history of philosophy-第76节
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one subject has such and such an experience； finds； for instance； in his religious feelings this
determination which inclines him to God； while another subject has different experiences
altogether。 We are in the habit of allowing one thing to be just and moral； others have another
mode of regarding it。 Hence if the truth depends upon experience； the element of universality； of
objectivity； &c。； comes from elsewhere； or is not justified by experience。 Hume thus declared this
sort of universality； as he declared necessity； to be rather subjectively than objectively existent； for
custom is just a subjective universality of this kind。 This is an important and acute observation in
relation to experience looked at as the source of knowledge； and it is from this point that the
Kantian reflection now begins。
Hume （Essays and Treatises on several subjects； Vol。 111。 Sect。 8； 11） then extended his
scepticism to the conceptions and doctrines of freedom and necessity； and to the proofs of the
existence of God； and in fact scepticism here possesses a wide field。 To such a system of
reasoning from thoughts and possibilities another method of reasoning may again be opposed； and
this reasoning is no better than the other。 What is said to be metaphysically established regarding
immortality； God； nature； &c。； lacks a real ground for resting upon； such as is professed to be
given； for the inferences on which men ground their proofs are subjectively formed conceptions。
But where a universality is found； it does not rest in the matter in itself； but is simply a subjective
necessity which is really mere custom。 Hence the result which Hume arrives at is necessarily
astonishment regarding the condition of human knowledge； a general state of mistrust； and a
sceptical indecision — which indeed does not amount to much。 The condition of human knowledge
regarding which Hume so much wonders； he further describes as containing an antagonism
between reason and instinct； this instinct； it is said； which embraces many sorts of powers；
inclinations； &c。； deceives us in many different ways； and reason demonstrates this。 But on the
other side it is empty； without content or principles of its own； and if a content is in question at all；
it must keep to those inclinations。 In itself reason thus has no criterion whereby the antagonism
between individual desires； and between itself and the desires； may be settled。 （8） Thus everything
appears in the form of an irrational existence devoid of thought； the implicitly true and right is not in
thought； but in the form of an instinct； a desire。
1。 Buhle： Geschichte der neuern Philosophie； Vol。 V。 Sect。 1； pp。 193…200。
2。 Tennemann's Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie von Wendt （Leipzig； 1829）； § 370；
pp。 439； 440； Hume： Essays and Treatises on several subjects； Vol。 III。 containing an Inquiry
Concerning Human Understanding （London； 1770）； Sect。 2。 pp。 21； 22； Sect。 4； P。 I。 p。 42；
Tennemann； Vol。 XI。 pp。 433； 434。
3。 Hume： op。 cit。； Vol。 III。 Not。 A。 pp。 283； 284。
4。 Tennemann op。 cit。； § 370； p。 440； Hume： op。 cit。； Vol。 III。 Sect。 4； Pt。 I。 pp。 43…45； Sect。 5；
pp。 66； 67； Buhle： Geschichte der neuern Philosophie； Vol。 V。 Sect。 1； pp。 204； 205； Tennemann；
Vol。 XI。 pp。 435； 436。
5。 Hume： op。 cit。； Vol。 III。 Sect。 vii。 Pt。 1； pp。 102； 103； Pt。 2； pp。 108； 109； Sect。 viii。 pp。 118；
119。
6。 Hume： op。 cit。； Vol。 IV。 containing an Inquiry concerning the principles of morals； Sect。 1； p。 4；
Appendix I。 p。 170。
7。 Buhle： op。 cit。； Vol。 V。 Sect。 1； pp。 230； 231； cf。 Hume； ibidem； Vol。 III。 Sect。 12； P。 II。 p。
221； Vol。 IV。； An Inquiry； &c。； Sect。 4； pp。 62…65； A dialogue； pp。 235； 236； &c。； &c。
8。 Hume： op。 cit。。 Vol。 III。 Sect。 12； Pt。 I。 pp。 217； 218； Not。 N。 pp。 296； 297； Buhle：
Geschichte der neuern Philosophie； Vol。 V。 Sect。 1； p。 210。
Section Two： Period of the Thinking Understanding
Chapter II。 — Transition Period
B。 Scottish Philosophy
1。 THOMAS REID。
Thomas Reid； born in 1710； died as a professor in Glasgow in 1796。（1） He maintained the
principle of common…sense。 His endeavour was to discover the principles of knowledge； and the
following are his conclusions： 〃（a） There are certain undemonstrated and undemonstrable
fundamental truths which common…sense begets and recognizes as immediately conclusive and
absolute。〃 This hence constitutes an immediate knowledge； in it an inward independent source is
set forth which is hereby opposed to religion as revealed。 〃（b） These immediate truths require no
