the critique of judgement-第39节
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lectual concept may serve； conversely； as attribute for a representation of sense； and so animate the latter with the idea of the supersensible； but only by the aesthetic factor subjectively attaching to the consciousness of the supersensible being employed for the purpose。 So； for example； a certain poet says in his description of a beautiful morning： 〃The sun arose； as out of virtue rises peace。〃 The consciousness of virtue； even where we put ourselves only in thought in the position of a virtuous man； diffuses in the mind a multitude of sublime and tranquillizing feelings； and gives a boundless outlook into a happy future； such as no expression within the compass of a definite concept completely attains。*
*Perhaps there has never been a more sublime utterance； or a thought more sublimely expressed； than the well…known inscription upon the Temple of Isis （Mother Nature）： 〃I am all that is； and that was； and that shall be； and no mortal hath raised the veil from before my face。〃 Segner made use of this idea in a suggestive vignette on the frontispiece of his Natural Philosophy； in order to inspire his pupil at the threshold of that temple into which he was about to lead him； with such a holy awe as would dispose his mind to serious attention。
In a word； the aesthetic idea is a representation of the imagination； annexed to a given concept； with which； in the free employment of imagination； such a multiplicity of partial representations are bound up； that no expression indicating a definite concept can be found for it one which on that account allows a concept to be supplemented in thought by much that is indefinable in words； and the feeling of which quickens the cognitive faculties； and with language； as a mere thing of the letter； binds up the spirit （soul） also。 The mental powers whose union in a certain relation constitutes genius are imagination and understanding。 Now； since the imagination； in its employment on behalf of cognition； is subjected to the constraint of the understanding and the restriction of having to be conformable to the concept belonging' thereto； whereas aesthetically it is free to furnish of its own accord； over and above that agreement with the concept； a wealth of undeveloped material for the understanding； to which the latter paid no regard in its concept； but which it can make use of； not so much objectively for cognition； as subjectively for quickening the cognitive faculties； and hence also indirectly for cognitions； it may be seen that genius properly consists in the happy relation； which science cannot teach nor industry learn； enabling one to find out ideas for a given concept； and； besides； to hit upon the expression for them…the expression by means of which the subjective mental condition induced by the ideas as the concomitant of a concept may be communicated to others。 This latter talent is properly that which is termed soul。 For to get an expression for what is indefinable in the mental state accompanying a particular representation and to make it universally communicable…be the expression in language or painting or statuary…is a 〃thing requiring a faculty for laying hold of the rapid and transient play of the imagination； and for unifying it in a concept （which for that very reason is original； and reveals a new rule which could not have been inferred from any preceding principles or examples） that admits of communication without any constraint of rules。
If； after this analysis； we cast a glance back upon the above definition of what is called genius； we find： First； that it is a talent for art…not one for science； in which clearly known rules must take the lead and determine the procedure。 Secondly； being a talent in the line of art； it presupposes a definite concept of the product…as its end。 Hence it presupposes understanding； but； in addition； a representation； indefinite though it be； of the material； i。e。； of the intuition； required for the presentation of that concept； and so a relation of the imagination to the understanding。 Thirdly； it displays itself； not so much in the working out of the projected end in the presentation of a definite concept； as rather in the portrayal； or expression of aesthetic ideas containing a wealth of material for effecting that intention。 Consequently the imagination is represented by it in its freedom from all guidance of rules； but still as final for the presentation of the given concept。 Fourthly； and lastly； the unsought and undesigned subjective finality in the free harmonizing of the imagination with the understanding's conformity to law presupposes a proportion and accord between these faculties such as cannot be brought about by any observance of rules； whether of science or mechanical imitation； but can only be produced by the nature of the individual。 Genius； according to these presuppositions； is the exemplary originality of the natural endowments of an individual in the free employment of his cognitive faculties。 On this showing； the product of a genius （in respect of so much in this product as is attributable to genius； and not to possible learning or academic instruction） is an example； not for imitation （for that would mean the loss of the element of genius； and just the very soul of the work）； but to be followed by another genius…one whom it arouses to a sense of his own originality in putting freedom from the constraint of rules so into force in his art that for art itself a new rule is won…which is what shows a talent to be exemplary。 Yet； since the genius is one of nature's elect…a type that must be regarded as but a rare phenomenon…for other clever minds his example gives rise to a school； that is to say a methodical instruction according to rules； collected； so far as the circumstances admit； from such products of genius and their peculiarities。 And； to that extent； fine art is for such persons a matter of imitation； for which nature； through the medium of a genius gave the rule。 But this imitation becomes aping when the pupil copies everything down to the deformities which the genius only of necessity suffered to remain； because they could hardly be removed without loss of force to the idea。 This courage has merit only in the case of a genius。 A certain boldness of expression and； in general； many a deviation from the common rule becomes him well； but in no sense is it a thing worthy of imitation。 On the contrary it remains all through intrinsically a blemish； which one is bound to try to remove； but for which the genius is； as it were； allowed to plead a privilege； on the ground that a scrupulous carefulness would spoil what is inimitable in the impetuous ardour of his soul。 Mannerism is another kind of aping…an aping of peculiarity （originality） in general； for the sake of removing oneself as far as possible from imitators； while the talent requisite to enable one to be at the same time exemplary is absent。 There are； in fact； two modes （modi） in general of arranging one's thoughts for utterance。 The one is called a manner （modus aestheticus）； the other a method （modus logicus）。 The distinction between them is this： the former possesses no standard other than the feeling of unity in the presentation； whereas the latter here follows definite principles。 As a consequence； the former is alone admissible for fine art。 It is only； however； where the manner of carrying the idea into execution in a product of art is aimed at singularity； instead of being made appropriate to the idea； that mannerism is properly ascribed to such a product。 The ostentatious （precieux）； forced； and affected styles； intended to mark one out from the common herd （though soul is wanting）； resemble the behaviour of a man who； as we say； hears himself talk； or who stands and moves about as if he were on a stage to be gaped at…action which invariably betrays a tyro。
SS 50。 The combination of taste and genius in products of fine art。
To ask whether more stress should be laid in matters of fine art upon the presence of genius or upon that of taste； is equivalent to asking whether more turns upon imagination or upon judgement。 Now； imagination rather entitles an art to be called an inspired （geistreiche） than a fine art。 It is only in respect of judgement that the name of fine art is deserved。 Hence it follows that judgement； being the indispensable condition （conditio sine qua non）； is at least what one must look to as of capital importance in forming an estimate of art as fine art。 So far as beauty is concerned； to be fertile and original in ideas is not such an imperative requirement as it is that the imagination in its freedom should be in accordance with the understanding's conformity to law。 For； in lawless freedom； imagination； with all its wealth； produces nothing but nonsense； the power of judgement； on the other hand； is the faculty that makes it consonant with understanding。 Taste； like judgement in general； is the discipline （or corrective） of genius。 It severely clips its wings； and makes it orderly or polished； but at the same time it gives it guidance directing and controlling its flight； so that it may preserve its character of finality。 It introduces a clearness and order into the plenitude of thoug
