the critique of judgement-第38节
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beautiful。 The art of sculpture； again； since in its products art is almost confused with nature； has excluded from its creations the direct representation of ugly objects； and； instead； only sanctions； for example； the representation of death （in a beautiful genius）； or of the warlike spirit （in Mars）； by means of an allegory； or attributes which wear a pleasant guise； and so only indirectly； through an interpretation on the part of reason； and not for the pure aesthetic judgement。 So much for the beautiful representation of an object； which is properly only the form of the presentation of a concept and the means by which the latter is universally communicated。 To give this form； however； to the product of fine art； taste merely is required。 By this the artist； having practised and corrected his taste by a variety of examples from nature or art； controls his work and； after many； and often laborious； attempts to satisfy taste； finds the form which commends itself to him。 Hence this form is not； as it were； a matter of inspiration； or of a free swing of the mental powers； but rather of a slow and even painful process of improvement； directed to making the form adequate to his thought without prejudice to the freedom in the play of those powers。 Taste is； however； merely a critical； not a productive faculty； and what conforms to it is not； merely on that account； a work of fine art。 It may belong to useful and mechanical art； or even to science； as a product following definite rules which are capable of being learned and which must be closely followed。 But the pleasing form imparted to the work is only the vehicle of communication and a mode； as it were； of execution； in respect of which one remains to a certain extent free； notwithstanding being otherwise tied down to a definite end。 So we demand that table appointments； or even a moral dissertation； and； indeed； a sermon； must bear this form of fine art； yet without its appearing studied。 But one would not call them on this account works of fine art。 A poem； a musical composition； a picture…gallery； and so forth； would； however； be placed under this head； and so in a would…be work of fine art we may frequently recognize genius without taste； and in another taste without genius。
SS 49。 The faculties of the mind which constitute genius。
Of certain products which are expected； partly at least； to stand on the footing of fine art； we say they are soulless； and this； although we find nothing to censure in them as far as taste goes。 A poem may be very pretty and elegant； but is soulless。 A narrative has precision and method； but is soulless。 A speech on some festive occasion may be good in substance and ornate withal； but may be soulless。 Conversation frequently is not devoid of entertainment； but yet soulless。 Even of a woman we may well say； she is pretty； affable； and refined； but soulless。 Now what do we here mean by 〃soul〃？ Soul （Geist） in an aesthetical sense； signifies the animating principle in the mind。 But that whereby this principle animates the psychic substance （Seele）…the material which it employs for that purpose…is that which sets the mental powers into a swing that is final； i。e。； into a play which is self…maintaining and which strengthens those powers for such activity。 Now my proposition is that this principle is nothing else than the faculty of presenting aesthetic ideas。 But； by an aesthetic idea I mean that representation of the imagination which induces much thought； yet without the possibility of any definite thought whatever； i。e。； concept； being adequate to it； and which language； consequently； can never get quite on level terms with or render completely intelligible。 It is easily seen； that an aesthetic idea is the counterpart （pendant） of a rational idea； which； conversely； is a concept； to which no intuition （representation of the imagination） can be adequate。 The imagination （as a productive faculty of cognition） is a powerful agent for creating； as it were； a second nature out of the material supplied to it by actual nature。 It affords us entertainment where experience proves too commonplace； and we even use it to remodel experience； always following； no doubt； laws that are based on analogy； but still also following principles which have a higher seat in reason （and which are every whit as natural to us as those followed by the understanding in laying hold of empirical nature）。 By this means we get a sense of our freedom from the law of association' （which attaches to the empirical employment of the imagination）； with the result that the material can be borrowed by us from nature in accordance with that law； but be worked up by us into something else…namely； what surpasses nature。 Such representations of the imagination may be termed ideas。 This is partly because they at least strain after something lying out beyond the confines of experience； and so seek to approximate to a presentation of rational concepts （i。e。； intellectual ideas）； thus giving to these concepts the semblance of an objective reality。 But； on the other hand； there is this most important reason； that no concept can be wholly adequate to them as internal intuitions。 The poet essays the task of interpreting to sense the rational ideas of invisible beings； the kingdom of the blessed； hell； eternity； creation； etc。 Or； again； as to things of which examples occur in experience； e。g。； death； envy； and all vices； as also love； fame； and the like； transgressing the limits of experience he attempts with the aid of an imagination which emulates the display of reason in its attainment of a maximum； to body them forth to sense with a completeness。 of which： nature affords no parallel； and it is in' fact precisely in the poetic art that the faculty of aesthetic ideas can show itself to full advantage。 This faculty； however； regarded solely on its own account； is properly no more than a talent' （of the imagination）。 If； now； we attach to a concept a representation of the imagination belonging to its presentation； but inducing solely on its own account such a wealth of thought as would never admit of comprehension in a definite concept； and； as a consequence； giving aesthetically an unbounded expansion to the concept itself； then the imagination here displays a creative activity； and it puts the faculty of intellectual ideas （reason） into motion…a motion； at the instance of a representation； towards an extension of thought； that； while germane； no doubt； to the concept of the object； exceeds what can be laid hold of in that representation or clearly expressed。 Those forms which do not constitute the presentation of a given concept itself； but which；。 as secondary representations of the imagination； express the derivatives connected with it； and its kinship with other concepts； are called （aesthetic） attributes of an object； the concept of Which； as an idea of reason； cannot be adequately presented。 In this way Jupiter's eagle； with the lightning in its claws； is an attribute of the mighty king of heaven； and the peacock of its stately queen。 They do not； like logical （aesthetic） attributes of an object； the concept of the sublimity and majesty of creation； but rather something else…something that gives the imagination an incentive to spread its flight over a whole host of kindred representations that provoke more thought than admits of expression in a concept determined by words。 They furnish an aesthetic idea； which serves the above rational idea as a substitute for logical presentation； but with the proper function； however； of animating the mind by opening out for it a prospect into a field of kindred representations stretching beyond its ken。 But it is not alone in the arts of painting or sculpture； where the name of attribute is customarily employed； that fine art acts in this way； poetry and rhetoric also drive the soul that animates their work wholly from the aesthetic attributes of the objects…attributes which go hand in hand with the logical； and give the imagination an impetus to bring more thought into： play in the matter； though in an undeveloped manner； than allows of being brought within the embrace of a concept； or； therefore； of being definitely formulated in language。 For the sake of brevity I must confine myself to a few examples only。 When the great king expresses himself in one of his poems by saying：
Oui； finissons sans trouble； et mourons sans regrets； En laissant l'Univers comble de nos bienfaits。 Ainsi l'Astre du jour； au bout de sa carriere； Repand sur l'horizon une douce lumiere； Et les derniers rayons qu'il darde dans les airs Sont les derniers soupirs qu'il donne a l'Univers；
he kindles in this way his rational idea of a cosmopolitan sentiment even at the close of life； with help of an attribute which the imagination （in remembering all the pleasures of a fair summer's day that is over and gone…a memory of which pleasures is suggested by a serene evening） annexes to that representation； and which stirs up a crowd of sensations and secondary representations for which no expression can be found。 On the other hand； even an intellectual concept may serve； conversely； as attribute for a representation of sense； and so animate th
