history of philosophy-第74节

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proceeds　directly　from　him。　For　we　saw　that　to　Locke　the　source　of　truth　is　experience；　or　Being
as　perceived。　Now　since　this　sensuous　Being；　as　Being；　has　in　it　the　quality　of　being　for
consciousness；　we　saw　that　it　necessarily　came　to　pass　that　in　Locke's　case　some　qualities；　at
least；　were　so　determined　that　they　were　not　in　themselves；　but　only　for　another；　and　that　colour；
figure；　&c。；　had　their　ground　only　in　the　subject；　in　his　particular　organization。　This
Being…for…another；　however；　was　not　by　him　accepted　as　the　Notion；　but　as　falling　within
self…consciousness　—　i。e。；　self…consciousness　not　looked　on　as　universal；　—　not　within　mind；　but
within　what　is　opposed　to　the　implicit。

George　Berkeley　was　born　in　1684　at　Kilcrin；　near　Thomastown；　in　the　county　of　Kilkenny；
Ireland：　in　1754　he　died　as　an　English　Bishop。（1）　He　wrote　the　“Theory　of　Vision；”　1709；　“A
Treatise　concerning　the　principles　of　human　knowledge；”　1710；　“Three　Dialogues　between　Hylas
and　Philonous；”　1713。　In　1784　his　collected　works　were　published　in　London　in　two　quarto
volumes。

Berkeley　advocated　an　idealism　which　came　very　near　to　that　of　Malebranche。　As　against　the
metaphysic　of　the　understanding；　we　have　the　point　of　view　that　all　existence　and　its　determinations
arise　from　feeling；　and　are　constituted　by　self…consciousness。　Berkeley's　first　and　fundamental
thought　is　consequently　this：　“The　Being　of　whatever　is　called　by　us　a　thing　consists　alone　in　its
being　perceived；”　i。e。；　our　determinations　are　the　objects　of　our　knowledge。　“All　objects　of
human　knowledge　are　ideas”　（so　called　by　Berkeley　as　by　Locke）；　“which　arise　either　from　the
impressions　of　the　outward　senses；　or　from　perceptions　of　the　inward　states　and　activities　of　the
mind；　or　finally；　they　are　such　as　are　constituted　by　means　of　memory　and　imagination　through　their
separation　and　rearrangement。　A　union　of　different　sensuous　feelings　appears　to　us　to　be　a
particular　thing；　e。g。；　the　feeling　of　colour；　taste；　smell；　figure；　&c。；　for　by　colours；　smells；　sounds；
something　of　which　we　have　a　sensation　is　always　understood。”（2）　This　is　the　matter　and　the
object　of　knowledge；　the　knower　is　the　percipient　“I；”　which　reveals　itself　in　relation　to　those
feelings　in　various　activities；　such　as　imagination；　remembrance；　and　will。

Berkeley　thus　indeed　acknowledges　the　distinction　between　Being…for…self　and　Other…Being；
which　in　his　case；　however；　itself　falls　within　the　“I。”　Of　the　matter　on　which　activity　is　directed；　it
is　no　doubt　in　regard　to　one　portion　allowed　that　it　does　not　exist　outside　of　mind　—　that　is　to　say；
so　far　as　our　thoughts；　inward　feelings　and　states；　or　the　operations　of　our　imaginary　powers　are
concerned。　But　in　like　manner　the　manifold　sensuous　conceptions　and　feelings　can　only　exist　in　a
mind。　Locke　certainly　distinguished　extension　and　movement；　for　example；　as　fundamental
qualities；　i。e。；　as　qualities　which　pertain　to　the　objects　in　themselves。　But　Berkeley　very　pertinently
points　out　inconsistency　here　from　the　point　of　view　that　great　and　small；　quick　and　slow；　hold
good　as　something　relative；　thus　were　extension　and　movement　to　be　inherent　or　implicit；　they
could　not　be　either　large　or　small；　quick　or　slow；　that　is；　they　could　not　be；　for　these
determinations　rest　in　the　conception（3）　of　such　qualities。　In　Berkeley　the　relation　of　things　to
consciousness　is　alone　dealt　with；　and　beyond　this　relationship　they　do　not　in　his　view　come。　From
this　it　follows　that　it　is　only　self…consciousness　that　possesses　them；　for　a　perception　which　is　not　in
a　conceiving　mind　is　nothing：　it　is　a　direct　contradiction。　There　can　be　no　substance；　he　says；　which
neither　conceives　nor　perceives；　and　which　is　yet　the　substratum　of　perceptions　and　conceptions。
If　it　is　represented　that　there　is　something　outside　of　consciousness　which　is　similar　to　the
conceptions；　this　is　likewise　contradictory；　a　conception　can　alone　be　similar　to　a　conception；　the
idea　to　the　idea　alone。（4）

