the critique of judgement-第6节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


these　in　all　their　variety；　or　for　an　investigation　of　them。　　　For　it　is　quite　conceivable　that；　despite　all　the　uniformity　of　the　things　of　nature　according　to　universal　laws；　without　which　we　would　not　have　the　form　of　general　empirical　knowledge　at　all；　the　specific　variety　of　the　empirical　laws　of　nature；　with　their　effects；　might　still　be　so　great　as　to　make　it　impossible　for　our　understanding　to　discover　in　nature　an　intelligible　order；　to　divide　its　products　into　genera　and　species　so　as　to　avail　ourselves　of　the　principles　of　explanation　and　comprehension　of　one　for　explaining　and　interpreting　another；　and　out　of　material　coming　to　hand　in　such　confusion　（properly　speaking　only　infinitely　multiform　and　ill…adapted　to　our　power…of　apprehension）　to　make　a　consistent　context　of　experience。　　　Thus　judgement；　also；　is　equipped　with　an　a　priori　principle　for　the　possibility　of　nature；　but　only　in　a　subjective　respect。　By　means　of　this　it　prescribes　a　law；　not　to　nature　（as　autonomy）；　but　to　itself　（as　heautonomy）；　to　guide　its　reflection　upon　nature。　This　law　may　be　called　the　law　of　the　specification　of　nature　in　respect　of　its　empirical　laws。　It　is　not　one　cognized　a　priori　in　nature；　but　judgement　adopts　it　in　the　interests　of　a　natural　order；　cognizable　by　our　understanding；　in　the　division　which　it　makes　of　nature's　universal　laws　when　it　seeks　to　subordinate　to　them　a　variety　of　particular　laws。　So　when　it　is　said　that　nature　specifies　its　universal　laws　on　a　principle　of　finality　for　our　cognitive　faculties；　i。e。；　of　suitability　for　the　human　understanding　and　its　necessary　function　of　finding　the　universal　for　the　particular　presented　to　it　by　perception；　and　again　for　varieties　（which　are；　of　course；　common　for　each　species）　connection　in　the　unity　of　principle；　we　do　not　thereby　either　prescribe　a　law　to　nature；　or　learn　one　from　it　by　observation…although　the　principle　in　question　may　be　confirmed　by　this　means。　For　it　is　not　a　principle　of　the　determinant　but　merely　of　the　reflective　judgement。　All　that　is　intended　is　that；　no　matter　what　is　the　order　and　disposition　of　nature　in　respect　of　its　universal　laws；　we　must　investigate　its　empirical　laws　throughout　on　that　principle　and　the　maxims　founded　thereon；　because　only　so　far　as　that　principle　applies　can　we　make　any　headway　in　the　employment　of　our　understanding　in　experience；　or　gain　knowledge。

　　　　　　　　　VI。　The　Association　of　the　Feeling　of　Pleasure　　　　　　　　　　　　with　the　Concept　of　the　Finality　of　Nature。

