the critique of judgement-第32节

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ry；　it　is　then　an　a　priori　judgement。

　　　　　　　　　　SS　38。　Deduction　of　judgements　of　taste。

　　Admitting　that　in　a　pure　judgement　of　taste　the　delight　in　the　object　is　connected　with　the　mere　estimate　of　its　form；　then　what　we　feel　to　be　associated　in　the　mind　with　the　representation　of　the　object　is　nothing　else　than　its　subjective　finality　for　judgement。　Since；　now；　in　respect　of　the　formal　rules　of　estimating；　apart　from　all　matter　（whether　sensation　or　concept）；　judgement　can　only　be　directed　to　the　subjective　conditions　of　its　employment　in　general　（which　is　not　restricted　to　the　particular　mode　of　sense　nor　to　a　particular　concept　of　the　understanding）；　and　so　can　only　be　directed　to　that　subjective　factor　which　we　may　presuppose　in　all　men　（as　requisite　for　a　possible　experience　generally）；　it　follows　that　the　accordance　of　a　representation　with　these　conditions　of　the　judgement　must　admit　of　being　assumed　valid　a　priori　for　every　one。　In　other　words；　we　are　warranted　in　exacting　from　every　one　the　pleasure　or　subjective　finality　of　the　representation　in　respect　of　the　relation　of　the　cognitive　faculties　engaged　in　the　estimate　of　a　sensible　object　in　general*。

　　*In　order　to　be　justified　in　claiming　universal　agreement　an　aesthetic　judgement　merely　resting　on　subjective　grounds；　it　is　sufficient　to　assume：　（1）　that　the　subjective　conditions　of　this　faculty　of　aesthetic　judgement　are　identical　with　all　men　in　what　concerns　the　relation　of　the　cognitive　faculties；　there　brought　into　action；　with　a　view　to　a　cognition　in　general。　This　must　be　true；　as　otherwise　men　would　be　incapable　of　communicating　their　representations　or　even　their　knowledge；　（2）　that　the　judgement　has　paid　regard　merely　to　this　relation　（consequently　merely　to　the　formal　condition　of　the　faculty　of　judgement）；　and　is　pure；　i。e。；　is　free　from　confusion　either　with　concepts　of　the　object　or　sensations　as　determining　grounds。　If　any　mistake　is　made　in　this　latter　point；　this　only　touches　the　incorrect　application　to　a　particular　case　of　the　right　which　a　law　gives　us；　and　does　not　do　away　with　the　right　generally。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Remark。

　　What　makes　this　deduction　so　easy　is　that　it　is　spared　the　necessity　of　having　to　justify　the　objective　reality　of　a　concept。　For　beauty　is　not　a　concept　of　the　object；　and　the　judgement　of　taste　is　not　a　cognitive　judgement。　All　that　it　holds　out　for　is　that　we　are　justified　in　presupposing　that　the　same　subjective　conditions　of　judgement　which　we　find　in　ourselves　are　universally　present　in　every　man；　and　further　that　we　have　rightly　subsumed　the　given　object　under　these　conditions。　The　latter；　no　doubt；　has　to　face　unavoidable　difficulties　which　do　not　affect　the　logical　judgement。　（For　there　the　subsumption　is　under　concepts；　whereas　in　the　aesthetic　judgement　it　is　under　a　mere　sensible　relation　of　the　imagination　and　understanding　mutually　harmonizing　with　one　another　in　the　represented　form　of　the　object；　in　which　case　the　subsumption　may　easily　prove　fallacious。）　But　this　in　no　way　detracts　from　the　legitimacy　of　the　claim　of　the　judgement　to　count　upon　universal　agreement…a　claim　which　amounts　to　no　more　than　this：　the　correctness　of　the　principle　of　judging　validly　for　every　one　upon　subjective　grounds。　For　as　to　the　difficulty　and　uncertainty　concerning　the　correctness　of　the　subsumption　under　that　principle；　it　no　more　casts　a　doubt　upon　the　legitimacy　of　the　claim　to　this　validity　on　the　part　of　an　aesthetic　judgement　generally；　or；　therefore；　upon　the　principle　itself；　than　the　mistakes　（though。　not　so　often　or　easily　incurred）；　to　which　the　subsumption　of　the　logical　judgement　under　its　principle　is　similarly　liable；　can　render　the　latter　principle；　which　is　objective；　open　to　doubt。　But　if　the　question　were：　How　is　it　possible　to　assume　a　priori　that　nature　is　a　complex　of　objects　of　taste？　the　problem　would　then　have　reference　to　teleology；　because　it　would　have　to　be　regarded　as　an　end　of　nature　belonging　essentially　to　its　concept　that　it　should　exhibit　forms　that　are　final　for　our　judgement。　But　the　correctness　of　this　assumption　may　still　be　seriously　questioned；　while　the　actual　existence　of　beauties　of　nature　is　patent　to　experience。