support from any elaborated science； nor do they submit to its criticism；〃 they cannot be criticized
by philosophy。 〃（c） Philosophy itself has no root other than that of an immediate； self…enlightening
truth； whatever contradicts such truth is in itself false； contradictory； and absurd。〃 This is true for
knowledge and 〃（d） Morality； the individual is moral if he acts in accordance with the perfect
principles of the perfection of the whole and with his own duty as it is known to him。〃（2）
2。 JAMES BEATTIE。
James Beattie； born 1735； was a professor of moral philosophy in Edinburgh and Aberdeen； and
died in 1803。 He likewise made common…sense the source of all knowledge。 〃The common…sense
of the plain human understanding is the source of all morality； of all religion； and all certainty。 The
confirmation of common…sense must be added to the testimony of our senses。 The truth is what the
necessities of my nature call upon me to believe。 Belief signifies conviction in the case of truths
which are certain； in that of those which are probable； approbation。 The truth which is certain is
known by means of intuition； the probable truth by means of proofs。〃（3） Such convictions as are
quite certain form the basis of actions。
3。 JAMES OSWALD。
James Oswald； a Scottish clergyman； made use of an expression which indicates that we have the
principles just mentioned as facts existing within us。（4） 〃The existence of the Divine Being is
（according to him） a fact absolutely raised above all reasoning and all doubt； and immediately
certain for the common…sense of morality。〃（5） The same principle was likewise established in
Germany at this time … an inward revelation； a knowledge of the conscience； and specially of God
and His Being。
4。 DUGALD STEWART。
To this school also belong Dugald Stewart； Edward Search；（9） Ferguson； and Hutcheson； most of
whom have written on morals。 The political economist Adam Smith from this point of view is
likewise a philosopher； and the best known of them all。 This Scottish philosophy is now given forth
in Germany as something new。 It is a popular philosophy； which； on the one hand； has the great
merit of seeking in man； and in his consciousness； for the source of all that should be held by him
as true； the immanence of what should be by him esteemed。 The content is at the same time a
concrete content； in a certain degree； it is the antithesis of metaphysics proper； of the wandering
about in abstract determinations of the understanding。 Of these Scots； Dugald Stewart； who is
living still；（10） appears to be the last and least significant； in them all there is the same
ground…work to be found； the same circle of reflection； namely； an a priori philosophy； though not
one which is to be pursued in a speculative way。 The general idea which pervades their principle is
that of the healthy human understanding； to this they have added benevolent desires； sympathy； a
moral sense； and from such grounds composed very excellent moral writings。 That is certainly all
very well in order to understand approximately； up to a certain degree of culture； what universal
thoughts are； in order to narrate their history； to appeal to examples； and to explain them； but
further it does not extend。
In more recent times this Scottish philosophy has passed to France； and Professor Royer…Collard；
now president of the Second Chamber；（11） as also his disciple； Jouffroy； in conformity with it；
pass from the facts of consciousness through cultured reasoning and experience； to a further stage
in development。 What by the French is called Idéologie （supra； p。 308） has also its place here； it
is abstract metaphysics； in so far as it is an enumeration and analysis of the most simple
thought…determinations。 They are not treated dialectically； but from our reflection； from our
thoughts； the material is derived； and in this the determinations therein contained are demonstrated。
1。 Tennemann's Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie von Wendt； § 371； p。 442。
2。 Rixner： Handbuch der Geschicte der Philosophie； Vol。 III。 § 119； p。 259； ct。 Thomas Reid； An
Inquiry into the human mind on the principles of common sense （Edinburgh； 1810）； chap。 i。 Sect。
4； pp。 19； 20 （translated into German； Leipzig； 1782； pp。 17； 18）； chap。 vi。 Sect。 20； pp。
372…375 （pp。 310； 311）； &c。
3。 Rixner： Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie； Vol。 III。 § 120； pp。 261； 262； cf。 James
Beattie： Essays on the nature and immutability of Truth； &c。 （Edinburh； 1772）； Pt。 I