　　The　conceived　harmony　of　nature　in　the　manifold　of　its　particular　laws　with　our　need　of　finding　universality　of　principles　for　it　must；　so　far　as　our　insight　goes；　be　deemed　contingent；　but　withal　indispensable　for　the　requirements　of　our　understanding；　and；　consequently；　a　finality　by　which　nature　is　in　accord　with　our　aim；　but　only　so　far　as　this　is　directed　to　knowledge。　The　universal　laws　of　understanding；　which　are　equally　laws　of　nature；　are；　although　arising　from　spontaneity；　just　as　necessary　for　nature　as　the　laws　of　motion　applicable　to　matter。　Their　origin　does　not　presuppose　any　regard　to　our　cognitive　faculties；　seeing　that　it　is　only　by　their　means　that　we　first　come　by　any　conception　of　the　meaning　of　a　knowledge　of　things　（of　nature）；　and　they　of　necessity　apply　to　nature　as　object　of　our　cognition　in　general。　But　it　is　contingent；　so　far　as　we　can　see；　that　the　order　of　nature　in　its　particular　laws；　with　their　wealth　of　at　least　possible　variety　and　heterogeneity　transcending　all　our　powers　of　comprehension；　should　still　in　actual　fact　be　commensurate　with　these　powers。　To　find　out　this　order　is　an　undertaking　on　the　part　of　our　understanding；　which　pursues　it　with　a　regard　to　a　necessary　end　of　its　own；　that；　namely；　of　introducing　into　nature　unity　of　principle。　This　end　must；　then；　be　attributed　to　nature　by　judgement；　since　no　law　can　be　here　prescribed　to　it　by　understanding。　　　The　attainment　of　every　aim　is　coupled　with　a　feeling　of　pleasure。　Now　where　such　attainment　has　for　its　condition　a　representation　a　priori…as　here　a　principle　for　the　reflective　judgement　in　general…the　feeling　of　pleasure　also　is　determined　by　a　ground　which　is　a　priori　and　valid　for　all　men：　and　that；　too；　merely　by　virtue　of　the　reference　of　the　object　to　our　faculty　of　cognition。　As　the　concept　of　finality　here　takes　no　cognizance　whatever　of　the　faculty　of　desire；　it　differs　entirely　from　all　practical　finality　of　nature。　　　As　a　matter　of　fact；　we　do　not；　and　cannot；　find　in　ourselves　the　slightest　effect　on　the　feeling　of　pleasure　from　the　coincidence　of　perceptions　with　the　laws　in　accordance　with　the　universal　concepts　of　nature　（the　categories）；　since　in　their　case　understanding　necessarily　follows　the　bent　of　its　own　nature　without　ulterior　aim。　But；　while　this　is　so；　the　discovery；　on　the　other　hand；　that　two　or　more　empirical　heterogeneous　laws　of　nature　are　allied　under　one　principle　that　embraces　them　both；　is　the　ground　of　a　very　appreciable　pleasure；　often　even　of　admiration；　and　such；　too；　as　does　not　wear　off　even　though　we　are　already　familiar　enough　with　its　object。　It　is　true　that　we　no　longer　notice　any　decided　pleasure　in　the　comprehensibility　of　nature；　or　in　the　unity　of　its　divisions　into　genera　and　species；　without　which　the　empirical　concepts；　that　afford　us　our　knowledge　of　nature　in　its　particular　laws；　would　not　be　possible。　Still　it　is　certain　that　the　pleasure　appeared　in　due　course；　and　only　by　reason　of　the　most　ordinary　experience　being　impossible　without　it；　bas　it　become　gradually　fused　with　simple　cognition；　and　no　longer　arrests　particular　attention。　Something；　then；　that　makes　us　attentive　in　our　estimate　of　nature　to　its　finality　for　our　understanding…an　endeavour　to　bring；　where　possible；　its　heterogeneous　laws　under　higher；　though　still　always　empirical；　laws…is　required；　in　order　that；　on　meeting　with　success；　pleasure　may　be　felt　in　this　their　accord　with　our　cognitive　faculty；　which　accord　is　regarded　by　us　as　purely　contingent。　As　against　this；　a　representation　of　nature　would　be　altogether　displeasing　to　us；　were　we　to　be　forewarned　by　it　that；　on　the　least　investigation　carried　beyond　the　commonest　experience；　we　should　come　in　contact　with　such　a　heterogeneity　of　its　laws　as　would　make　the　union　of　its　particular　laws　under　universal　empirical　laws　impossible　for　our　understanding。　For　this　would　conflict　with　the　principle　of　the　subjectively　final　specification　of　nature　in　its　genera；　and　with　our　own　reflective　judgement　in　respect　thereof。　　　Yet　this　presupposition　of　judgement　is　so　indeterminate　on　the　question　of　the　extent　of　the　prevalence　of　that　ideal　finality　of　nature　for　our　cognitive　faculties；　that　if　we　are　told　that　a　more　searching　or　enlarged　knowledge　of　nature；　derived　from　observation；　must　eventually　bring　us　into　contact　with　a　multiplicity　of　laws　that　no　human　understanding　could　reduce　to　a　principle；　we　can　reconcile　ourselves　to　the　thought。　But　still　we　listen　more　gladly　to　others　who　hold　out　to　us　the　hope　that　the　more　intimately　we　come　to　know　the　secrets　of　nature；　or　the　better　we　are　able　to　compare　it　with　external　members　as　yet　unknown　to　us；　the　more　simple　shall　we　find　it　in　its　principles；　and　the　further　our　experience　advances　the　more　harmonious　shall　we　find　it　in　the　apparent　heterogeneity　of　its　empirical　laws。　For　our　judgement　makes　it　imperative　upon　us　to　proceed　on　the　principle　of　the　conformity　of　nature　to　our　faculty　of　cognition；　so　far　as　that　principle　extends；　without　deciding…for　the　rule　is　not　given　to　us　by　a　determinant　judgement…whether　bounds　are　anywhere　set　to　it　or　not。　For；　while　in　respect　of　the　rational　employment　of　our　cognitive　faculty；　bounds　may　be　definitely　determined；　in　the　empirical　field　no　such　determination　of　bounds　is　possible。

　　　　　　　　　　VII。　The　Aesthetic　Representation　of　the　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Finality　of　Nature。

　　That　which　is　purely　subjective　in　the　representation　of　an　object；　i。e。；　what　constitutes　its　reference　to　the　subject；　not　to　the　object；　is　its　aesthetic　quality。　On　the　other　hand；　that　which　in　such　a　representation　serves；　or　is　available；　for　the　determination　of　the　object　（for　or　purpose　of　knowledge）；　is　its　logical　validity。　In　the　cognition　of　an　object　of　sense；　both　sides　are　presented　conjointly。　In　the　sense…representation　of　external　things；　the　quality　of　space　in　which　we　intuite　them　is　the　merely　subjective　side　of　my　representation　of　them　（by　which　what　the　things　are　in　themselves　as　objects　is　left　quite　open）；　and　it　is　on　account　of　that　reference　that　the　object　in　being　intuited　in　space　is　also　thought　merely　as　phenomenon。　But　despite　its　purely　subjective　quality；　space　is　still　a　constituent　of　the　knowledge　of　things　as　phenomena。　Sensation　（here　external）　also　agrees　in　expressing　a　merely　subjective　side　of　our　representations　of　external　things；　but　one　which　is　properly　their　matter　（through　which　we　are　given　something　with　real　existence）；　just　as　space　is　the　mere　a　priori　form　of　the　possibility　of　their　intuition；　and　so　sensation　is；　none　the　less；　also　employed　in　the　cognition　of　external　objects。　　　But　that　subjective　side　of　a　representation　which　is　in