history of philosophy-第60节

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not　get　beyond　the　ordinary　point　of　view　of　consciousness；　viz。　that　objects　outside　of　us　are　the
real　and　the　true。　The　finite　is　thus　not　grasped　by　Locke　as　absolute　negativity；　i。e。；　in　its
infinitude；　this　we　shall　not　find　until　we　come　to　deal　in　the　third　place　with　Leibnitz。　It　is　in　a
higher　sense　that　Leibnitz　asserts　individuality；　the　differentiated；　to　be　self…existent　and　indeed
objectless；　to　be　true　Being。　That　is　to　say；　it　is　not　according　to　him　finite；　but　is　yet　distinguished；
thus；　each　monad　is　itself　the　totality。　Leibnitz　and　Locke　hence　likewise　stand　in　a　position　of
mutual　independence　and　antagonism。

John　Locke　was　born　in　1632；　at　Wrington；　in　England。　He　studied　for　himself　the　Cartesian
philosophy　at　Oxford；　setting　aside　the　scholastic　philosophy　which　was　still　in　vogue。　He　devoted
himself　to　the　study　of　medicine；　which；　however；　on　account　of　his　delicate　health；　he　never　really
practised。　In　1664　he　went　with　an　English　ambassador　for　a　year　to　Berlin。　After　his　return　to
England；　he　became　acquainted　with　the　intellectual　Earl　of　Shaftesbury　of　that　time；　who　availed
himself　of　his　medical　advice；　and　in　whose　house　he　lived　without　requiring　to　give　himself　up　to
practice。　When　Lord　Shaftesbury　became　Lord　Chancellor　of　England；　Locke　received　an　office
from　him；　which；　however；　he　soon　lost　by　a　change　of　ministry。　Owing　to　his　dread　of　falling　a
prey　to　consumption；　he　betook　himself　in　1675　to　Montpellier　for　the　benefit　of　his　health。　When
his　patron　came　into　power　again　he　once　more　recovered　the　place　he　had　lost；　only　to　be　again
deposed　on　a　fresh　overthrow　of　this　minister；　and　he　was　now　compelled　to　flee　from　England。
“The　act　by　means　of　which　Locke　was　driven　from　Oxford”　（what　post　he　held　there　we　are　not
told）　“was　not　an　enactment　of　the　University；　but　of　James　II。；　by　whose　express　command；　and
by　the　peremptory　authority　of　a　written　warrant；　the　expulsion　was　carried　out。　From　the
correspondence　that　took　place；　it　is　evident　that　the　college　submitted　itself　against　its　will　to　a
measure　which　it　could　not　resist　without　compromising　the　peace　and　quiet　of　its　members。”
Locke　went　to　Holland；　which　was　at　that　time　the　land　wherein　all　who　were　obliged　to　effect
their　escape　from　any　oppression；　whether　political　or　religious；　found　protection；　and　in　which　the
most　famous　and　liberal…minded　men　were　to　be　met　with。　The　Court　party　persecuted　him　even
here；　and　by　royal　warrant　he　was　ordered　to　be　taken　prisoner　and　sent　to　England；　consequently
he　had　to　remain　hidden　with　his　friends。　When　William　of　Orange　ascended　the　English　throne；
after　the　Revolution　of　1688；　Locke　returned　with　him　to　England。　He　was　there　made
Commissioner　of　Trade　and　Plantation；　gave　to　the　world　his　famous　treatise　on　the　Human
Understanding；　and　finally；　having　withdrawn　from　public　office　or　account　of　the　delicacy　of　his
health；　he　spent　his　remaining　years　in　the　country　houses　of　English　nobles；　he　died　on　the　28th
day　of　October；　1704；　in　the　seventy…third　year　of　his　life。（1）

