the critique of judgement-第36节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


alone　gives　life　to　the　work；　would　be　bodyless　and　evanescent　（e。g。；　in　the　poetic　art　there　must　be　correctness　and　wealth　of　language；　likewise　prosody　and　metre）。　For　not　a　few　leaders　of　a　newer　school　believe　that　the　best　way　to　promote　a　free　art　is　to　sweep　away　all　restraint　and　convert　it　from　labour　into　mere　play。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SS　44。　Fine　art

　　There　is　no　science　of　the　beautiful；　but　only　a　critique。　Nor；　again；　is　there　an　elegant　（schone）　science；　but　only　a　fine　（schone）　art。　For　a　science　of　the　beautiful　would　have　to　determine　scientifically；　i。e。；　by　means　of　proofs；　whether　a　thing　was　to　be　considered　beautiful　or　not；　and　the　judgement　upon　beauty；　consequently；　would；　if　belonging　to　science；　fail　to　be　a　judgement　of　taste。　As　for　a　beautiful　science…a　science　which；　as　such；　is　to　be　beautiful；　is　a　nonentity。　For　if；　treating　it　as　a　science；　we　were　to　ask　for　reasons　and　proofs；　we　would　be　put　off　with　elegant　phrases　（bons　mots）。　What　has　given　rise　to　the　current　expression　elegant　sciences　is；　doubtless；　no　more　than　this；　that　common　observation　has；　quite　accurately；　noted　the　fact　that　for　fine　art；　in　the　fulness　of　its　perfection；　a　large　store　of　science　is　required；　as；　for　example；　knowledge　of　ancient　languages；　acquaintance　with　classical　authors；　history；　antiquarian　learning；　etc。　Hence　these　historical　sciences；　owing　to　the　fact　that　they　form　the　necessary　preparation　and　groundwork　for　fine　art；　and　partly　also　owing　to　the　fact　that　they　are　taken　to　comprise　even　the　knowledge　of　the　products　of　fine　art　（rhetoric　and　poetry）；　have　by　a…confusion　of　words；　actually　got　the　name　of　elegant　sciences。　　　Where　art；　merely　seeking　to　actualize　a　possible　object　to　the　cognition　of　which　it　is　adequate；　does　whatever　acts　are　required　for　that　purpose。　then　it　is　mechanical。　But　should　the　feeling　of　pleasure　be　what　it　has　immediately　in　view；　it　is　then　termed　aesthetic　art。　As　such　it　may　be　either　agreeable　or　fine　art。　The　description　〃agreeable　art〃　applies　where　the　end　of　the　art　is　that　the　pleasure　should　accompany　the　representations　considered　as　mere　sensations；　the　description　〃fine　art〃　where　it　is　to　accompany　them　considered　as　modes　of　cognition。　　　Agreeable　arts　are　those　which　have　mere　enjoyment　for　their　object。　Such　are　all　the　charms　that　can　gratify　a　dinner　party：　entertaining　narrative；　the　art　of　starting　the　whole　table　in　unrestrained　and　sprightly　conversation；　or　with　jest　and　laughter　inducing　a　certain　air　of　gaiety。　Here；　as　the　saying　goes；　there　may　be　much　loose　talk　over　the　glasses；　without　a　person　wishing　to　be　brought　to　book　for　all　he　utters；　because　it　is　only　given　out　for　the　entertainment　of　the　moment；　and　not　as　a　lasting　matter　to　be　made　the　subject　of　reflection　or　repetition。　（Of　the　same　sort　is　also　the　art　of　arranging　the　table　for　enjoyment；　or；　at　large　banquets；　the　music　of　the　orchestra…a　quaint　idea　intended　to　act　on　the　mind　merely　as　an　agreeable　noise　fostering　a　genial　spirit；　which；　without　any　one　paying　the　smallest　attention　to　the　composition；　promotes　the　free　flow　of　conversation　between　guest　and　guest。）　In　addition　must　be　included　play　of　every　kind　which　is　attended　with　no　further　interest　than　that　of　making　the　time　pass　by　unheeded。　　　Fine　art；　on　the　other　hand；　is　a　mode　of　representation　which　is　intrinsically　final；　and　which；　although　devoid　of　an　end；　has　the　effect　of　advancing　the　culture　of　the　mental　powers　in　the　interests　of　social　communication。　　　The　universal　communicability　of　a　pleasure　involves　in　its　very　concept　that　the　pleasure　is　not　one　of　enjoyment　arising　out　of　mere　sensation；　but　must　be　one　of　reflection。　Hence　aesthetic　art；　as　art　which　is　beautiful；　is　one　having　for　its　standard　the　reflective　judgement　and　not　organic　sensation。

　　　　　SS　45。　Fine　art　is　an　art；　so　far　as　it　has　at　the　same　　　　　　　　　　　　　　time　the　appearance　of　being　nature。

