history of philosophy-第68节

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multiplicity　which　remains　locked　up　in　simplicity。　Determinateness　and　variation　such　as　this；
which　remains　and　goes　on　in　the　existence　itself；　is　a　perception；”　and　therefore　Leibnitz　says　all
monads　perceive　or　represent　（for　we　may　translate　perceptio　by　representation　＇Vorstellung＇）。　In
other　words；　they　are　in　themselves　universal；　for　universality　is　just　simplicity　in　multiplicity；　and
therefore　a　simplicity　which　is　at　the　same　time　change　and　motion　of　multiplicity。　This　is　a　very
important　determination；　in　substance　itself　there　is　negativity；　determinateness；　without　its
simplicity　and　its　implicitude　being　given　up。　Further；　in　it　there　is　this　idealism；　that　the　simple　is
something　in　itself　distinguished；　and　in　spite　of　its　variation；　that　it　yet　remains　one；　and　continues
in　its　simplicity。　An　instance　of　this　is　found　in　“I；”　my　spirit。　I　have　many　conceptions；　a　wealth
of　thought　is　in　me；　and　yet　I　remain　one；　notwithstanding　this　variety　of　state。　This　identity　may　be
found　in　the　fact　that　what　is　different　is　at　the　same　time　abrogated；　and　is　determined　as　one；　the
monads　are　therefore　distinguished　by　modifications　in　themselves；　but　not　by　external
determinations。　These　determinations　contained　in　the　monads　exist　in　them　in　ideal　fashion；　this
ideality　in　the　monad　is　in　itself　a　whole；　so　that　these　differences　are　only　representations　and
ideas。　This　absolute　difference　what　is　termed　the　Notion；　what　falls　asunder　in　the　mere
representation　is　held　together。　This　is　what　possesses　interest　in　Leibnitz's　philosophy。　Such
ideality　in　the　same　way　pertains　to　the　material；　which　is　also　a　multiplicity　of　monads；　therefore
the　system　of　Leibnitz　is　an　intellectual　system；　in　accordance　with　which　all　that　is　material　has
powers　of　representation　and　perception。　As　thus　representing；　the　monad；　says　Leibnitz；
possesses　activity；　for　activity　is　to　be　different；　and　yet　to　be　one；　and　this　is　the　only　true
difference。　The　monad　not　only　represents；　it　also　changes；　but　in　doing　so；　it　yet　remains　in　itself
absolutely　what　it　is。　This　variation　is　based　on　activity。　“The　activity　of　the　inner　principle；　by
means　of　which　it　passes　from　one　perception　to　another；　is　desire　（appetitus）。”　Variation　in
representation　is　desire；　and　that　constitutes　the　spontaneity　of　the　monad；　all　is　now　complete　in
itself；　and　the　category　of　influence　falls　away。　Indeed；　this　intellectuality　of　all　things　is　a　great
thought　on　the　part　of　Leibnitz：　“All　multiplicity　is　included　in　unity；”（10）　determination　is　not　a
difference　in　respect　of　something　else；　but　reflected　into　itself；　and　maintaining　itself。　This　is　one
aspect　of　things；　but　the　matter　is　not　therein　complete；　it　is　equally　the　case　that　it　is　different　in
respect　of　other　things。

Fifthly：　These　representations　and　ideas　are　not　necessarily　conscious　representations　and　ideas；
any　more　than　all　monads　as　forming　representations　are　conscious。　It　is　true　that　consciousness　is
itself　perception；　but　a　higher　grade　of　the　same；　perceptions　of　consciousness　Leibnitz　calls
apperceptions。　The　difference　between　the　merely　representing　and　the　self…conscious　monads
Leibnitz　makes　one　of　degrees　of　clearness。　The　expression　representation　has；　however；　certainly
something　awkward　about　it；　since　we　are　accustomed　to　associate　it　only　with　consciousness；
and　with　consciousness　as　such；　but　Leibnitz　admits　also　of　unconscious　representation。　When　he
then　adduces　examples　of　unconscious　representations；　he　appeals　to　the　condition　of　a　swoon　or
of　sleep；　in　which　we　are　mere　monads：　and　that　representations　without　consciousness　are
present　in　such　states　he　shows　from　the　fact　of　our　having　perceptions　immediately　after
awakening　out　of　sleep；　which　shows　that　others　must　have　been　there；　for　one　perception　arises
only　out　of　others。（11）　That　is　a　trivial　and　empirical　demonstration。

Sixthly：　These　monads　constitute　the　principle　that　exists。　Matter　is　nothing　else　than　their
passive　capability。　This　passive　capability　it　is　which　constitutes　the　obscurity　of　the
representations；　or　a　confusion　which　never　arrives　at　distinction；　or　desire；　or　activity。（12）　That　is
a　correct　definition　of　the　conception；　it　is　Being；　matter；　in　accordance　with　the　moment　of
simplicity。　This　is　implicitly　activity；　“mere　implicitness　without　actualization”　would　therefore　be　a
better　expression。　The　transition　from　obscurity　to　distinctness　Leibnitz　exemplifies　by　the　state　of
swooning。

