history of philosophy-第59节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


so　to　speak；　intellectual　in　Him。　If　this　be　further　analyzed　it　in　no　way　differs　from　Spinozism。
Malebranche　indeed　in　a　popular　way　allows　soul　and　things　to　subsist　as　independent；　but　this
independence　vanishes　away　like　smoke　when　the　principle　is　firmly　grasped。　The　catechism　says：
“God　is　omnipresent；”　and　if　this　omnipresence　be　developed　Spinozism　is　arrived　at；　and　yet
theologians　then　proceed　to　speak　against　the　system　of　identity；　and　cry　out　about　Pantheism。

b。　We　must　further　remark　that　Malebranche　also　makes　the　universal；　thought；　the　essential；　by
placing　it　before　the　particular。　“The　soul　has　the　Notion　of　the　infinite　and　universal：　it　knows
nothing　excepting　through　the　Idea　which　it　has　of　the　infinite；　this　Idea　must　hence　come　first。　The
universal　is　not　a　mere　confusion　of　individual　ideas；　it　is　not　a　union　of　individual　things。”
According　to　Locke　the　individual　from　which　the　universal　is　formed　precedes　（infra；　p。　299）；
according　to　Malebranche　the　universal　Idea　is　what　comes　first　in　man。　“If　we　wish　to　think　of
anything　particular　we　think　first　of　the　universal；”　it　is　the　principle　of　the　particular；　as　space　is　of
things。　All　essentiality　precedes　our　particular　conceptions；　and　this　essentiality　comes　first。　“All
essential　existences　（essences）　come　before　our　ordinary　conception；　they　cannot　be　such
excepting　by　God’　s　presence　in　the　mind　and　spirit。　He　it　is　who　contains　all　things　in　the
simplicity　of　His　nature。　It　seems　evident　that　mind　would　not　be　capable　of　representing　to　itself
the　universal　Notions　of　species；　kind；　and　suchlike；　if　it　did　not　see　all　things　comprehended　in
one。”　The　universal　is　thus　in　and　for　itself；　and　it　does　not　take　its　rise　through　the　particular。
“Since　each　existent　thing　is　an　individual；　we　cannot　say　that　we　see　something　actually　created
when；　for　example；　we　see　a　triangle　in　general；”　for　we　see　it　through　God。　“No　account　can　be
given　of　how　spirit　knows　abstract　and　common　truths；　excepting　through　the　presence　of　Him
who　can　enlighten　spirit　in　an　infinite　way；”　because　He　is　in　and　for　Himself　the　universal。　“We
have　a　clear　idea　of　God；”　of　the　universal：　“We　can　have　such　only　through　union　with　Him；　for
this　idea　is　not　a　created　one；”　but　is　in　and　for　itself。　As　with　Spinoza；　the　one　universal　is　God；
and　in　so　far　as　it　is　determined；　it　is　the　particular；　we　see　this　particular　only　in　the　universal；　as
we　see　bodies　in　space。　“We　already　have　a　conception　of　infinite　Being；　inasmuch　as　we　have　a
conception　of　Being　without　regard　to　whether　it　is　finite　or　infinite。　To　know　a　finite　we　must　limit
the　infinite；　and　this　last　must　thus　precede。　Thus　spirit　perceives　all　in　the　infinite；　this　is　so　far　from
being　a　confused　conception　of　many　particular　things　that　all　particular　conceptions　are　merely
participations　in　the　universal　Idea　of　infinitude　—　in　the　same　way　that　God　does　not　receive　this
Being　from〃　finite　“creatures；　but；”　on　the　contrary；　“all　creatures　only　subsist　through　Him。〃（3）

c。　As　regards　the　turning　of　the　soul　to　God；　Malebranche　says　what　Spinoza　said　from　his　ethical
point　of　view：　“It　is　impossible　that　God　should　have　an　end　other　than　Himself　（the　Holy
Scriptures　place　this　beyond　doubt）；”　the　will　of　God　can　only　have　the　good；　what　is　without
doubt　universal　as　its　end。　“Hence　not　only　is　it　essential　that　our　natural　love；　i。e。；　the　emotion
which　he　brings　forth　in　our　spirit；　should　strive　after　Him〃　—　〃the　will　is　really　love　towards　God〃
—　〃but　it　is　likewise　impossible　that　the　knowledge　and　the　light　He　gives　to　our　spirit　should　make
anything　else　known　than　what　is　in　Him；”　for　thought　only　exists　in　unity　with　God。　“If　God　were
to　make　a　spirit　and　give　it　the　sun　as　an　idea　or　as　the　immediate　object　of　its　knowledge；　God
would　have　made　this　spirit　and　the　idea　of　this　spirit　for　the　sun　and　not　for　Himself。”　All　natural
love；　and　still　more　knowledge；　and　the　desire　after　truth；　have　God　as　their　end。”　All　motions　of
the　will　as　regards　the　creatures　are　only　determinations　of　motion　as　regards　the　creator。”
Malebranche　quotes　from　Augustine　“that　we　see　God　even　from　the　time　we　first　enter　upon　this
life　（dès　cette　vie）；　through　the　knowledge　that　we　have　of　eternal　truths。　The　truth　is　uncreated；
unchangeable；　immeasurable；　eternal　above　all　things；　it　is　true　through　itself；　and　has　its　perfection
from　no　thing。　It　makes　the　creator　more　perfect；　and　all　spirits　naturally　seek　to　know　it：　now
there　is　nothing　that　has　these　perfections　but　God；　and　thus　the　truth　is　God。　We　perceive　these
unchangeable　and　eternal　truths；　hence　we　see　God。”　“God　indeed　sees　but　He　does　not　feel
sensuous　things。　If　we　see　something　sensuous；　sensation　and　pure　thought　are　to　be　found　in　our
consciousness。　Sensation　is　a　modification　of　our　spirit；　God　occasions　this　because　He　knows
that　our　soul　is　capable　of　it。　The　Idea　which　is　bound　up　with　the　sensation　is　in　God；　we　see　it；
etc。　This　relation；　this　union　of　our　mind　and　spirit　with　the　Word　（Verbe）　of　God；　and　of　our　will
with　His　love；　is　that　we　are　formed　after　the　image　of　God　and　in　His　likeness。〃（4）　Thus　the　love
of　God　consists　in　relating　one’　s　affections　to　the　Idea　of　God；　whoever　knows　himself　and
thinks　his　affections　clearly；　loves　God。　We　further　find　sundry　empty　litanies　concerning　God；　a
catechism　for　children　of　eight　years　of　age　respecting　goodness；　justice；　omnipresence；　the　moral
order　of　the　world；　in　all　their　lifetime　theologians　do　not　get　any　further。

