the critique of judgement-第46节
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ognitions。 The concept of magnitude may be given a priori in the intuition of space； e。g。； of the right line； etc。； the concept of cause in impenetrability； in the impact of bodies； etc。 Consequently both may be verified by means of an empirical intuition； i。e。； the thought of them may be indicated （demonstrated； exhibited） in an example； and this it must be possible to do： for otherwise there would be no certainty of the thought not being empty； i。e。； having no object。 In logic the expressions demonstrable or indemonstrable are ordinarily employed only in respect of propositions。 A better designation would be to call the former propositions only mediately； and the latter； propositions immediately； certain。 For pure philosophy； too； has propositions of both these kinds…meaning thereby true propositions which are in the one case capable； and in the other incapable； of proof。 But； in its character of philosophy； while it can； no doubt； prove on a priori grounds； it cannot demonstrate…unless we wish to give the complete go…by to the meaning of the word which makes demonstrate （ostendere； exhibere） equivalent to giving an accompanying presentation of the concept in intuition （be it in a proof or in a definition）。 Where the intuition is a priori this is called its construction； but when even the intuition is empirical； we have still got the illustration of the object； by which means objective reality is assured to the concept。 Thus an anatomist is said to demonstrate the human eye when he renders the concept； of which he has previously given a discursive exposition； intuitable by means of the dissection of that organ。 It follows from the above that the rational concept of the supersensible substrate of all phenomena generally； or even of that which must be laid at the basis of our elective will in respect of moral laws； i。e。； the rational concept of transcendental freedom； is at once specifically an indemonstrable…concept； and a rational idea； whereas virtue is so in a measure。 For nothing can be given which in itself qualitatively answers in experience to the rational concept of the former； while in the case of virtue no empirical product of the above causality attains the degree that the rational idea prescribes as the rule。 Just as the imagination； in the case of a rational idea； fails with its intuitions to attain to the given concept； so understanding； in the case of an aesthetic idea； fails with its concepts ever to attain to the completeness of the internal intuition which imagination conjoins with a given representation。 Now since the reduction of a representation of the imagination to concepts is equivalent to giving its exponents； the aesthetic idea may be called on inexponible representation of the imagination （in its free play）。 I shall have an opportunity hereafter of dealing more fully with ideas of this kind。 At present I confine myself to the remark； that both kinds of ideas； aesthetic ideas as well as rational； are bound to have their principles； and that the seat of these principles must in both cases be reason…the latter depending upon the objective； the former upon the subjective； principles of its employment。 Consonantly with this； GENIUS may also be defined as the faculty of aesthetic ideas。 This serves at the same time to point out the reason why it is nature （the nature of the individual） and not a set purpose； that in products of genius gives the rule to art （as the production of the beautiful）。 For the beautiful must not be estimated according to concepts； but by the final mode in which the imagination is attuned so as to accord with the faculty of concepts generally； and so rule and precept are incapable of serving as the requisite subjective standard for that aesthetic and unconditioned finality in fine art which has to make a warranted claim to being bound to please every one。 Rather must such a standard be sought in the element of mere nature in the subject； which cannot be comprehended under rules or concepts； that is to say； the supersensible substrate of all the subject's faculties （unattainable by any concept of understanding）； and consequently in that which forms the point of reference for the harmonious accord of all our faculties of cognition…the production of which accord is the ultimate end set by the intelligible basis of our nature。 Thus alone is it possible for a subjective and yet universally valid principle a priori to lie at the basis of that finality for which no objective principle can be prescribed。
REMARK 2。
The following important observation here naturally presents itself： There are three kinds of antinomies of pure reason； which； however； all agree in forcing reason to abandon the otherwise very natural assumption which takes the objects of sense for things…in…themselves； and to regard them； instead； merely as phenomena； and to lay at their basis an intelligible substrate （something supersensible； the concept of which is only an idea and affords no proper knowledge）。 Apart from some such antinomy； reason could never bring itself to take such a step as…to adopt a principle so severely restricting the field of its speculation； and to submit to sacrifices involving the complete dissipation of so many otherwise brilliant hopes。 For even now that it is recompensed for this loss by the prospect of a proportionately wider scope of action from a practical point of view； it is not without a pang of regret that it appears to part company with those hopes； and to break away from the old ties。 The reason for there being three kinds of antinomies is to be found in the fact that there are three faculties of cognition； understanding； judgement； and reason； each of which； being a higher faculty of cognition； must have its a priori principles。 For； so far as reason passes judgement upon these principles themselves and their employment； it inexorably requires the unconditioned for the given conditioned in respect of them all。 This can never be found unless the sensible； instead of being regarded as inherently appurtenant to things…in…themselves； is treated as a mere phenomenon； and； as such； being made to rest upon something supersensible （the intelligible substrate of external and internal nature） as the thing…in…itself。 There is then （1） for the cognitive faculty an antinomy of reason in respect of the theoretical employment of understanding carried to the point of the unconditioned； （2） for the feeling of pleasure and displeasure an antinomy of reason in respect of the aesthetic employment of judgement； （3） for the faculty Of desire an antinomy in respect of the practical employment of self…legislative reason。 For all these faculties have their fundamental a priori principles； and； following an imperative demand of reason； must be able to judge and to determine their object unconditionally in accordance with these principles。 As to two of the antinomies of these higher cognitive faculties； those； namely； of their theoretical and of their practical employment； we have already shown elsewhere both that they are inevitable； if no cognisance is taken in such judgements of a supersensible substrate of the given objects as phenomena； and； on the other hand； that they can be solved the moment this is done。 Now； as to the antinomy incident to the employment of judgement in conformity with the demand of reason； and the solution of it here given； we may say that to avoid facing it there are but the following alternatives。 It is open to us to deny that any a priori principle lies at the basis of the aesthetic judgement of taste； with the result that all claim to the necessity of a universal consensus of opinion is an idle and empty delusion； and that a judgement of taste only deserves to be considered to this extent correct； that it so happens that a number share the same opinion； and even this； not； in truth； because an a priori principle is presumed to lie at the back of this agreement； but rather （as with the taste of the palate） because of the contingently resembling organization of the individuals。 Or else； in the alternative； we should have to suppose that the judgement of taste is in fact a disguised judgement of reason on the perfection discovered in a thing and the reference of the manifold in it to an end； and that it is consequently only called aesthetic on account of the confusion that here besets our reflection； although fundamentally it is teleological。 In this latter case the solution of the antinomy with the assistance of transcendental ideas might be declared otiose and nugatory； and the above laws of taste thus reconciled with the objects of sense； not as mere phenomena； but even as things…in…themselves。 How unsatisfactory both of those alternatives alike are as a means of escape has been shown in several places in our exposition of judgements of taste。 If； however； our deduction is at least credited with having been worked out on correct lines； even though it may not have been sufficiently clear in all its details； three ideas then stand out in evidence。 Firstly； there is the supersensible in general； without further determination； as substrate of nature； secondly； this same supersensible as principle of the subjective finality of nature for our cognitive