Seventhly：　Bodies　as　bodies　are　aggregates　of　monads：　they　are　mere　heaps　which　cannot　be
termed　substances；　any　more　than　a　flock　of　sheep　can　bear　this　name。（13）　The　continuity　of　the
same　is　an　arrangement　or　extension；　but　space　is　nothing　in　itself；（14）　it　is　only　in　another；　or　a
unity　which　our　understanding　gives　to　that　aggregate。（15）

b。　Leibnitz　goes　on　to　determine　and　distinguish　more　clearly　as　the　principal　moments；　inorganic；
organic；　and　conscious　monads；　and　he　does　it　in　the　following　way。

Such　bodies　as　have　no　inner　unity；　whose　elements　are　connected　merely　by　space；　or　externally；
are　inorganic；　they　have　not　an　entelechy　or　one　monad　which　rules　over　the　rest。（16）　The
continuity　of　space　as　a　merely　external　relation　has　not　the　Notion　in　itself　of　the　likeness　of　these
monads　in　themselves。　Continuity　is　in　fact　to　be　regarded　in　them　as　an　arrangement；　a　similarity　in
themselves。　Leibnitz　therefore　defines　their　movements　as　like　one　another；　as　a　harmony　in
themselves；（17）　but　again；　this　is　as　much　as　saying　that　their　similarity　is　not　in　themselves。　In　fact
continuity　forms　the　essential　determination　of　the　inorganic；　but　it　must　at　the　same　time　not　be
taken　as　something　external　or　as　likeness；　but　as　penetrating　or　penetrated　unity；　which　has
dissolved　individuality　in　itself　like　a　fluid。　But　to　this　point　Leibnitz　does　not　attain；　because　for　him
monads　are　the　absolute　principle；　and　individuality　does　not　annul　itself。

A　higher　degree　of　Being　is　found　in　bodies　with　life　and　soul；　in　which　one　monad　has　dominion
over　the　rest。　The　body　which　is　bound　up　with　the　monad；　of　which　the　one　monad　is　the
entelechy　or　soul；　is　with　this　soul　named　a　living　creature；　an　animal。　One　such　entelechy　rules
over　the　rest；　yet　not　really；　but　formally：　the　limbs　of　this　animal；　however；　are　again　themselves
such　living　things；　each　of　which　has　in　its　turn　its　ruling　entelechy　within　it。（18）　But　ruling　is　here　an
inappropriate　expression。　To　rule　in　this　case　is　not　to　rule　over　others；　for　all　are　independent；　it　is
therefore　only　a　formal　expression。　If　Leibnitz　had　not　helped　himself　out　with　the　word　rule；　and
developed　the　idea　further；　this　dominant　monad　would　have　abrogated　the　others；　and　put　them　in
a　negative　position；　the　implicitness　of　the　other　monads；　or　the　principle　of　the　absolute　Being　of
these　points　or　individuals　would　have　disappeared。　Yet　we　shall　later　on　come　across　this　relation
of　the　individuals　to　one　another。

The　conscious　monad　distinguishes　itself　from　the　naked　（material）　monads　by　the　distinctness　of
the　representation。　But　this　is　of　course　only　an　indefinite　word；　a　formal　distinction；　it　indicates
that　consciousness　is　the　very　thing　that　constitutes　the　distinction　of　the　undistinguished；　and　that
distinction　constitutes　the　determination　of　consciousness。　Leibnitz　more　particularly　defined　the
distinction　of　man　as　that　“he　is　capable　of　the　knowledge　of　necessary　and　eternal　truths；〃　—　or
that　he　conceives　the　universal　on　the　one　hand；　and　on　the　other　what　is　connected　with　it；　the
nature　and　essence　of　self…consciousness　lies　in　the　universality　of　the　Notions。　“These　eternal
truths　rest　on　two　maxims；　the　one　is　that　of　contradiction；　the　other　is　that　of　sufficient　reason。”
The　former　of　these　is　unity　expressed　in　useless　fashion　as　a　maxim；　the　distinction　of　the
undistinguishable；　A=A；　it　is　the　definition　of　thinking；　but　not　a　maxim　which　could　contain　a　truth
as　content；　or　it　does　not　express　the　Notion　of　distinction　as　such。　The　other　important　principle
was；　on　the　other　hand：　What　is　not　distinguished　in　thought　is　not　distinguished　（p。　333）。　“The
maxim　of　the　reason　is　that　everything　has　its　reason；”（19）　—　the　particular　has　the　universal　as　its
essential　reality。　Necessary　truth　must　have　its　reason　in　itself　in　such　a　manner　that　it　is　found　by
analysis；　i。e。　through　that　very　maxim　of　identity。　For　analysis　is　the　very　favourite　plan　of　resolving
into　simple　ideas　and　principles：　a　resolution　which　annihilates　their　relation；　and　which　therefore　in
fact　forms　a　transition　into　the　opposite；　though　it　does　not　have　the　consciousness　of　the　same；
and　on　that　account　also　excludes　the　Notion；　for　every　opposite　it　lays　hold　of　only　in　its　identity。
Sufficient　reason　seems　to　be　a　pleonasm；　but　Leibnitz　understood　by　this　aims；　final　causes
（caus？　finales）；　the　difference　between　which　and　the　causal　nexus　or　the　efficient　cause　he　here
brings　under　discussion。（20）

c。　The　universal　itself；　absolute　essence；　which　with　Leibnitz　is　something　quite　different　from　the
monads；　separates　itself　also　into　two　s