　　　　　　　SS　39。　The　communicability　of　a　sensation。

　　Sensation；　as　the　real　in　perception；　where　referred　to　knowledge；　is　called　organic　sensation　and　its　specific　quality　may　be　represented　as　completely　communicable　to　others　in　a　like　mode；　provided　we　assume　that　every　one　has　a　like　sense　to　our　own。　This；　however；　is　an　absolutely　inadmissible　presupposition　in　the　case　of　an　organic　sensation。　Thus　a　person　who　is　without　a　sense　of　smell　cannot　have　a　sensation　of　this　kind　communicated　to　him；　and；　even　if　be　does　not　suffer　from　this　deficiency；　we　still　cannot　be　certain　that　he　gets　precisely　the　same　sensation　from　a　flower　that　we　get　from　it。　But　still　more　divergent　must　we　consider　men　to　be　in　respect　of　the　agreeableness　or　disagreeableness　derived　from　the　sensation　of　one　and　the　same　object　of　sense；　and　it　is　absolutely　out　of　the　question　to　require　that　pleasure　in　such　objects　should　be　acknowledged　by　every　one。　Pleasure　of　this　kind；　since　it　enters　into　the　mind　through　sense…our　role；　therefore；　being　a　passive　one…may　be　called　the　pleasure　of　enjoyment。　　　On　the　other　hand；　delight　in　an　action　on　the　score　of　its　moral　character　is　not　a　pleasure　of　enjoyment；　but　one　of　self…asserting　activity　and　in　this　coming　up　to　the　idea　of　what　it　is　meant　to　be。　But　this　feeling；　which　is　called　the　moral　feeling；　requires　concepts　and　is　the　presentation　of　a　finality；　not　free；　but　according　to　law。　It；　therefore；　admits　of　communication　only　through　the　instrumentality　of　reason　and；　if　the　pleasure　is　to　be　of　the　same　kind　for　everyone；　by　means　of　very　determinate　practical　concepts　of　reason。　　　The　pleasure　in　the　sublime　in　nature；　as　one　of　rationalizing　contemplation；　lays　claim　also　to　universal　participation；　but　still　it　presupposes　another　feeling；　that；　namely；　of　our　supersensible　sphere；　which　feeling；　however　obscure　it　may　be；　has　a　moral　foundation。　But　there　is　absolutely　no　authority　for　my　presupposing　that　others　will　pay　attention　to　this　and　take　a　delight　in　beholding　the　uncouth　dimensions　of　nature　（one　that　in　truth　cannot　be　ascribed　to　its　aspect；　which　is　terrifying　rather　than　otherwise）。　Nevertheless；　having　regard　to　the　fact　that　attention　ought　to　be　paid　upon　every　appropriate　occasion　to　this　moral　birthright；　we　may　still　demand　that　delight　from　everyone；　but　we　can　do　so　only　through　the　moral　law；　which；　in　its　turn；　rests　upon　concepts　of　reason。　　　The　pleasure　in　the　beautiful　is；　on　the　other　hand；　neither　a　pleasure　of　enjoyment　nor　of　an　activity　according　to　law；　nor　yet　one　of　a　rationalizing　contemplation　according　to　ideas；　but　rather　of　mere　reflection。　Without　any　guiding…line　of　end　or　principle；　this　pleasure　attends　the　ordinary　apprehension　of　an　object　by　means　of　the　imagination；　as　the　faculty　of　intuition；　but　with　a　reference　to　the　understanding　as　faculty　of　concepts；　and　through　the　operation　of　a　process　of　judgement　which　bas　also　to　be　invoked　in　order　to　obtain　the　commonest　experience。　In　the　latter　case；　however；　its　functions　are　directed　to　perceiving　an　empirical　objective　concept；　whereas　in　the　former　（in　the　aesthetic　mode　of　estimating）　merely　to　perceiving　the　adequacy　of　the　representation　for　engaging　both　faculties　of　knowledge　in　their　freedom　in　an　harmonious　（subjectively　final）　employment；　i。e。；　to　feeling　with　pleasure　the　subjective　bearings　of　the　representation。　This　pleasure　must　of　necessity　depend　for　every　one　upon　the　same　conditions；　seeing　that　they　are　the　subjective　conditions　of　the　possibility　of　a　cognition　in　general；　and　the　proportion　of　these　cognitive　faculties　which　is　requisite　for　taste　is　requisite　also　for　ordinary　sound　understanding；　the　presence　of　which　we　are　entitled　to　presuppose　in　every　one。　And；　for　this　reason　also；　one　who　judges　with　taste　（provided　he　does　not　make　a　mistake　as　to　this　consciousness；　and　does　not　take　the　matter　for　the　form；　or　charm　for　beauty）　can　impute　the　subjective　finality；　i。e。；　his　delight　in　the　object；　to　everyone　else　and　suppose　his　feeling　universally　communicable；　and　that；　too；　without　the　mediation　of　concepts。

　　　　　　　　　　SS　40。　Taste　as　a　kind　of　sensus　communis。

　　The　name　of　sense　is　often　given　to　judgement　where　what　attracts　attention　is　not　so　much　its　reflective　act　as　merely　its　result。　So　we　speak　of　a　sense　of　truth；　of　a　sense　of　propriety；　or　of　justice；　etc。　And　yet；　of　course；　we　know；　or　at　least　ought　well　enough　to　know；　that　a　sense　cannot　be　the　true　abode　of　these　concepts；　not　to　speak　of　its　being　competent；　even　in　the　slightest　degree；　to　pronounce　universal　rules。　On　the　contrary；　we　recognize　that　a　representation　of　this　kind；　be　it　of　truth；　propriety；　beauty；　or　justice；　could　never　enter　our　thoughts　were　we　not　able　to　raise　ourselves　above　the　level　of　the　senses　to　that　of　higher　faculties　of　cognition。　Common　human　understanding　which　as　mere　sound　（not　yet　cultivated）　understanding；　is　looked　upon　as　the　least　we　can　expect　fro