the critique of judgement-第31节

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　rectification　and　extension　of　our　judgements　of　taste。　But　that　matter　is　not　one　of　exhibiting　the　determining　ground　of　aesthetic　judgements　of　this　kind　in　a　universally　applicable　formula…which　is　impossible。　Rather　is　it　the　investigation　of　the　faculties　of　cognition　and　their　function　in　these　judgements；　and　the　illustration；　by　the　analysis　of　examples；　of　their　mutual　subjective　finality；　the　form　of　which　in　a　given　representation　has　been　shown　above　to　constitute　the　beauty　of　their　object。　Hence　with　regard　to　the　representation　whereby　an　object　is　given；　the　critique　of　taste　itself　is　only　subjective；　viz。；　it　is　the　art　or　science　of　reducing　the　mutual　relation　of　the　understanding　and　the　imagination　in　the　given　representation　（without　reference　to　antecedent　sensation　or　concept）；　consequently　their　accordance　or　discordance；　to　rules；　and　of　determining　them　with　regard　to　their　conditions。　It　is　art　if　it　only　illustrates　this　by　examples；　it　is　science　if　it　deduces　the　possibility　of　such　an　estimate　from　the　nature　of　these　faculties　as　faculties　of　knowledge…in　general。　It　is　only　with　the　latter；　as　transcendental　critique；　that　we　have　here　any　concern。　Its　proper　scope　is　the　development　and　justification　of　the　subjective　principle　of　taste；　as　an　a　priori　principle　of　judgement。　As　an　art；　critique　merely　looks　to　the　physiological　（here　psychological）　and；　consequently；　empirical　rules；　according　to　which　in　actual　fact　taste　proceeds　（passing　by　the　question　of　their　possibility）　and　seeks　to　apply　them　in　estimating　its　objects。　The　latter　critique　criticizes　the　products　of　fine　art；　just　as　the　former　does　the　faculty　of　estimating　them。

　　　　　　SS　35。　The　principle　of　taste　is　the　subjective　principle　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　the　general　power　of　judgement。

　　The　judgement　of　taste　is　differentiated　from　logical　judgement　by　the　fact　that；　whereas　the　latter　subsumes　a　representation　under　a　concept　of　the　object；　the　judgement　of　taste　does　not　subsume　under　a　concept　at　all…for；　if　it　did；　necessary　and　universal　approval　would　be　capable　of　being　enforced　by　proofs。　And　yet　it　does　bear　this　resemblance　to　the　logical　judgement；　that　it　asserts　a　universality　and　necessity；　not；　however；　according　to　concepts　of　the　object；　but　a　universality　and　necessity　that　are；　consequently；　merely　subjective。　Now　the　concepts　in　a　judgement　constitute　its　content　（what　belongs　to　the　cognition　of　the　object）。　But　the　judgement　of　taste　is　not　determinable　by　means　of　concepts。　Hence　it　can　only　have　its　ground　in　the　subjective　formal　condition　of　a　judgement　in　general。　The　subjective　condition　of　all　judgements　is　the　judging　faculty　itself；　or　judgement。　Employed　in　respect　of　a　representation　whereby　an　object　is　given；　this　requires　the　harmonious　accordance　of　two　powers　of　representation。　These　are：　the　imagination　（for　the　intuition　and　the　arrangement　of　the　manifold　of　intuition）；　and　the　understanding　（for　the　concept　as　a　representation　of　the　unity　of　this　arrangement）。　Now；　since　no　concept　of　the　object　underlies　the　judgement　here；　it　can　consist　only　in　the　subsumption　of　the　imagination　itself　（in　the　case　of　a　representation　whereby　an　object　is　given）　under　the　conditions　enabling　the　understanding　in　general　to　advance　from　the　intuition　to　concepts。　That　is　to　say；　since　the　freedom　of　the　imagination　consists　precisely　in　the　fact　that　it　schematizes　without　a　concept；　the　judgement　of　taste　must　found　upon　a　mere　sensation　of　the　mutually　quickening　activity　of　the　imagination　in　its　freedom；　and　of　the　understanding　with　its　conformity　to　law。　It　must　therefore　rest　upon　a　feeling　that　allows　the　object　to　be　estimated　by　the　finality　of　the　representation　（by　which　an　object　is　given）　for　the　furtherance　of　the　cognitive　faculties　in　their　free　play。　Taste；　then；　as　a　subjective　power　of　judgement；　contains　a　principle　of　subsumption；　not　of　intuitions　under　concepts；　but　of　the　faculty　of　intuitions　or　presentations；　i。e。；　of　the　imagination；　under　the　faculty　of　concepts；　i。e。；　the　understanding；　so　far　as　the　former　in　its　freedom　accords　with　the　latter　in　its　conformity　to　law。　　　For　the　discovery　of　this　title　by　means　of　a　deduction　of　judgements　of　taste；　we　can　only　avail　ourselves　of　the　guidance　of　the　formal　peculiarities　of　judgements　of　this　kind；　and　consequently　the　mere　consideration　of　their　logical　form。