The　philosophy　of　Locke　is　much　esteemed；　it　is　still；　for　the　most　part；　the　philosophy　of　the
English　and　the　French；　and　likewise　in　a　certain　sense　of　the　Germans。　To　put　it　in　a　few　words；　it
asserts　on　the　one　hand　that　truth　and　knowledge　rest　upon　experience　and　observation；　and　on
the　other　the　analysis　of　and　abstraction　from　general　determinations　is　prescribed　as　the　method
of　knowledge；　it　is；　so　to　speak；　a　metaphysical　empiricism；　and　this　is　the　ordinary　method
adopted　in　the　sciences。　In　respect　of　method；　Locke　thus　employs　an　exactly　opposite　system　to
that　of　Spinoza。　In　the　methods　of　Spinoza　and　Descartes　an　account　of　the　origin　of　ideas　may　be
dispensed　with；　they　are　accepted　at　once　as　definitions；　such　as　those　of　substance；　the　infinite；
mode；　extension；　etc。；　all　of　which　constitute　a　quite　incoherent　list。　But　we　require　to　show　where
these　thoughts　come　in；　on　what　they　are　founded；　and　how　they　are　verified。　Thus　Locke　has
striven　to　satisfy　a　true　necessity。　For　he　has　the　merit　of　having　deserted　the　system　of　mere
definitions；　which　were　before　this　made　the　starting　point；　and　of　having　attempted　to　make
deduction　of　general　conceptions；　inasmuch　as　he　was；　for　example；　at　the　pains　to　show　how
substantiality　arises　subjectively　from　objects。　That　is　a　further　step　than　any　reached　by　Spinoza；
who　begins　at　once　with　definitions　and　axioms　which　are　unverified。　Now　they　are　derived；　and
no　longer　oracularly　laid　down；　even　if　the　method　and　manner　whereby　this　authentication　is
established　is　not　the　right　one。　That　is　to　say；　here　the　matter　in　question　is　merely　subjective；　and
somewhat　psychological；　since　Locke　merely　describes　the　methods　of　mind　as　it　appears　to　us　to
be。　For　in　his　philosophy　we　have　more　especially　to　deal　with　the　derivation　of　the　general
conceptions；　or　ideas；　as　he　called　them；　that　are　present　in　our　knowledge；　and　with　their　origin
as　they　proceed　from　what　is　outwardly　and　inwardly　perceptible。　Malebranche　no　doubt　likewise
asks　how　we　arrive　at　conceptions；　and　thus　he　apparently　has　before　him　the　same　subject　of
investigation　as　has　Locke。　But　firstly；　this　psychological　element　in　Malebranche　is　merely　the
later　development；　and　then　to　him　the　universal　or　God　is　plainly　first；　while　Locke　commences　at
once　with　individual　perceptions；　andonly　from　them　does　he　proceed　to　Notions；　to　God。　The
universal　to　Locke　is；　therefore；　merely　a　later　result；　the　work　of　our　minds；　it　is　simply　something
pertaining　to　thought；　as　subjective。　Every　man　undoubtedly　knows　that　when　his　consciousness
develops　empirically；　he　commences　from　feelings；　from　quite　concrete　conditions；　and　that　it　is
only　later　on　that　general　conceptions　come　in；　which　are　connected　with　the　concrete　of　sensation
by　being　contained　therein。　Space；　for　example；　comes　to　consciousness　later　than　the　spacial；　the
species　later　than　the　individual；　and　it　is　only　through　the　activity　of　my　consciousness　that　the
universal　is　separated　from　the　particular　of　conception；　feeling；　etc。　Feeling　undoubtedly　comes
lowest；　it　is　the　animal　mode　of　spirit；　but　in　its　capacity　as　thinking；　spirit　endeavours　to　transform
feeling　into　its　own　form。　Thus　the　course　adopted　by　Locke　is　quite　a　correct　one；　but　all　dialectic
considerations　are　utterly　and　entirely　set　aside；　since　the　universal　is　merely　analyzed　from　the
empirical　concrete。　And　in　this　matter　Kant　reproaches　Locke　with　reason；　the　individual　is　not　the
source　of　universal　conceptions；　but　the　understanding。

As　to　Locke's　further　reflections；　they　are　very　simple。　Locke　considers　how　the　understanding　is
only　consciousness；　and　in　being　so　is　something　in　consciousness；　and　he　only　recognizes　the
implicit　in　as　far　as　it　is　in　the　same。

a。　Locke's　philosophy　is　more　especially　directed　against　Descartes；　who；　like　Plato；　had　spoken
of　innate　ideas。　Locke　likewise　makes　special　examination　of　the　“inborn　impressions　（notiones
communes　in　foro　interiori　descript？）”　which　Lord　Herbert　assumes　in　his　work　De　veritate。
In　the　first　book　of　his　work　Locke　combats　the　so…called　innate　ideas；　theoretic　as　well　as
practical；　i。e。；　the　universal；　absolutely　existent　ideas　which　at　the　same　time　are　represented　as
pertaining　to　mind　in　a　natural　way。　Locke　said　that　we　arrive　first　at　that　which　we　call　idea。　By
this　he　understands　not　the　essential　determinations　of　man；　but　conceptions　which　we　have　and
which　are　present　and　exist　in　consciousness　as　such：　in　the　same　way　we　all　have　arms　and　legs
as　parts　of　our　bodies；　and　the　desire　to　eat　exists　in　everyone。　In　Locke　we　thus　have　the
conception　of　the　soul　as　of　a　contentless　tabula　rasa　which　is　by…and…by　filled　with　what　we　call
experience。（2）　The　expression　“innate　principles”　was　at　that　time　common；　and　these　innate
principles　have　sometimes　been　foolishly　spoken　of。　But　their　true　signification　is　that　they　are
implicit；　that　they　are　essential　moments　in　the　nature　of　thought；　qualities　of　a　germ；　which　do　not
yet　exist：　only　in　relation　to　this　last　there　is　an　element　of　truth　in　Locke's　conclusions。　As　diverse
conceptions　essentially　determined　they　are　only　legitimatized　by　its　being　shown　that　they　are
implied　in　the　essential　nature　of　thought；　but　as　propositions　which　hold　good　as　axioms；　and
conceptions　which　are　immediately　accepted　as　laid　down　in　definitions；　they　undoubtedly　possess
the　form　of　that　which　is　present　and　inborn。　As　they　are　regarded　they　are　bound　to　have　value　in
and　for　themselves；　but　this　is　a　mere　assertion。　From　the　other　point　of　view　the　question　of
whence　they　come　is　a　futile　one。　Mind　is　undoubtedly　determined　in　itself；　for　it　is　the　explicitly
existent　Notion；　its　development　signifies　the　coming　to　consciousness。　But　the　determinations
which　it　brings　forth　from　itself　cannot　be　called　innate；　for　this　development　must　be　occasioned
by　an　external；　and　only　on　that　does　the　activity　of　mind　react；　in　order　that　it　may　for　the　first
time　become　conscious　of　its　reality。

The　grounds　on　which　Locke　refutes　innate　ideas　are　emp