We　have　given　the　principal　of　Malebranche’　s　ideas；　the　remainder　of　his　philosophy　is
composed　partly　of　formal　logic；　and　partly　of　empirical　psychology。　He　passes　to　the　treatment　of
errors；　how　they　arise；　how　the　senses；　the　imagination；　the　understanding；　deceive　us；　and　how
we　must　conduct　ourselves　in　order　to　effect　a　remedy。　Then　Malebranche　goes　on　（T。　III。　L。　VI。
P。　I。　chap。　i。　pp。　1…3）　to　the　rules　and　laws　for　recognizing　the　truth。　Thus　here　the　term
Philosophy　was　even　applied　to　the　manner　in　which　reflections　on　particular　objects　are　drawn
from　formal　logic　and　external　facts。






1。　Buhle：　Gesch。　d。　neuern　Philosophie；　Vol。　III。　Sec。　2；　pp。　430；　431。　
2。　Malebranche：　De　la　recherche　de　la　vérité　（Paris；　1736）；　T。　II。　L。　III。　Part　I。　chap。　i。　pp。　4…6；
T。　I。　L。　I。　chap。　i。　pp。　6；　7；　P。　II　chap。　ii。　pp。　66…68；　chap。　iii。　p。　72；　chap。　iv。　p。　84；　chap。　v。　p。
92；　chap。　vi。　pp。　95；　96。
3。　Malebranche：　De　la　recherche　de　la　vérité；　T。　II。　L。　III。　Part　II。　chap。　vi。　pp。　100…102。
4。　Malebranche：　De　la　recherche　de　la　vérité；　T。　II。　L。　III。　P。　II。　chap。　vi。　pp。　103…107；
109…111。




Section　Two：　Period　of　the　Thinking　Understanding
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　I。　—　The　Metaphysics　of　the　Understanding
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　B　1。　LOCKE。

When　experience　means　that　the　Notion　has　objective　actuality　for　consciousness；　it　is　indeed　a
necessary　element　in　the　totality；　but　as　this　reflection　appears　in　Locke；　signifying　as　it　does　that
we　obtain　truth　by　abstraction　from　experience　and　sensuous　perception；　it　is　utterly　false；　since；
instead　of　being　a　moment；　it　is　made　the　essence　of　the　truth。　It　is　no　doubt　true　that　against　the
hypothesis　of　the　inward　immediacy　of　the　Idea；　and　against　the　method　of　setting　it　forth　in
definitions　and　axioms；　as　also　against　absolute　substance；　the　demand　that　ideas　should　be
represented　as　results；　and　the　claims　of　individuality　and　self…consciousness；　assert　their　rights　to
recognition。　In　the　philosophy　of　Locke　and　Leibnitz；　however；　these　necessities　make　themselves
known　in　an　imperfect　manner　only；　the　one　fact　which　is　common　to　both　philosophers　is　that
they；　in　opposition　to　Spinoza　and　Malebranche；　take　for　their　principle　the　particular；　finite
determinateness　and　the　individual。　According　to　Spinoza　and　Malebranche　substance　or　the
universal　is　the　true；　the　sole　existent；　the　eternal；　that　which　is　in　and　for　itself；　without　origin；　and
of　which　particular　things　are　only　modifications　which　are　conceived　through　substance。　But
hereby　Spinoza　has　done　an　injury　to　this　negative；　he　hence　arrived　at　no　immanent　determination；
for　all　that　is　determined　and　individual　is　merely　annihilated　in　his　system。　Now；　on　the　contrary；
the　general　inclination　of　consciousness　is　to　maintain　the　difference；　partly　in　order　to；　mark　itself
out　as　implicitly　free　in　opposition　to　its　object　…　Being；　nature；　and　God；　and　partly　in　order　to
recognize　the　unity　in　this　opposition；　and　from　the　opposition　itself　to　make　the　unity　emerge。　But
those　who　were　the　instruments　of　this　tendency　comprehended　themselves　but　little；　they　had　still
no　clear　consciousness　of　their　task；　nor　of　the　manner　in　which　their　claims　could　be　satisfied。
With　Locke；　this　principle　makes　its　first　entrance　into　Philosophy　in　a　manner　so　completely　at
variance　with　the　inflexible　undifferentiated　identity　of　the　substance　of　Spinoza；　that　the　sensuous
and　limited；　the　immediate　present　and　existent；　is　the　main　and　fundamental　matter。　Locke　does
not　get　beyond　the　ordinary　point　of　view　of　consciousness；　viz。