the critique of judgement-第48节

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　finality　in　the　beauty　of　nature　is　the　one　upon　which　we　ourselves　invariably　take　our　stand　in　our　aesthetic　judgements；　forbidding　us　to　have　recourse　to　any　realism　of　a　natural　end　in　favour　of　our　faculty　of　representation　as　a　principle　of　explanation；　is　that　in　our　general　estimate　of　beauty　we　seek　its　standard　a　priori　in　ourselves；　and；　that　the　aesthetic　faculty　is　itself　legislative　in　respect　of　the　judgement　whether　anything　is　beautiful　or　not。　This　could　not　be　so　on　the　assumption　of　a　realism　of　the　finality　of　nature；　because　in　that　case　we　should　have　to　go　to　nature　for　instruction　as　to　what　we　should　deem　beautiful；　and　the　judgement　of　taste　would　be　subject　to　empirical　principles。　For　in　such　an　estimate　the　question　does　not　turn　on　what　nature　is；　or　even　on　what　it　is　for　us　in　the　way　of　an　end；　but　on　how　we　receive　it。　For　nature　to　have　fashioned　its　forms　for　our　delight　would　inevitably　imply　an　objective　finality　on　the　part　of　nature；　instead　of　a　subjective　finality　resting　on　the　play　of　imagination　in　its　freedom；　where　it　is　we　who　receive　nature　with　favour；　and　not　nature　that　does　us　a　favour。　That　nature　affords　us　an　opportunity　for　perceiving　the　inner　finality　in　the　relation　of　our　mental　powers　engaged　in　the　estimate　of　certain　of　its　products；　and；　indeed；　such　a　finality　as　arising　from　a　supersensible　basis　is　to　be　pronounced　necessary　and　of　universal　validity；　is　a　property　of　nature　which　cannot　belong　to　it　as　its　end；　or　rather；　cannot　be　estimated　by　us　to　be　such　an　end。　For　otherwise　the　judgement　that　would　be　determined　by　reference　to　such　an　end　would　found　upon　heteronomy；　instead　of　founding　upon　autonomy　and　being　free；　as　befits　a　judgement　of　taste。　　　The　principle　of　the　idealism　of　finality　is　still　more　clearly　apparent　in　fine　art。　For　the　point　that　sensations　do　not　enable　us　to　adopt　an　aesthetic　realism　of　finality　（which　would　make　art　merely　agreeable　instead　of　beautiful）　is　one　which　it　enjoys　in　common　with　beautiful　nature。　But　the　further　point　that　the　delight　arising　from　aesthetic　ideas　must　not　be　made　dependent　upon　the　successful　attainment　of　determinate　ends　（as　an　art　mechanically　directed　to　results）；　and　that；　consequently；　even　in　the　case　of　the　rationalism　of　the　principle；　an　ideality　of　the　ends　and　not　their　reality　is　fundamental；　is　brought　home　to　us　by　the　fact　that　fine　art；　as　such；　must　not　be　regarded　as　a　product　of　understanding　and　science；　but　of　genius；　and　must；　therefore；　derive　its　rule　from　aesthetic　ideas；　which　are　essentially　different　from　rational　ideas　of　determinate　ends。　　　Just　as　the　ideality　of　objects　of　sense　as　phenomena　is　the　only　way　of　explaining　the　possibility　of　their　forms　admitting　of　a　priori　determination；　so；　also；　the　idealism　of　the　finality　in　estimating　the　beautiful　in　nature　and　in　art　is　the　only　hypothesis　upon　which　a　critique　can　explain　the　possibility　of　a　judgement　of　taste　that　demands　a　priori　validity　for　every　one　（yet　without　basing　the　finality　represented　in　the　object　upon　concepts）。

　　　　　　　　　　　SS　59。　Beauty　as　the　symbol　of　morality。

　Intuitions　are　always　required　to　verify　the　reality　of　our　concepts。　If　the　concepts　are　empirical；　the　intuitions　are　called　examples：　if　they　are　pure　concepts　of　the　understanding；　the　intuitions　go　by　the　name　of　schemata。　But　to　call　for　a　verification　of　the　objective　reality　of　rational　concepts；　i。e。；　of　ideas；　and；　what　is　more；　on　behalf　of　the　theoretical　cognition　of　such　a　reality；　is　to　demand　an　impossibility；　because　absolutely　no　intuition　adequate　to　them　can　be　given。　　　All　hypotyposis　（presentation；　subjectio　sub　adspectum）　as　a　rendering　in　terms　of　sense；　is　twofold。　Either　it　is　schematic；　as　where　the　intuition　corresponding　to　a　concept　comprehended　by　the　understanding　is　given　a　priori；　or　else　it　is　symbolic；　as　where　the　concept　is　one　which　only　reason　can　think；　and　to　which　no　sensible　intuition　can　be　adequate。　In　the　latter　case　the　concept　is　supplied　with　an　intuition　such　that　the　procedure　of　judgement　in　dealing　with　it　is　merely　analogous　to　that　which　it　observes　in　schematism。　In　other　words；　what　agrees　with　the　concept　is　merely　the　rule　of　this　procedure；　and　not　the　intuition　itself。　Hence　the　agreement　is　merely　in　the　form　of　reflection；　and　not　in　the　content。　　　Notwithstanding　the　adoption　of　the　word　symbolic　by　modern　logicians　in　a　sense　opposed　to　an　intuitive　mode　of　representation；　it　is　a　wrong　use　of　the　word　and　subversive　of　its　true　meaning；　for　the　symbolic　is　only　a　mode　of　any　intrinsic　connection　with　the　intuition　of　sentation　is；　in　fact；　divisible　into　the　schematic　and　the　symbolic。　Both　are　hypotyposes；　i。e。；　presentations　（exhibitiones）；　not　mere　marks。　Marks　are　merely　designations　of　concepts　by　the　aid　of　accompanying　sensible　signs　devoid　of　any　intrinsic　connection　with　the　intuition　of　the　object。　Their　sole　function　is　to　afford　a　means　of　reinvoking　the　concepts　according　to　the　imagination's　law　of　association…a　purely　subjective　role。　Such　marks　are　either　words　or　visible　（algebraic　or　even　mimetic）　signs；　simply　as　expressions　for　concepts。*

