history of philosophy-第70节

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possessed　of　the　power　of　representation；　and　is　as　such　a　representation　of　the　universe；
therefore　implicitly　the　totality　of　the　whole　world。　But　at　the　same　time　this　representation　is　not　in
consciousness；　the　naked　monad　is　implicitly　the　universe；　and　difference　is　the　development　of　this
totality　in　it。（31）　What　develops　itself　therein　is　at　the　same　time　in　harmony　with　all　other
developments；　all　is　one　harmony。　“In　the　universe　all　things　are　closely　knit　together；　they　are　in
one　piece；　like　an　ocean：　the　slightest　movement　transmits　its　influence　far　and　wide　all
around。”（32）　From　a　single　grain　of　sand；　Leibnitz　holds；　the　whole　universe　might　be
comprehended　in　its　entire　development　if　we　only　knew　the　sand　grain　thoroughly。　There　is　not
really　much　in　all　this；　though　it　sounds　very　fine；　for　the　rest　of　the　universe　is　considerably　more
than　a　grain　of　sand；　well　though　we　knew　it；　and　considerably　different　therefrom。　To　say　that　its
essence　is　the　universe　is　mere　empty　talk：　for　the　fact　is　that　the　universe　as　essence　is　not　the
universe。　To　the　sand　grain　much　must　be　added　which　is　not　present；　and　since　thought　adds
more　than　all　the　grains　of　sand　that　exist；　the　universe　and　its　development　may　in　this　way
certainly　be　comprehended。　Thus　according　to　Leibnitz　every　monad　has　or　is　the　representation
of　the　entire　universe；　which　is　the　same　as　saying　that　it　is　really　representation　in　general；　but　at
the　same　time　it　is　a　determinate　representation；　by　means　of　which　it　comes　to　be　this　particular
monad；　therefore　it　is　representation　according　to　its　particular　situation　and　circumstances。（33）

The　representations　of　the　monad　in　itself；　which　constitute　its　universe；　develop　themselves　from
themselves；　as　the　spiritual　element　in　it；　according　to　the　laws　of　their　own　activity　and　desire；　just
as　the　movements　of　their　outer　world　do　according　to　laws　of　bodies；　hence　liberty　is　nothing
other　than　this　spontaneity　of　immanent　development；　but　as　in　consciousness。　The　magnetic
needle；　on　the　contrary；　has　only　spontaneity　without　consciousness；　and　consequently　without
freedom。　For；　says　Leibnitz；　the　nature　of　the　magnetic　needle　is　to　turn　to　the　north；　if　it　had
consciousness　it　would　imagine　that　this　was　its　self…determination；　it　would　thus　have　the　will　to
move　round　in　accordance　with　its　nature。（34）　But　it　is　clear　that　in　the　course　of　conscious
representations　there　is　involved　no　necessary　connection；　but　contingency　and　want　of　sequence
are　to　be　found；　the　reason　of　this　according　to　Leibnitz　（Oper。　T。　II。　P。　I。　p。　75）　being　“because
the　nature　of　a　created　substance　implies　that　it　changes　incessantly　according　to　a　certain　order；
which　order　guides　it　spontaneously　（spontanément）　in　all　the　circumstances　which　befall　it；　so　that
one　who　sees　all　things　recognizes　in　the　present　condition　of　substance　the　past　also　and　the
future。　The　law　of　order；　which　determines　the　individuality　of　the　particular　substance；　has　an
exact　reference　to　what　takes　place　in　every　other　substance　and　in　the　whole　universe。”　The
meaning　of　this　is　that　the　monad　is　not　a　thing　apart；　or　that　there　are　two　views　of　it；　the　one
making　it　out　as　spontaneously　generating　its　representations；　so　far　as　form　is　concerned；　and　the
other　making　it　out　to　be　a　moment　of　the　whole　of　necessity；　Spinoza　would　call　this　regarding　it
from　both　sides。　An　organic　whole；　a　human　being；　is　thus　for　instance　the　assertion　of　his　aim
from　out　of　himself：　at　the　same　time　the　being　directed　on　something　else　is　involved　in　his　Notion。
He　represents　this　and　that　to　himself；　he　wills　this　and　that；　his　activity　employs　itself　and　brings
about　changes。　His　inward　determination　thus　becomes　corporeal　determination；　and　then　change
going　beyond　himself；　he　appears　as　cause；　influencing　other　monads。　But　this　Being…for…another　is
only　an　appearance。　For　the　other；　i。e。；　the　actual；　in　so　far　as　the　monad　determines　it　or　makes　it
negative；　is　the　passive　element　which　the　monad　has　in　itself：　all　moments　are　indeed　contained
therein；　and　for　that　very　reason　it　has　no　need　of　other　monads；　but　only　of　the　laws　of　the
monads　in　itself。　But　if　the　Being…for…another　is　mere　appearance；　the　same　may　be　said　of
Being…for…self；　for　this　has　significance　only　in　reference　to　Being…for…another。

