　between　the　world　and　goodness；　to　Jacobi　it
is　represented　on　its　immediate　knowledge。

Everything　which　has　been　written　upon　God　since　Jacobi's　time；　by　philosophers　such　as　Fries
and　by　theologians；　rests　on　this　conception　of　immediate　intellectual　knowledge；　and　men　even
call　this　revelation；　though　in　another　sense　than　the　revelation　of　theology。　Revelation　as
immediate　knowledge　is　in　ourselves；　while　the　Church　holds　revelation　to　be　something　imparted
from　without。（10）　In　the　theological　sense；　faith　is　faith　in　something　which　is　given　to　us　through
teaching。　It　is　a　sort　of　deception　when　faith　and　revelation　are　spoken　of　and　represented　as　if
faith　and　revelation　in　the　theological　sense　were　here　in　question；　for　the　sense　in　which　they　are
used；　and　which　may　be　termed　philosophic；　is　quite　a　different　one；　however　pious　an　air　may　be
assumed　in　using　the　terms。　This　is　Jacobi's　standpoint；　and　whatever　is　by　philosophers　and
theologians　said　against　it；　this　teaching　is　eagerly　accepted　and　disseminated。　And　nowhere　is
there　anything　to　be　found　but　reflections　originating　from　Jacobi；　whereby　immediate　knowledge
is　opposed　to　philosophic　knowledge　and　to　reason；　and　people　speak　of　reason；　philosophy；
&c。；　as　a　blind　man　speaks　of　colours。　It　is；　indeed；　allowed　that　a　man　cannot　make　shoes　unless
he　is　a　shoemaker；　even　although　he　have　the　measure　and　foot；　and　also　the　hands。　But　when
Philosophy　is　concerned；　immediate　knowledge　signifies　that　every　man　as　he　walks　and　stand　is　a
philosopher；　that　he　can　dogmatize　as　he　chooses；　and　that　he　is　completely　acquainted　with
Philosophy。

By　reason；　however；　mediate　knowledge　merely　is　on　the　one　hand　understood；　and　on　the　other
the　intellectual　perception　which　speaks　of　facts　（supra；　pp。　413…415）。　In　this　respect　it　is　true　that
reason　is　the　knowledge　and　revelation　of　absolute　truth；　since　the　understanding　is　the　revelation
of　the　finite　（Jacobi's　Werke；　Vol。　II。　pp。　8…14；　101）。　“We　maintained　that　two　different　powers　of
perception　in　man　have　to　be　accepted：　a　power　of　perception　through　visible　and　tangible　and
consequently　corporeal　organs　of　perception；　and　another　kind　of　power；　viz。　through　an　invisible
organ　which　in　no　way　represents　itself　to　the　outward　senses；　and　whose　existence　is　made
known　to　us　through　feeling　alone。　This　organ；　a　spiritual　eye　for　spiritual　objects；　has　been　called
by　men　—　generally　speaking　—　reason。　He　whom　the　pure　feelings　of　the　beautiful　and