　　　SS　36。　The　problem　of　a　deduction　of　judgements　of　taste。

　　To　form　a　cognitive　judgement　we　may　immediately　connect　with　the　perception　of　an　object　the　concept　of　an　object　in　general；　the　empirical　predicates　of　which　are　contained　in　that　perception。　In　this　way；　a　judgement　of　experience　is　produced。　Now　this　judgement　rests　on　the　foundation　of　a　priori　concepts　of　the　synthetical　unity　of　the　manifold　of　intuition；　enabling　it　to　be　thought　as　the　determination　of　an　object。　These　concepts　（the　categories）　call　for　a　deduction；　and　such　was　supplied　in　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason。　That　deduction　enabled　us　to　solve　the　problem：　How　are　synthetical　a　priori　cognitive　judgements　possible？　This　problem　had；　accordingly；　to　do　with　the　a　priori　principles　of　pure　understanding　and　its　theoretical　judgements。　　　But　we　may　also　immediately　connect　with　a　perception　a　feeling　of　pleasure　（or　displeasure）　and　a　delight；　attending　the　representation　of　the　object　and　serving　it　instead　of　a　predicate。　In　this　way　there　arises　a　judgement　which　is　aesthetic　and　not　cognitive。　Now；　if　such　a　judgement　is　not　merely　one　of　sensation；　but　a　formal　judgement　of　reflection　that　exacts　this　delight　from　everyone　as　necessary；　something　must　lie　at　its　basis　as　its　a　priori　principle。　This　principle　may；　indeed；　be　a　mere　subjective　one　（supposing　an　objective　one　should　be　impossible　for　judgements　of　this　kind）；　but；　even　as　such；　it　requires　a　deduction　to　make　it　intelligible　how　an　aesthetic　judgement　can　lay　claim　to　necessity。　That；　now；　is　what　lies　at　the　bottom　of　the　problem　upon　which　we　are　at　present　engaged；　i。e。：　How　are　judgements　of　taste　possible？　This　problem；　therefore；　is　concerned　with　the　a　priori　principles　of　pure　judgement　in　aesthetic　judgements；　i。e。；　not　those　in　which　（as　in　theoretical　judgements）　it　has　merely　to　subsume　under　objective　concepts　of　understanding；　and　in　which　it　comes　under　a　law；　but　rather　those　in　which　it　is　itself；　subjectively；　object　as　well　as　law。　　　We　may　also　put　the　problem　in　this　way：　How　a　judgement　possible　which；　going　merely　upon　the　individual's　own　feeling　of　pleasure　in　an　object　independent　of　the　concept　of　it；　estimates　this　as　a　pleasure　attached　to　the　representation　of　the　same　object　in　every　other　individual；　and　does　so　a　priori；　i。e。；　without　being　allowed　to　wait　and　see　if　other　people　will　be　of　the　same　mind？　　　It　is　easy　to　see　that　judgements　of　taste　are　synthetic；　for　they　go　beyond　the　concept　and　even　the　intuition　of　the　object；　and　join　as　predicate　to　that　intuition　something　which　is　not　even　a　cognition　at　all；　namely；　the　feeling　of　pleasure　（or　displeasure）。　But；　although　the　predicate　（the　personal　pleasure　that　is　connected　with　the　representation）　is　empirical；　still　we　need　not　go　further　than　what　is　involved　in　the　expressions　of　their　claim　to　see　that；　so　far　as　concerns　the　agreement　required　of　everyone；　they　are　a　priori　judgements；　or　mean　to　pass　for　such。　This　problem　of　the　Critique　of　judgement；　therefore；　is　part　of　the　general　problem　of　transcendental　philosophy：　How　are　synthetic　a　priori　judgements　possible？

　　　　SS　37。　What　exactly　it　is　that　is　asserted　a　priori　of　an　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　object　in　a　judgement　of　taste。

　　The　immediate　synthesis　of　the　representation　of　an　object　with　pleasure　can　only　be　a　matter　of　internal　perception；　and；　were　nothing　more　than　this　sought　to　be　indicated；　would　only　yield　a　mere　empirical　judgement。　For　with　no　representation　can　I　a　priori　connect　a　determinate　feeling　（of　pleasure　or　displeasure）　except　where　I　rely　upon　the　basis　of　an　a　priori　principle　in　reason　determining　the　will。　The　truth　is　that　the　pleasure　（in　the　moral　feeling）　is　the　consequence　of　the　determination　of　the　will　by　the　principle。　It　cannot；　therefore；　be　compared　with　the　pleasure　in　taste。　For　it　requires　a　determinate　concept　of　a　law：　whereas　the　pleasure　in　taste　has　to　be　connected　immediately　with　the　sample　estimate　prior　to　any　concept。　For　the　same　reason；　also；　all　judgements　of　taste　are　singular　judgements；　for　they　unite　their　predicate　of　delight；　not　to　a　concept；　but　to　a　given　singular　empirical　representation。　　　Hence；　in　a　judgement　of　taste；　what　is　represented　a　priori　as　a　universal　rule　for　the　judgement　and　as　valid　for　everyone；　is　not　the　pleasure　but　the　universal　validity　of　this　pleasure　perceived；　as　it　is；　to　be　combined　in　the　mind　with　the　mere　estimate　of　an　object。　A　judgement　to　the　effect　that　it　is　with　pleasure　that　I　perceive　and　estimate　some　object　is　an　empirical　judgement。　But　if　it　asserts　that　I　think　the　object　beautiful；　i。e。；　that　I　may　attribute　that　delight　to　everyone　as　necessary；　it　is　then　an　a　priori　judgement。

　　　　　　　　　　SS　38。　Deduction　of　judgements　of　taste。

　　Adm