The　important　point　in　Leibnitz's　philosophy　is　this　intellectuality　of　representation　which　Leibnitz；
however；　did　not　succeed　in　carrying　out；　and　for　the　same　reason　this　intellectuality　is　at　the　same
time　infinite　multiplicity；　which　has　remained　absolutely　independent；　because　this　intellectuality　has
not　been　able　to　obtain　mastery　over　the　One。　The　separation　in　the　Notion；　which　proceeds　as
far　as　release　from　itself；　or　appearance　in　distinct　independence；　Leibnitz　did　not　succeed　in
bringing　together　into　unity。　The　harmony　of　these　two　moments；　the　course　of　mental
representations　and　the　course　of　things　external；　appearing　mutually　as　cause　and　effect；　is　not
brought　by　Leibnitz　into　relation　in　and　for　themselves；　he　therefore　lets　them　fall　asunder；　although
each　is　passive　as　regards　the　other。　He　moreover　considers　both　of　them　in　one　unity；　to　be　sure；
but　their　activity　is　at　the　same　time　not　for　themselves。　Every　forward　advance　becomes　therefore
incomprehensible　when　taken　by　itself；　because　the　course　of　the　representation　as　through　aims　in
itself；　requires　this　moment　of　Other…Being　or　of　passivity；　and　again　the　connection　of　cause　and
effect　requires　the　universal：　each　however　lacks　this　its　other　moment。　The　unity　which　according
to　Leibnitz　is　to　be　brought　about　by　the　pre…established　harmony；　namely　that　the　determination
of　the　will　of　man　and　the　outward　change　harmonize；　is　therefore　brought　about　by　means　of
another；　if　not　indeed　from　without；　for　this　other　is　God。　Before　God　the　monads　are　not　to　be
independent；　but　ideal　and　absorbed　in　Him。

At　this　point　the　demand　would　come　in　that　in　God　Himself　there　should　be　comprehended　the
required　unity　of　that　which　before　fell　asunder；　and　God　has　the　special　privilege　of　having　laid　on
Him　the　burden　of　what　cannot　be　comprehended。　The　word　of　God　is　thus　the　makeshift　which
leads　to　a　unity　which　itself　is　only　hypothetical；　for　the　process　of　the　many　out　of　this　unity　is　not
demonstrated。　God　plays　therefore　in　the　later　philosophy　a　far　greater　part　than　in　the　early；
because　now　the　comprehension　of　the　absolute　opposition　of　thought　and　Being　is　the　chief
demand。　With　Leibnitz　the　extent　to　which　thoughts　advance　is　the　extent　of　the　universe；　where
comprehension　ceases；　the　universe　ceases；　and　God　begins：　so　that　later　it　was　even　maintained
that　to　be　comprehended　was　derogatory　to　God；　because　he　was　thus　degraded　into　finitude。　In
that　procedure　a　beginning　is　made　from　the　determinate；　this　and　that　are　stated　to　be　necessary；
but　since　in　the　next　place　the　unity　of　these　moments　is　not　comprehended；　it　is　transferred　to
God。　God　is　therefore；　as　it　were；　the　waste　channel　into　which　all　contradictions　flow：　Leibnitz's
Théodicée　is　just　a　popular　summing　up　such　as　this。　There　are；　nevertheless；　all　manner　of
evasions　to　be　searched　out　—　in　the　opposition　of　God's　justice　and　mercy；　that　the　one　tempers
the　other；　how　the　fore…knowledge　of　God　and　human　freedom　are　compatible　—　all　manner　of
syntheses　which　never　come　to　the　root　of　the　matter　nor　show　both　sides　to　be　moments。

These　are　the　main　moments　of　Leibnitz's　philosophy。　It　is　a　metaphysic　which　starts　from　a
narrow　determination　of　the　understanding；　namely；　from　absolute　multiplicity；　so　that　connection
can　only　be　grasped　as　continuity。　Thereby　absolute　unity　is　certainly　set　aside；　but　all　the　same　it
is　presupposed；　and　the　association　of　individuals　with　one　another　is　to　be　explained　only　in　this
way；　that　it　is　God　who　determines　the　harmony　in　the　changes　of　individuals。　This　is　an　artificial
system；　which　is　founded　on　a　category　of　the　understanding；　that　of　the　absoluteness　of　abstract
individuality。　What　is　of　importance　in　Leibnitz　lies　in　the　maxims；　in　the　principle　of　individuality
and　the　maxim　of　indistinguishability。






1。　La　vie　de　Mr。　Leibnitz　par　Mr。　le　Chevalier　de　Jaucourt　（Essais　de　Théodicée；　par　Leibnitz；
Amsterdam；　1747；　T。　I。）；　pp。　1…28；　45；　59…62；　66…74；　77…80；　87…92；　110…116；　148…151；
Brucker。　Hist。　crit。　phil。；　T。　IV。　P。　II。　pp。　335…368；　Leibnitzii　Opera　omnia　（ed。　Dutens）；　T。　II。；　P
I。　pp。　45；　46。　

2。　Vie　de　Mr。　Leibnitz；　pp。　134…143；　Brucker。　Hist。　crit。　philos。　T。　IV。　P。　II。　pp。　385；　389；
Tennemann；　vol。　xi。　pp。　181；　182。

3。　Leibnitzii　Opera；　T。　II。　P。　I。　pp。　32…39。

4。　Ibidem；　Principia　philosophi？；　pp。　20…31。

5。　cf。　Leibnitz：　Essais　de　Théodicée；　T。　I。　P。　I。　§　10；　p。　86。

6。　Leibnitz：　Principes　de　la　nature　et　la　grace；　§　1；　p。　32　（Recueil　de　diverses　pièces　par
Des…Maiseaux；　T。　II。　p。　485）；　Principia　philosophi？；　§　1；　2；　p。　20。

7。　Leibnitzii　De　ipsa　natura　sive　de　vi　insita　actionibusque　creaturarum　（Oper。　T。　II。　P。　II。）；　§　11；
p。　55；　Principia　philosophi？；　§　3…6；　18；　pp。　20…22；　Principes　de　la　nature　et　de　la　grace；　§