　　*The　intuitive　mode　of　knowledge　must　be　contrasted　with　the　discursive　mode　（not　with　the　symbolic）。　The　former　is　either　schematic；　by　mean　demonstration；　symbolic；　as　a　representation　following　a　mere　analogy。

　　All　intuitions　by　which　a　priori　concepts　are　given　a　foothold　are；　therefore；　either　schemata　or　symbols。　Schemata　contain　direct；　symbols　indirect；　presentations　of　the　concept。　Schemata　effect　this　presentation　demonstratively；　symbols　by　the　aid　of　an　analogy　（for　which　recourse　is　had　even　to　empirical　intuitions）；　in　which　analogy　judgement　performs　a　double　function：　first　in　applying　the　concept　to　the　object　of　a　sensible　intuition；　and　then；　secondly；　in　applying　the　mere　rule　of　its　reflection　upon　that　intuition　to　quite　another　object；　of　which　the　former　is　but　the　symbol。　In　this　way；　a　monarchical　state　is　represented　as　a　living　body　when　it　is　governed　by　constitutional　laws；　but　as　a　mere　machine　（like　a　handmill）　when　it　is　governed　by　an　individual　absolute　will；　but　in　both　cases　the　representation　is　merely　symbolic。　For　there　is　certainly　no　likeness　between　a　despotic　state　and　a　handmill；　whereas　there　surely　is　between　the　rules　of　reflection　upon　both　and　their　causality。　Hitherto　this　function　has　been　but　little　analysed；　worthy　as　it　is　of　a　deeper　study。　Still　this　is　not　the　place　to　dwell　upon　it。　In　language　we　have　many　such　indirect　presentations　modelled　upon　an　analogy　enabling　the　expression　in　question　to　contain；　not　the　proper　schema　for　the　concept；　but　merely　a　symbol　for　reflection。　Thus　the　words　ground　（support；　basis）；　to　depend　（to　be　held　up　from　above）；　to　flow　from　（instead　of　to　follow）；　substance　（as　Locke　puts　it：　the　support　of　accidents）；　and　numberless　others；　are　not　schematic；　but　rather　symbolic　hypotyposes；　and　express　concepts　without　employing　a　direct　intuition　for　the　purpose；　but　only　drawing　upon　an　analogy　with　one；　i。e。；　transferring　the　reflection　upon　an　object　of　intuition　to　quite　a　new　concept；　and　one　with　which　perhaps　no　intuition　could　ever　directly　correspond。　Supposing　the　name　of　knowledge　may　be　given　to　what　only　amounts　to　a　mere　mode　of　representation　（which　is　quite　permissible　where　this　is　not　a　principle　of　the　theoretical　determination　of　the　object　in　respect　of　what　it　is　in　itself；　but　of　the　practical　determination　of　what　the　idea　of　it　ought　to　be　for　us　and　for　its　final　employment）；　then　all　our　knowledge　of　God　is　merely　symbolic；　and　one　who　takes　it；　with　the　properties　of　understanding；　will；　and　so　forth；　which　only　evidence　their　objective　reality　in　beings　of　this　world；　to　be　schematic；　falls　into　anthropomorphism；　just　as；　if　he　abandons　every　intuitive　element；　he　falls　into　Deism　which　furnishes　no　knowledge　whatsoever…not　even　from　a　practical　point　of　view。　　　Now；　I　say；　the　beautiful　is　the　symbol　of　the　morally　good；　and　only　in　this　light　（a　point　of　view　natural　to　every　one；　and　one　which　every　one　exacts　from　others　as　a　duty）　does　it　give　us　pleasure　with　an　attendant　claim　to　the　agreement　of　every　one　else；　whereupon　the　mind　becomes　conscious　of　a　certain　ennoblement　and　elevation　above　mere　sensibility　to　pleasure　from　impressions　of　sense；　and　also　appraises　the　worth　of　others　on　the　score　of　a　like　maxim　of　their　judgement。　This　is　that　intelligible　to　which　taste；　as　noticed　in　the　preceding　paragraph；　extends　its　view。　It　is；　that　is　to　say；　what　brings　even　our　higher　cognitive　faculties　into　common　accord；　and　is　that　apart　from　which　sheer　contradiction　would　arise　between　their　nature　and　the　claims　put　forward　by　taste。　In　this　faculty；　judgement　does　not　find　itself　subjected　to　a　heteronomy　of　laws　of　experience　as　it　does　in　the　empirical　estimate　of　things…in　respect　of　the　objects　of　such　a　pure　delight　it　gives　the　law　to　itself；　just　as　reason　does　in　respect　of　the　faculty　of　desire。　Here；　too；　both　on　account　of　this　inner　possibility　in　the　subject；　and　on　account　of　the　external　possibility　of　a　nature　harmonizing　therewith；　it　finds　a　reference　in　itse