Thus；　while　Locke's　ultimate　point　is　abstract　substance；　Being　generally　with　the　real
determination　of　a　substratum　of　accidents；　Berkeley　declares　this　substance　to　be　the　most
incomprehensible　assumption　of　all；　but　the　incomprehensibility　does　not　make　this　Being　into　an
absolute　nullity；　nor　does　it　make　it　in　itself　incomprehensible。（5）　For　Berkeley　brings　forward
against　the　present　existence　of　external　objects　only　the　inconceivability　of　the　relation　of　a　Being
to　mind。　This　inconceivability；　however；　is　destroyed　in　the　Notion；　for　the　Notion　is　the　negative
of　things；　and　this　moved　Berkeley　and　Leibnitz　to　shut　up　the　two　sides　in　themselves。　There
nevertheless　remains　a　relationship　of　what　is　“other”　to　us；　these　feelings　do　not　develop　from　us
as　Leibnitz　represents；　but　are　determined　through　somewhat　else。　When　Leibnitz　speaks　of
development　within　the　monads；　it　is　nothing　but　empty　talk；　for　the　monads　as　they　follow　in
succession　have　no　inward　connection。　Each　individual　is　thus　determined　through　another；　and　not
through　us；　and　it　does　not　matter　what　this　external　is；　since　it　remains　a　contingent。　Now　in
relation　to　the　two　sides　of　Leibnitz　which　are　indifferent　to　one　another；　Berkeley　says　that　such
an　“other”　is　quite　superfluous。　Berkeley　calls　the　other　the　objects；　but　these；　he　says；　cannot　be
what　we　call　matter；　for　spirit　and　matter　cannot　come　together。（6）　But　the　necessity　of
conceptions　directly　contradicts　this　Being…within…self　of　the　conceiver；　for　the　Being…within…self　is
the　freedom　of　the　conceiver；　the　latter　does　not；　however；　produce　the　conceptions　with
freedom；　they　have　for　him　the　form　and　determinateness　of　an　independent　“other。”　Berkeley
likewise　does　not　accept　idealism　in　the　subjective　sense；　but　only　in　respect　that　there　are　spirits
which　impart　themselves　（in　the　other　case　the　subject　forms　his　own　conceptions）；　and
consequently；　that　it　is　God　alone　who　brings　to　pass　such　conceptions；　thus　the　imaginations　or
conceptions　which　are　produced　by　us　with　our　individual　activity　remain　separate　from　these
others；（7）　i。e。　from　the　implicit。

This　conception　gives　an　instance　of　the　difficulties　which　appear　in　regard　to　these　questions；　and
which　Berkeley　wished　to　escape　from　in　a　quite　original　way。　The　inconsistency　in　this　system
God　has　again　to　make　good；　He　has　to　bear　it　all　away；　to　Him　the　solution　of　the　contradiction　is
left。　In　this　idealism；　in　short；　the　common　sensuous　view　of　the　universe　and　the　separation　of
actuality；　as　also　the　system　of　thought；　of　judgments　devoid　of　Notion；　remain　exactly　as　before；
plainly　nothing　in　the　content　is　altered　but　the　abstract　form　that　all　things　are　perceptions　only。（8）
Such　idealism　deals　with　the　opposition　between　consciousness　and　its　object　merely；　and　leaves
the　extension　of　the　conceptions　and　the　antagonisms　of　the　empirical　and　manifold　content　quite
untouched；　and　if　we　ask　what　then　is　the　truth　of　these　perceptions　and　conceptions；　as　we　asked
formerly　of　things；　no　answer　is　forthcoming。　It　is　pretty　much　a　matter　of　indifference　whether　we
believe　in　things　or　in　perceptions；　if　self…consciousness　remains　possessed　entirely　by　finalities；　it
receives　the　content　in　the　ordinary　way；　and　that　content　is　of　the　ordinary　kind。　In　its　individuality
it　stumbles　about　amid　the　conceptions　of　an　entirely　empirical　existence；　without　knowing　and
understanding　anything　else　about　the　content：　that　is　to　say　in　this　formal　idealism　reason　has　no
content　of　its　own。

As　to　what　Berkeley　further　states　in　respect　of　the　empirical　content；　where　the　object　of　his
investigation　becomes　entirely　psychological；　it　relates　in　the　main　to　finding　out　the　difference
between　the　sensations　of　sight　and　feeling；　and　to　discovering　which　kind　of　sensations　belong　to
the　one　and　which　to　the　other。　This　kind　of　investigation　keeps　entirely　to　the　phenomenal；　and
only　therein　distinguishes　the　various　sorts　of　phenomena；　or　comprehension　only　reaches　as　far　as
to　distinctions。　The　only　point　of　interest　is　that　these　investigations　have　in　their　course　chiefly
lighted　on　space；　and　a　dispute　is　carried　on　as　to　whether　we　obtain　the　conception　of　distance
and　so　on；　in　short　all　the　conceptions　relating　to　space；　through　sight　or　feeling。　Space　is　just　this
sensuous　universal；　the　universal　in　individuality　itself；　which　in　the　empirical　consideration　of
empirical　multiplicity　invites　and　leads　us　on　to　thought　（for　it　itself　is　thought）；　and　by　it　this　very
sensuous　perception　and　reasoning　respecting　perception　is　in　its　action　confused。　And　since　here
perception　finds　an　objective　thought；　it　really　would　be　led　on　to　thought　or　to　the　possession　of　a
thought；　but　at　the　same　time　it　cannot　arrive　at　thought　in　its　completion；　since　thought　or　the
Notion　are　not　in　question；　and　it　clearly　cannot　come　to　the　consciousness　of　true　reality。　Nothing
is　thought　in　the　form　of　thought；　but　only　as　an　external；　as　something　foreign　to　thought。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　David　Hume　（next　section）　—　Contents



1。　Nachrichten　von　dem　Leben　und　den　Schriften　des　Bischofs　Berkeley　（in　Berkeley's　ph