　　　A　product　of　fine　art　must　be　recognized　to　be　art　and　not　nature。　Nevertheless　the　finality　in　its　form　must　appear　just　as　free　from　the　constraint　of　arbitrary　rules　as　if　it　were　a　product　of　mere　nature。　Upon　this　feeling　of　freedom　in　the　play　of　our　cognitive　faculties…which　play　has　at　the　same　time　to　be　final　rests　that　pleasure　which　alone　is　universally　communicable　without　being　based　on　concepts。　Nature　proved　beautiful　when　it　wore　the　appearance　of　art；　and　art　can　only　be　termed　beautiful；　where　we　are　conscious　of　its　being　art；　while　yet　it　has　the　appearance　of　nature。　　　For；　whether　we　are　dealing　with　beauty　of　nature　or　beauty　of　art；　we　may　make　the　universal　statement：　That　is　beautiful　which　pleases　in　the　mere　estimate　of　it　（not　in　sensation　or　by　means　of　a　concept）。　Now　art　has　always　got　a　definite　intention　of　producing　something。　Were　this　〃something；〃　however；　to　be　mere　sensation　（something　merely　subjective）；　intended　to　be　accompanied　with　pleasure；　then　such　product　would；　in　our　estimation　of　it；　only　please　through　the　agency　of　the　feeling　of　the　senses。　On　the　other　hand；　were　the　intention　one　directed　to　the　production　of　a　definite　object；　then；　supposing　this　were　attained　by　art；　the　object　would　only　please　by　means　of　a　concept。　But　in　both　cases　the　art　would　please；　not　in　the　mere　estimate　of　it；　i。e。；　not　as　fine　art；　but　rather　as　mechanical　art。　　　Hence　the　finality　in　the　product　of　fine　art；　intentional　though　it　be；　must　not　have　the　appearance　of　being　intentional；　i。e。；　fine　art　must　be　clothed　with　the　aspect　of　nature；　although　we　recognize　it　to　be　art。　But　the　way　in　which　a　product　of　art　seems　like　nature　is　by　the　presence　of　perfect　exactness　in　the　agreement　with　rules　prescribing　how　alone　the　product　can　be　what　it　is　intended　to　be；　but　with　an　absence　of　laboured　effect　（without　academic　form　betraying　itself）；　i。e。；　without　a　trace　appearing　of　the　artist　having　always　had　the　rule　present　to　him　and　of　its　having　fettered　his　mental　powers。

　　　　　　　　　　　　SS　46。　Fine　art　is　the　art　of　genius。

　　Genius　is　the　talent　（natural　endowment）　which　gives　the　rule　to　art。　Since　talent；　as　an　innate　productive　faculty　of　the　artist；　belongs　itself　to　nature；　we　may　put　it　this　way：　Genius　is　the　innate　mental　aptitude　（ingenium）　through　which　nature　gives　the　rule　to　art。　　　Whatever　may　be　the　merits　of　this　definition；　and　whether　it　is　merely　arbitrary；　or　whether　it　is　adequate　or　not　to　the　concept　usually　associated　with　the　word　genius　（a　point　which　the　following　sections　have　to　clear　up）；　it　may　still　be　shown　at　the　outset　that；　according　to　this　acceptation　of　the　word；　fine　arts　must　necessarily　be　regarded　as　arts　of　genius。　　　For　every　art　presupposes　rules　which　are　laid　down　as　the　foundation　which　first　enables　a　product；　if　it　is　to　be　called　one　of　art；　to　be　represented　as　possible。　The　concept　of　fine　art；　however；　does　not　permit　of　the　judgement　upon　the　beauty　of　its　product　being　derived　from　any　rule　that　has　a　concept　for　its　determining　ground；　and　that　depends；　consequently；　on　a　concept　of　the　way　in　which　the　product　is　possible。　Consequently　fine　art　cannot　of　its　own　self　excogitate　the　rule　according　to　which　it　is　to　effectuate　its　product。　But　since；　for　all　that；　a　product　can　never　be　called　art　unless　there　is　a　preceding　rule；　it　follows　that　nature　in　the　individual　（and　by　virtue　of　the　harmony　of　his　faculties）　must　give　the　rule　to　art；　i。e。；　fine　art　is　only　possible　as　a　product　of　genius。　　　From　this　it　may　be　seen　that　genius　（1）　is　a　talent　for　producing　that　for　which　no　definite　rule　can　be　given；　and　not　an　aptitude　in　the　way　of　cleverness　for　what　can　be　learned　according　to　some　rule；　and　that　consequently　originality　must　be　its　primary　property。　（2）　Since　there　may　also　be　original　nonsense；　its　products　must　at　the　same　time　be　models；　i。e。；　be　exemplary；　and；　consequently；　though　not　themselves　derived　from　imitation；　they　must　serve　that　purpose　for　others；　i。e。；　as　a　standard　or　rule　of　estimating。　（3）　It　cannot　indicate　scientifically　how　it　brings　about　its　product；　but　rather　gives　the　rule　as　nature。　Hence；　where　an　author　owes　a　product　to　his　genius；　he　does　not　himself　know　how　the　ideas　for　it　have　entered　into　his　head；　nor　has　he　it　in　his　power　to　invent　the　like　at　pleasure；　or　methodically；　and　communicate　the　same　to　others　in　such　precepts　as　would　put　them　in　a　position　to　produce　similar　products。　（Hence；　presumably；　our　word　Genie　is　derived　from　genius；　as　the　peculiar　guardian　and　guiding　spirit　given　to　a　man　at　his　birth；　by　the　inspiration　of　which　those　original　ideas　were　obtained。）　（4）　Nature　prescribes　the　rule　through　genius　not　to　science　but　to　art；　and　this　also　only　in　so　far　as　it　is　to　be　fine　art。

　　　　　　　　　SS　47。　Elucidation　and　confirmation　of　the　above　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　explanation　of　genius。

　　Every　one　is　agreed　on　the　point　of　the　complete　opposition　between　genius　and　the　spirit　of　imitation。　Now　since　learning　is　nothing　but　imitation；　the　greatest　ability；　or　aptness　as　a　pupil　（capacity）；　is　still；　as　such；　not　equivalent　to　genius。　Even　though　a　man　weaves　his　own　thoughts　or　fancies；　instead　of　merely　taking　in　what　others　have　thought；　an